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B.

INTRODUCTION

Risky rescues occur regularly.' Our modem mythology reflects the ideal

of the unknown stranger who comes into a community, performs a heroic
act such as a rescue, and then departs without more ado. To keep the heroes

unknown, the mythologists sometimes place them behind masks, such as for
t
This research was supported by a summer research stipend from Brooklyn Law
School. For very helpful comments, I thank Sam Murumba, Tony Sebok, and Larry Solan, and
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Richard Torres, and Michael Wigotsky. Participants at a Brooklyn Law School Faculty
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I.
Awards or recognition for civilian rescues by various entities number "946 non-risky
rescues ... and 243 risky rescues ... per year in the United States." David A. Hyman, Rescue
Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REv. 653, 668
(2006). "At least 78 Americans lose their lives every year as a result of attempting to rescue
someone else .... [Al substantial percentage of risky rescuers and a significant number of nonrisky rescuers were injured-sometimes quite severely." Id. at 668-69.
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Batman and Robin, Spider-Man, the Lone Ranger and Tonto,2 and even
Superman who, stretching credulity, is not recognizable as Clark Kent.3
Now in some sense these stars are not unknown strangers, because they are
known by their hero identities. To make them truly unknown, they would
have to disappear from town without any recognized identity at all.4
Furthermore, other than for the Lone Ranger and Tonto, these particular
stars reside in one community where they have become known as heroes.
Nevertheless, they approach our ideal heroes because they perform daring,
selfless, beneficent acts and do not remain around afterwards for public
adoration. Interestingly, they do not use their fame for any advantage,
reproductive or otherwise. In fact, even though Superman and Spider-Man
are portrayed as particularly inept at romance in their everyday identities,
they resist the benefit of divulging their true character to the objects of their
affections.5 They all do their duties disinterestedly. Kant, champion of the
obligation to perform duties not out of self-interest, would be proud of
them. Darwin, father of the notion of the "selfish gene," may be
confounded. 6
2.
While Tonto is not masked, as an Amerindian in the Western frontier, he is largely
"invisible" to the white community. Cf Benjamin R. Barber, Democratic Alternatives to the
Mullahs and the Malls: Citizenship in an Age of Global Anarchy, in 24 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 107, 110 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2004) ("[T]he new world was 'empty'
(the 'red man' was invisible in Europe's eyes, part of the continent's flora and fauna) .... ").
3.
1 leave it to my younger readers to add current "masked" comic book and television
heroes.
4.
For example, as the Lone Ranger and Tonto leave at the end of an adventure, we
would change the standard ending to this: "Who is that masked man?" "I haven't the slightest
idea." (Notice, it is not, "Who is that masked man and that Indian?")
5.
Ellickson has a somewhat different understanding of these heroic tales. "Popular
culture not only reinforces first-party preferences to enforce norms altruistically; it also tells
third parties that it is appropriate to reward enforcers after the fact. Superman elicits admiration

from Lois Lane; Batman, from Vicki Vail."

ROBERT

C.

ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW

238

(1991).
6.

Truly altruistic and self-sacrificing behavior "represents an evolutionary mistake for
RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 191
(1987). "Even if sainthood takes you into the biologically maladaptive, the Darwinian would
think this no more than the occasional price you pay for a first-class social-facilitating
mechanism like morality. Most of us admire saints, but feel no great pressure to follow them-

the individual showing it."

nor do we think we should."

MICHAEL RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY

244 (2d ed. 1998)

(citation omitted). "Saintliness is an attractive topic for preaching, but with little practical
persuasive force." John L. Mackie, The Law of the Jungle: MoralAlternatives and Principles of
Evolution, in PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 303, 312 (Michael Ruse ed., 1998). On the other hand,
perhaps we should knock religious saints down a peg, as people who are "just trying to get on
the right side of whatever god they believe in[.] Religious people sometimes claim that only
religion can guarantee genuine self-sacrifice; but this is baffling to the secular, since religions
nearly always promise that self-sacrifice now will reap enormous rewards later." JANET
RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN

156 (2000).
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The duty to rescue is commonly viewed as a moral obligation to be
undertaken irrespective of the rescuer's self-interest. If self-interest is
evident, the endeavor, even if extremely brave, may be considered less
praiseworthy. On the other hand, our visceral reactions may sometimes be
at odds with our idealized view of disinterested rescues. While we greatly
admire the stranger who heroically rescues a grandmother in dire distress,
our marvel is hardly diminished when the rescuer is her granddaughter. The
rescuer's strong emotional attachment to the rescuee, rather than grounds
for dismissing the rescue as merely self-interested and therefore amoral, is
seen as a wonderful manifestation of the love between them worthy of
celebration.
In this Article I examine the apparent inconsistency between our visceral
approval of risky rescues of those to whom one feels an attachment, and the
proposition that true moral conduct must not be done out of self-interest. I
begin with a brief look at the legal doctrine of "peril invites rescue,"
whereby rescuers are granted tort claims for actual damages directly against
parties who wrongfully put the rescuees at risk. No distinction is made here
between disinterested and self-interested rescues. I then turn to evolutionary
principles that, pursuant to the precept of the "selfish" gene, argue that in
particular circumstances it is in one's own biological interest to attempt
even dangerous rescues despite the personal risk, as where a person runs
into a burning building to pull out her children.7 This genetic self-interest
may well be a primary source of our emotional approval of such conduct.
Next, focusing on the predictions of evolutionary psychology regarding
rescues, I scrutinize them through the lenses of the most commonly
espoused moral systems, utilitarianism and Kantianism. Looking to some of
their unsettled principles, I conclude that the evolutionary "selfish" drive to
act "altruistically" only in particular, genetically self-interested
circumstances fits with surprising comfort within the fuzzy fringes of
standard moral theory.

7.
In another article I discuss the legal doctrine of "peril invites rescue" and the main
evolutionary principles that predict when rescues are likely to be undertaken. See Bailey Kuklin,
Peril Invites Rescue: An Evolutionary Perspective, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 171 (2006). Unfortunately, the reported rescue cases reveal insufficient information to discern whether, in practice,
actual rescue cases tend to align with evolutionary predictions.
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THE RESCUE DOCTRINE AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

A.

"PerilInvites Rescue"

The rescue doctrine, often stated as "peril invites rescue" or "danger
invites rescue," is well established in the law. If one person wrongfully puts
another's property or person at risk, a rescuer has a direct cause of action
against the wrongdoer for actual harm to herself arising from the rescue
attempt, whether or not it is successful.8 The rescuee's negligence is not a
defense raisable by a third-party tortfeasor and also subjects the rescuee
herself to liability to the rescuer. While the rescuer must avoid contributory
negligence, the courts are generous to such an actor in ruling on the
question.9
Although the courts are charitable to rescuers in determining
contributory negligence, when granting damages, in accord with the
standard tort remedy,"0 they simply return the rescuer to her ex ante
position."1 The common law provides no bounties for rescues. Perhaps
virtue is reckoned to be its own reward, 2 or inducements are thought to be
unnecessary. 3 Nevertheless, some recognition is provided by private
8. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 445 cmt. d, illus. 4 (1965); DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 456 (2000); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 266-67 (1999); 4 FOWLER
V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 160 n.41 (2d ed. 1986).
9.
See DOBBS, supra note 8, at 456; EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 134; JOHN G. FLEMING, THE
LAW OF TORTS 157 (7th ed. 1987); 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 8, at 209-10, 210 n.36.
10. See FLEMING, supra note 9, at 208.
11. Id. at 206-08.
12. One court similarly challenged the grant of any relief to the rescuer. It rejected a
recovery in restitution for a person who rescued lumber at risk of being carried away by the
tides after having been accidentally loosened, reasoning that "it is better for the public that these
voluntary acts of benevolence from one man to another, which are charities and moral duties,
but not legal duties, should depend altogether for their reward upon the moral duty of gratitude."
Nicholson v. Chapman, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 536, 539 (C.P.D.), quoted in John D. McCamus,
Necessitous Intervention: The Altruistic Intermeddler and the Law of Restitution, 11 OTTAWA L.
REv. 297, 302 (1979). Some commentators relatedly question the affirmative duty to rescue:
Another moral argument sometimes made against imposing a duty to
rescue is that the imposition of a legal duty to rescue might impoverish the
moral quality of rescue, because it would be hard for either the rescuer or
third parties to know with certainty whether the rescue was motivated by
moral beliefs or by the fear of legal sanctions.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 647, 682
(2002).
13. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65, 103 (1985). See
generally KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM (1996) (arguing that altruists
simply have a different perspective than rational actors). "Since the enforcement of a legal claim
for compensation is costly even if the claim is settled rather than litigated, we predict that a
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organizations and governmental authorities. 14 Evolutionary psychology
instructs us that nature may provide other positive inducements.
B. EvolutionaryPsychology
Evolutionary psychology studies behavior from an evolutionary
perspective. 5 Evolution itself is generally understood today from the
perspective of the "selfish" gene. 16 Because more organisms are produced
than can survive and reproduce in this world of limited resources and
conflict, those that have advantageous traits are more likely to leave their
genes behind in the gene pool via descendants and other relatives who share
their genes. 7 From the gene's viewpoint, a successful gene is "selfish" in
the metaphorical sense that it increases its chances of continued survival if
it predisposes its organism to characteristics and behavior that protect the
gene. This implies that a gene would incline its organism to altruistic
behavior only to the extent that this conduct ultimately acts to the gene's
own benefit. But since evolution works incrementally over very long
periods of time, the predisposed behavior of humans today was largely
shaped during the period when our ancestors were struggling as huntergatherers on the African savanna. 8 To infer current behavioral inclinations,
legal system concerned with maximizing efficiency would refuse to grant compensation in
rescue situations where altruism provided a strong inducement to rescue attempts." William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 95 (1978). For analysis, see id. at
95-100.
14. See Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law
Impose a Duty to Help Endangered Persons or Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
991, 996-99 (2000) (identifying private and government incentives and help for rescuers);
Hyman, supra note 1, at 666 ("This Article describes approximately 20 different entities that
provided data on awards or recognition for civilian rescue."); Christopher H. White, Comment,
No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Case for Reform of the Rescue Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 507, 529-30 (2002) (describing government protections and incentives for rescuers).
15. See generally CHRISTOPHER BADCOCK, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (2000); DAVID
M. Buss, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (1999); JOHN CARTWRIGHT, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (2000); HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (Charles Crawford & Dennis
L. Krebs eds., 1998).
16. The seminal tracts are GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION
(1966) and RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (new ed. 1989).
17. See WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 22-34.
18. The circumstance in which humans evolved is called the environment of evolutionary
adaptedness ("EEA"). See, e.g., ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 37-39 (1994); Donald
Symons, On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior, in THE
ADAPTED MIND 137, 143-44 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992). For questions about the
concept of the EEA, see KEVIN N. LALAND & GILLIAN R. BROWN, SENSE AND NONSENSE:
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 177-82 (2002).
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one must understand human survival and reproductive needs in those distant
conditions. Accordingly, three main forms of altruistic behavior relevant to
the rescue doctrine have been investigated by evolutionary psychologists:
kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection. I outline these three
in turn, pointing out the behavior of a rescuer that would be expected by the
application of each of these notions.
1. Kin Selection
A selfish gene is interested not only in its own organism, but also in
those organisms in which identical copies of it reside. These are, quite
likely, relatives. It may therefore promote itself by making its own organism
fitter to cope with the conditions it confronts as well as by inclining the
organism to favor the other organisms with its copies, as where siblings are
disposed to advance the interests of one other. The gene's stake in its copies
in related organisms is the essence of kin selection. 9
The gene, through its own organism, cannot directly perceive which
other organisms contain copies of it. Yet it can make estimates. 2' The more
closely the other organism is related, the more its genes overlap, and thus,
the more likely any particular variation of the gene (i.e., allele) will reside in
the other organism's genome. In this regard, identical twins share 100% of
their genes, siblings, parents and offspring share 50%, grandparents,
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces and nephews share 25%, and, first
cousins share 12.5%. Since humans cannot directly perceive kinship, other
mechanisms must serve as proxies. Empirically, persons are more likely to
be related if they are raised in the same household, or, historically, lived
nearby, or even simply knew one another, or looked alike.2" Thus kin
19. Kin selection is "[t]he selection of genes due to one or more individuals favoring or
disfavoring the survival and reproduction of relatives (other than offspring) who possess the
same genes by common descent." EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 587 (1975). See
generally BADCOCK, supra note 15, at 85-88; DAVID P. BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR
79-93 (1977); Buss, supra note 15, at 222-49; CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 74-78; HELENA
CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE PEACOCK 293-310 (1991); ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION
45-47, 169-202 (1985).
20. It is a common convention among evolutionists to anthropomorphize the gene by
giving it interests, desires, and other human characteristics. This is metaphoric shorthand.
21. See C. R. BADCOCK, THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM 75 (1986); CARTWRIGHT, supra note
15, at 80-82; DAWKINS, supra note 16, at 89-90; W. D. HAMILTON, Selection of Selfish and
Altruistic Behaviour in Some Extreme Models, in NARROW ROADS OF GENE LAND 198, 211
(1996); R. PAUL SHAW & YUWA WONG, GENETIC SEEDS OF WARFARE 27, 39 (1989); Charles
Crawford, Psychology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 303, 310-11 (Mary Maxwell
ed., 1991). But still, the uncertainty in discerning relatedness may challenge the claim that kin
selection supports morality. See ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, DARWINISM IN PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL
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selection implies that the choice to encounter risks for another should take
into account one's familiarity with, or resemblance to, her.
Copies in other organisms are not all equally valuable to a gene. The
value of the copy turns on the extent to which it is able to promote
replication of the gene. In the rescue context, it is not beneficial to a gene to
put itself at risk for a copy in an organism that is going nowhere reproductively, as where the organism is beyond its breeding years and is incapable
of aiding other copies to reproduce. Thus, under kin selection, it is in a
gene's interest to take risks for relatives not only in proportion to their
relatedness, but also to the extent that the relatives have their reproductive
and assisting years ahead. Reproductive factors beyond age also count,
which in the modern world relate to such things as the rescuee's attractiveness and wealth, and her educational, vocational, and social
accomplishments.
But relatives are not the only persons who may be of help. Even total
strangers may perform invaluable services. This possibility takes us to the
next way in which the selfish gene may prosper through risk-taking:
reciprocal altruism.
2.

Reciprocal Altruism

Reciprocal altruism pursues the idea that genetic success can be
enhanced by obtaining the future support of others, even if they are

SCIENCE AND POLICY 130-32 (2000). On the other hand, this uncertainty "may be fortunate ...
because it may enlarge the circle of recipients of kin-selected altruism." Dennis L. Krebs, The

Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 15, at
337, 354. Perhaps uncertainty is not required for the enlargement. "The actual explanation of the
extent of our previous instinctive caring may be the mechanism of kin selection, but (in the
absence of evolutionary knowledge) it will not be obvious why biological relationships bear
such significance." ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES 277 (2001). "[R]elatives may be more likely
to cooperate with you or come to your aid in situations of need, but shouldn't that then be the
basis of caring for others: care for those who are likely to cooperate with you or to come to your
aid in need?" Id. at 277-78. By understanding this beneficial caring behavior, "the appropriate
domain of that behavior may get extended, eventually (by some) to include all of humanity." Id.
at 278. In general, "once ethics of some sort exists, once our normative boxes and operators are
in place and prepared to receive content, and once our evaluative capacities are functioning,
ethics can get extended beyond its originating function." Id. Others have had similar thoughts.
See, e.g., ERNST MAYR, TOWARD A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 81-85 (1988) (arguing that
reason and culture lead humans to extend altruism beyond inclusive fitness); PETER SINGER,
THE EXPANDING CIRCLE 139 (1981) (explaining modem altruism towards strangers comes from
the human capacity to reason, thereby "bring[ing] with it an appreciation of the reasons for
extending to strangers the concern we feel for our kin and our friends"); see also infra note 64
and accompanying text.
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unrelated, by helping them in their own times of need.22 This reciprocation
may occur directly or indirectly, as where one person saves another from
drowning, who in turn feeds a starving person, who then pulls the original
rescuer's child from a burning building.23 I examine this principle in greater

detail because it squarely involves the morals, norms and related emotions
that this Article addresses.
Because reciprocal altruism depends on the expectation of future

reciprocation, the possibility of free-riding is worrisome. In the situations
under consideration, once a rescue is effectuated, the rescuee and her
supporters may simply decline to reciprocate, directly or indirectly. With
this as a risk, the establishment of the practice of reciprocal altruism is

threatened at square one.
However, the threat of free-riding is reduced by several factors. Norms
can overcome the temptation to cheat.2 4 Social mores induce people to
cooperate. 5 Religious and moral feelings may engender guilt and shame in
shirkers.26 The moral sensibilities of others also produce psychic sticks.
22. Reciprocal altruism is "[t]he trading of altruistic acts by individuals at different times.
For example, one person saves a drowning person in exchange for the promise (or at least the
expectation) that his altruistic act will be repaid if the circumstances are reversed at some time
in the future." WILSON, supra note 19, at 593. The elements are: "1. The exchanged acts, while
beneficial to the recipient, are costly to the performer. 2. There is a time lag between giving and
receiving. 3. Giving is contingent on receiving." FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED 24 (1996).
See generally BADCOCK, supra note 15, at 102-06; BARASH, supra note 19, at 94-96; Buss,
supra note 15, at 253-77; CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 84-88; CRONIN, supra note 19, at 25365; TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 47-49; Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of ReciprocalAltruism,
46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1971).
23. See BADCOCK, supra note 15, at 105-06; BOBBI S. Low, WHY SEX MATTERS 152
(2000); Trivers, supra note 22, at 39.
24. "[S]election may favor learning from the altruistic and cheating experiences of others,
helping others coerce cheaters, forming multiparty exchange systems, and formulating rules for
regulated exchanges in such multiparty systems." Trivers, supra note 22, at 52. "In short,
selection may favor the elaboration of norms of reciprocal conduct." Id.; see also JOHN
MAYNARD SMITH, THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION 184 (3d ed. 1975) (explaining "how a group
comes to consist wholly of altruistic individuals in the first place, since in a mixed group
altruism will be eliminated by selection," through an answer that, among more intelligent social
mammals, "the difference between altruism and selfishness may be a matter of education and
not of genetics, so that altruism may be spread by education to all members of a group").
25. In general, social norms are partly "sustained by the emotions that are triggered when
they are violated: embarrassment, guilt and shame in the violator; anger and indignation in the
observers." JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 113 (1989). For example,
altruistic behaviors "save altruists from the future pain and suffering that would have been
caused by loss or shame upon not behaving altruistically." ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES'
ERROR 176 (1994).
26. To recapture the benefits of possible future aid when a person has been cut off for
cheating, "the cheater should be selected to make up for the misdeed and to show convincing
evidence that future cheating is not planned; in short, a reparative gesture is called for."
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Ostracism and moralistic aggression against slackers" or those who decline
to punish them2" raise the cost of defection. This moral reaction may stem
TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 389. The emotion of guilt may have been selected partly "to motivate

the cheater to compensate his misdeed and to behave reciprocally in the future, and thus to
prevent the rupture of reciprocal relationships." Trivers, supra note 22, at 50; see BADCOCK,
supra note 15, at 104 ("Guilt can be seen as an internal warning of the likely negative responses
of others to your own cheating, and feelings of remorse clearly motivate attempts at reparation
where the damage has already been done."); BADCOCK, supra note 21, at 40 ("Even anger
directed at oneself in the form of guilt and remorseful feelings" may serve to mollify others for
reciprocal failures by inducing "some act of reparation or expiation in one's own interests.");
VICTOR S. JOHNSTON, WHY WE FEEL 84 (1999) (explaining that guilt helps monitor reciprocal
altruism); RICHARD JOYCE, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY 111 (2006) ("The hypothesis.., is
that natural selection opted for a special motivational mechanism for this realm [of cooperative
behavior]: moral conscience."); STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 404 (1997) ("Guilt can
rack a cheater who is in danger of being found out. ... [The cheater] has an interest in
preventing the rupture by making up for the misdeed and keeping it from happening again.");
TRIVERS, supra note 19; Robert H. Frank, Economics, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION,
supra note 21, at 91, 96-102 (explaining that "irrational" emotions, such as vengeance, envy,
and guilt, when known to others, facilitate cooperation); Nicholas Agar, Agar's Review of Katz,
17 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 123, 133 (2002) (book review) ("According to psychologists the primary
function of regretting a missed opportunity is to identify conditions that will facilitate taking
similar opportunities in future. A bonobo that regrets not helping the victim of violence will be
more likely to come to the aid of future victims."). In general, "a great deal of the time it is our
emotions that are driving our moral judgments .... JOYCE, supra,at 130.
Since studies show that reparative altruistic behavior occurs only when others know of the
cheating, see TRIVERS, supra note 19, in accordance with some commentators, one might more
properly refer to the cheater's emotion as shame, a reaction to public disapprobation or external
standards of conduct, rather than guilt, which relates to internal concerns of conscience. See,
e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 360, 401 (1973) ("Shame is the feeling of disgrace and humiliation which follows
upon a transgression found out; guilt is the feeling of secret badness attendant upon one not, or
not yet, found out."); PINKER, supra, at 405 (noting that shame is "the reaction to a transgression
after it has been discovered"); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 277 (1981);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 445 (1971); Jon Elster, Weakness of Will and the FreeRider Problem, I ECON. & PHIL. 231, 246 (1985).
27. "[T]he psychological system underlying human reciprocal altruism... might select for
friendliness towards altruists, but . . . 'moralistic aggression' against cheats," moralistic
aggression being resentful anger. BADCOCK, supra note 21, at 39. "Anger protects a person
whose niceness has left her vulnerable to being cheated." PINKER, supra note 26, at 404. "Many
psychologists have remarked that anger has moral overtones; almost all anger is righteous
anger." Id.; see JOHNSTON, supra note 26, at 84 (finding that anger helps monitor reciprocal
altruism). See generally Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Punishment Allows the Evolution of
Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups, 13 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1992);
Michael E. Price et al., Punitive Sentiment as an Anti-Free Rider Psychological Device, 23
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 203 (2002). "A strong reciprocator has an initial predisposition to
cooperate with other cooperators, and retaliates against non-cooperators by punishing them,
even when this behaviour cannot be justified in terms of long-run self (or extended kin)
interest." Herbert Gintis, Group Selection and Human Prosociality,in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS
OF MORALITY 215, 216 (Leonard D. Katz ed., 2000). Human moralistic aggression and
indignation counteract the emotional rewards of unreciprocated altruism, and educate and deter
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from an innate sense of fairness or justice. 9 While the morality of rescue is
taken up below, it has been posited that the quality of virtue or morality has

been driven largely by reciprocal altruism.3"
Nevertheless, as life in the modern world attests, norms alone are not
enough to guarantee cooperative behavior.3 1 Emotions not tied to norms can
also facilitate reciprocation.32 Indeed, the very function of emotions in

the nonreciprocator. See Trivers, supra note 22, at 49. Cooperators may seek retribution against
noncooperators. "Such retribution can take many forms including noncooperators being
physically attacked, being made the victim of gossip ... or being denied access to some
important resource." Lee A. Dugatkin, Cooperation in Animals: An Evolutionary Overview, 17

BIOLOGY & PHIL. 459, 472 (2002).
reputation." Id. (citing evidence that
"rules").
28. "In many systems, cheating is
but also anyone who fails to punish

"Punishment may also be linked to cooperation via
even some animals punish one another for violating

further discouraged by the rule: punish not only cheaters
cheaters." Low, supra note 23, at 153; see ROBERT
AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 55 (1997) ("By linking vengefulness against
nonpunishers with vengefulness against defectors, the metanorm provides a mechanism by
which the norm against defection becomes self-policing.").
29. See TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 389. Trivers "believe[s] that a sense of fairness has
evolved in human beings as the standard against which to measure the behavior of other people,
so as to guard against cheating in reciprocal relationships." Id. at 388. Referring to indirect
reciprocation, he contends that a sense of justice is especially needed:
[I]n species such as our own in which a system of multi-party altruism
may operate so that an individual does not necessarily receive reciprocal
benefits from the individual aided but may receive the return from third
parties. This sense of justice involves two components: individuals share a
common standard or sense of fairness, and infractions of this standard are
associated with strong emotional reactions and aggressive impulses.
Id. at 389. See generally THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW (Roger

D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992).
30.

See infra note 64.

31. Among the strategies for promoting cooperation are to "enlarge the shadow of the
future," "teach reciprocity," "insist on no more than equity," "respond quickly to provocation,"
and "cultivate a personal reputation as a reciprocator." Buss, supra note 15, at 258 (Box 9-1).
"Enlarge the shadow of the future" means indicating, through actions or commitments, that the
parties will often interact in the extended future; "respond quickly to provocation" means
retaliating quickly when the cooperator defects. Id.
32. See generally Daniel M. T. Fessler & Kevin J. Haley, The Strategy of Affect: Emotions
in Human Cooperation, in GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (Peter

Hammerstein ed., 2003). "Emotions appear to be a key determinant of behavior in cooperative
relationships. Emotions affect behavior both directly, by motivating action, and indirectly, as
actors anticipate others' emotional responses." Id. "Different emotions affect cooperative
behavior in different ways: some emotions lead actors to forego the temptation to defect, some
lead them to reciprocate harm suffered or benefits provided, and some lead them to repair
damaged relationships." Id. In this chapter the authors "discuss[] thirteen emotions that seem to
have the greatest impact on cooperation," including romantic love, gratitude, anger, envy, guilt,
righteousness, contempt, and, shame and pride. Id. at 7, 9-21.
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general may be to promote one's evolutionary fitness.33 In the context of

reciprocal altruism, emotional inducements to respond to another's need,
beyond those mentioned above, spring from gratitude for prior aid,34 as well
as sympathy for the plight of the person in distress. 35 Liking a person
33. Emotions can be defined "as qualitatively different conscious states that have evolved
to represent the nature, magnitude, and direction of expected threats or benefits to some aspect
of our personal fitness." JOHNSTON, supra note 26, at 86 (emphasis added). "[E]motions are
adaptations .. " PINKER, supra note 26, at 370. Various studies lead:
[T]o the conclusion that the human mind contains evolved emotional and
motivational mechanisms that are specifically targeted to address adaptive
problems involved in parenting, emotional communication with infants and
adults, kinship, mate choice, sexual attraction, aggression, the avoidance of
danger, mate guarding, effort allocation in child care, and so on.
John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED
MIND, supra note 18, at 19, 99. "The problem with the emotions is not that they are untamed
forces or vestiges of our animal past; it is that they were designed to propagate copies of the
genes that built them rather than to promote happiness, wisdom, or moral values." PINKER,
supra note 26, at 370. Deceit in the form of sham emotions, such as sham generosity, anger,
guilt, and shame, may do the work of real emotions by provoking beneficial responses from
others. Id. at 405; Trivers, supra note 22, at 50. Thus, to discriminate between real and sham
emotions, trust and distrust evolved, which then escalated the "cognitive arms race," see
Trivers, supra note 22, at 50, even leading to self-deception as a means to better deceive others.
See PINKER, supra note 26, at 405, 421-23; TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 415-20. See generally
Randolph M. Nesse & Alan T. Lloyd, The Evolution of Psychodynamic Mechanisms, in THE
ADAPTED MIND, supra note 18, at 601. On the other hand, Elster contends that some emotions
may actually reduce evolutionary fitness, as where they interfere with physical performance or
cool reasoning. See JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS 46-50 (1999). Regarding the nature of
emotions, see generally id. and JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE
EMOTIONS (1999).
34. Trivers "think[s] the emotion of gratitude has been selected to regulate human
responses to altruistic acts, and that the emotion is sensitive to the cost/benefit ratio of such
acts." TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 388; see Trivers, supra note 22, at 49 (similar language).
"Psychologists have shown that human beings reciprocate more when the original act was
expensive for the benefactor, even though the benefit given is the same." TRIVERS, supra note
19, at 389; see BADCOCK, supra note 15, at 104 ("Sociological findings suggest that the greater
the need of the recipient of altruism and the scarcer the resources of the altruist, the greater will
be the tendency of the recipient to reciprocate."); PINKER, supra note 26, at 404 ("Gratitude
calibrates the desire to reciprocate according to the costs and benefits of the original act. We are
grateful to people when their favor helps us a lot and has cost them a lot.").
35. Trivers also "believe[s] the emotion of sympathy has been selected to motivate
altruistic behavior as a function of the plight of the recipient of the behavior." TRIVERS, supra
note 19, at 388-89; see Trivers, supra note 22, at 49 (similar language). Feeling sympathy for a
cooperator increases the cost of defecting. See Robert H. Frank, Regulating Sexual Behavior:
Richard Posner's Sex and Reason, in LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 149, 156 (Lawrence
A. Frolik ed., 1999). "Because of this cost, the person who sympathizes with his trading
partners is less likely to defect, and is thus more likely to reap the long-run gains of
cooperation." Id.; see PINKER, supra note 26, at 404 ("Sympathy, the desire to help those in
need, may be an emotion for earning gratitude. If people are most grateful when they most need
the favor, a person in need is an opportunity to make an altruistic act go farthest."). "If the
cost/benefit ratio is important in determining the value of co-operation, the emotions of
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motivates aiding her.36 In 37general, feeling good about reciprocating reduces,
even outweighs, its costs.

Yet even norms and emotions together are no guarantee of
reciprocation. 3' Therefore, rescues driven by reciprocal altruism would also
be informed by other factors affecting the likelihood of later reciprocation.

Beyond the question of whether the rescuer herself is likely to be in need of
a future rescue,39 these factors encompass the probable inclination to
gratitude and sympathy could be seen as having evolved to motivate reciprocity, and to be
sensitive to the net cost or benefit in each particular case." BADCOCK, supra note 15, at 104. But
cf C. Daniel Batson, Unto Others: A Service... and a Disservice, in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS
OF MORALITY, supra note 27, at 207, 209 ("To the best of my knowledge, there is at present no
plausible egoistic explanation of the motivation to help evoked by empathy.").
36. "Liking is the emotion that initiates and maintains an altruistic partnership. It is,
roughly, a willingness to offer someone a favor, and is directed to those who appear willing to
offer favors back." PINKER, supra note 26, at 404. "The tendency to like others, not necessarily
closely related, to form friendships and to act altruistically toward friends and toward those one
likes will be selected for as the immediate emotional rewards motivating altruistic behavior and
the formation of altruistic partnerships." Trivers, supra note 22, at 48; see TRIVERS, supra note
19, at 388 (similar language).
37. One study found that kin selection and reciprocal altruism predict rescue intentions
more than do the psychological satisfactions of the rescuer. See Daniel J. Kruger, Evolution and
Altruism: Combining Psychological Mediators with Naturally Selected Tendencies, 24
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 118, 118-24 (2003). When aid is given primarily to alleviate one's
own distress from knowledge of another's suffering, Jane Goodall wonders, "Does this mean,
then, that we act altruistically only to soothe our own consciences? That our helping, in the final

analysis, is but a selfish desire to set our minds at rest?"

JANE GOODALL, THROUGH A WINDOW

214 (1990). But she demurs to this reductionism. "The very fact that we feel distressed by the
plight of individuals we have never met, says it all." Id. at 215. Well, not quite. Perhaps "what
matters to society is whether people are likely to be nice to each other, not their motives." MATT
RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE

21 (1996). Or we could finesse the problem this way:

"Typically, altruistichelping is defined as voluntary action, intended to benefit another, that is
not performed with the expectation of receiving external rewards or avoiding external aversive
reactions or punishments." Patricia A. Oswald, The Effects of Cognitive and Affective
Perspective Taking on Empathic Concern and Altruistic Helping, 136 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 613,
615 (1996) (second and third emphases added). Or again: "Psychological altruism, as many
philosophers have recognized, is not a matter of going against one's dominant desires but rather
having dominant desires that are directed towards others." Philip Kitcher, Psychological
Altruism, Evolutionary Origins, and Moral Rules, 89 PHIL. STUD. 283, 291 (1998) (footnote
omitted). Still, "[t]he discovery that tendencies to altruism are shaped by benefits to genes is one
of the most disturbing in the history of science." Randolph Nesse, Why Is Group Selection Such
a Problem?, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 633, 633 (1994). Moreover, because we evolved to be
sensitive to those who are calculatingly self-interested, "[w]e are programmed to deeply

distrust-or even detest-the theory of sociobiology."

ALISON JOLLY, LUCY'S LEGACY

110

(1999). In the end, the moral conundrum remains. See generally RIDLEY, supra.
38. Nevertheless "[a] considerable body of evidence suggests that many people, in many
different societies, and under many different social conditions, including complete anonymity,
behave like the strong reciprocator." Gintis, supra note 27, at 217 (reviewing some of the
evidence); see, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, Cheaters and Chumps, Ill NAT. HIST. 20 (2002).
39. For example, one court reasons:
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reciprocate of the rescuee and her supporters, as well as their opportunity to
do so. 40 Among the many relevant details are whether the rescuee is young
or old, strong or weak, brave or cowardly, magnanimous or egoistic,
trustworthy or oblivious, popular or alienated, and whether she is a stranger,
community member, neighbor, friend, or fellow householder. For example,
a middle-aged, daring companion who has helped others before is more
likely to reciprocate than is an elderly, fearful, antisocial outsider.
Despite the improbability that a particular rescue would be reciprocated,
community norms may nevertheless prescribe the attempt.41 At first glance,
norms seem to arise from community interests, 42 not individual ones, as in
the utilitarian mandate to sacrifice the welfare of particular persons for the
overall benefit of the community. The adoption of such norms appears to
run up against the implications of the selfish gene. 43 To explain this, one
Construction work by its very nature is "dangerous." Manifestly, then, the
salutary "danger invites rescue" precept has special significance in the
construction field because of the close-knit relationship among workers (akin
to that among firemen, policemen, etc.) and the interdependence required of
the workers for their mutual safety. There is often no time for outside help;
workers have no choice but to aid their fellows.
Rivera v. Sealand Contractors Corp., 630 N.Y.S.2d 899, 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (citations
omitted); see Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 297 N.Y.S. 639, 644 (N.Y. App. Div.
1969) ("These men were dependent upon one another and responded in a manner consistent
with their relationship as a crew.").
40. This may give rise to what has been called the banker's paradox, whereby "when we
need help the most, we are often least able to reciprocate." Joan B. Silk, Cooperation Without
Counting: The Puzzle of Friendship,in GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION,
supra note 32, at 37, 48. Like bankers who prefer to lend money to those who need it least,
since they are the lowest credit risks, rescuers may prefer to rescue those least likely to find
themselves at risk, for they may be the ones more likely to reciprocate. Id.
41. Etzioni found "no widely accepted definition of 'community,"' but sees it as implying
two required attributes: "first, a web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals,
relationships that often crisscross and reinforce one another . . . .and second, a measure of
commitment to a set of shared values, norms and meanings, and a shared history and identityin short, to a particular culture." Amitai Etzioni, Survey Article: On Social and Moral Revival, 9
J. POL. PHIL. 356, 359 (2001) (footnote omitted). The practice of reciprocal altruism seems
almost implicit in this description.
42. "A norm is an organized or institutionalized pattern of social rewards and punishments
for doing or not doing A in circumstances C. A norm, then, corresponds to a normative
statement that is generally enforced." NozICK, supra note 21, at 247. But sociologists and
anthropologists "disagree about the precise definition of norms." Id. at 238.
43. See, e.g., Kermyt G. Anderson, Relatedness and Investment in Children in South
Africa, 16 HUM. NATURE 1, 3 (2005) ("[S]ocial rules can and do override the obligations
imposed by genetic relatedness [kin selection]."). But one must not be too quick to conclude
that norms may not be in the interest of individuals, or particular individuals. Nozick sees norms
as "facilitat[ing] cooperation to mutual benefit." NOZICK, supra note 21, at 251. A particular
norm may be adopted because it "can be followed more easily, or because its violations can be
detected more easily, or because it is less costly in time, energy, or resources to follow it-these
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might turn to the minority view that group selection also operates in natural
selection, at least to some extent.44 But before retreating to this or another
position to understand why a resourceful, self-reliant person would feel the
urge to take a risk to rescue a person unlikely to reciprocate, we should
consider other potential evolutionary benefits to the rescuer. This takes us to
the next topic, sexual selection.

3.

Sexual Selection

Evolutionary success is measured by the extent one's genes persist in the
gene pool. Reproduction, not merely survival, is the touchstone. While kin
selection meets this goal indirectly and reciprocal altruism facilitates it,
mating is the more direct route. For this, one needs a mate. The processes of

factors fit with the rubric of facilitating mutual benefit." Id. That a norm may benefit some
persons to the detriment of others may be because "these people had the greater resources or
greater power or greater authority to affect which norm got instituted." Id.; see William Irons,
Anthropology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 21, at 71, 77 (prompting
study of "the prediction that people will try to influence the social rules and other aspects of
their culture in such a way as to promote their reproductive interests."). In discussing morality
in light of the self-centered aspect of evolution, Alexander writes that individuals would benefit
from the completely moral behavior of others. See Richard D. Alexander, Biology and the
Moral Paradoxes, in LAW, BIOLOGY AND CULTURE 101, 107 (Margaret Gruter & Paul
Bohannan eds., 1983) [hereinafter Alexander, Moral Paradoxes] ("Any ideally moral person
would incidentally 'help' every other person in the society, however slightly, to achieve the
goals that evolutionists believe have driven evolution by natural selection, because he would
hurt himself (a competitor) by dispensing his beneficence indiscriminately."); see R. D.
Alexander, A Biological Interpretation of Moral Systems, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS
179, 190 (Paul Thompson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Alexander, Moral Systems]. "One way of
[encouraging others to be moral] is to designate as heroes (i.e. as appropriate targets for special
rewards) those who most closely approach the ideal moral condition." Alexander, Moral
Paradoxes,supra, at 107.
44. See, e.g., ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID S. WILSON, UNTO OTHERS (1998). But see, e.g.,
TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 67-85 ("The Group Selection Fallacy"); John Alroy et al., Open Peer
Commentary, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 608 (1994). See generally THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY
147-220 (David L. Hull & Michael Ruse eds., 1998) (Part III: Units of Selection). "For altruism
to evolve through group selection, groups composed of individuals inclined to sacrifice
themselves for the sake of their groups must prevail over groups containing more selfish
individuals ...." Krebs, supra note 21, at 355; see EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE 258
(1998) (noting that, under mathematical models of population genetics, "[i]f the reduction of
survival and reproduction of individuals due to genes for altruism is more than offset by the
increased probability of survival of the group due to the altruism, the altruism genes will rise in
frequency throughout the entire population of competing groups"). "[M]ost biologists believe
that few, if any, species have met [this condition]." Krebs, supra note 2 1, at 355.
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competing with others of the same sex for a mate and being chosen by the
desired mate is known as sexual selection.45
Males and females provide different basic resources to the reproductive
endeavor. Among mammals, the female supplies the egg, internally gestates
it, and nurses the offspring, perhaps for years. At least in human ancestral
times, it seems that nurturing of the offspring was also largely a female task.
Of necessity and tradition, a woman invests much in her offspring. The
male, on the other hand, can leave descendants simply by supplying a
minimal investment: the sperm. As straight economic theory would then
suggest, males must compete with other males for the more valuable
biological resources provided by females.4 6 But since human males usually
supply more than simply sperm to the mating enterprise, for favored
females will typically not mate with them otherwise, females also must
attract preferred mates. Females compete with one another for the males
who can better assure their reproductive success. All this falls within the
evolutionary principle of sexual selection.
Because men and women bring different resources and play different
roles in the reproductive process, their biological interests do not entirely
coincide. For example, because a woman is severely limited in the number
of her potential offspring, indiscriminate promiscuity is of limited
biological benefit to her.47 On the other hand, because a man can sire many
offspring, indiscriminate promiscuity may offer him large biological
benefits. A female, then, is interested in superior matings in order to assure
that her relatively few offspring are more promising breeders themselves,

45. There are two forms of sexual selection: "intersexual selection (often typified by
female choice of males) and intrasexual selection (often typified by the male-male competition
for access to females)." DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 103 (1991); see DAVID M.
Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE 3 (1994); Buss, supra note 15, at 385; JAMES L. GOULD &
CAROL G. GOULD, SEXUAL SELECTION 86 (2d ed. 1997); Low, supra note 23, at 22-23. See
generally BADCOCK, supra note 15, at 149-88; BARASH, supra note 19, at 152-72;
CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 124-56; CRONIN, supra note 19, at 111-249 (Part 11: The
Peacock).
46. See, e.g., GEOFFREY MILLER, THE MATING MIND 86 (2000); David M. Buss, The
Psychology of Human Mate Selection: Exploring the Complexity of the Strategic Repertoire, in
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 15, at 405, 410-11.
47. The modem availability of easy, dependable contraceptives has altered this calculus.
This aside, there are times in which matings outside a marriage may be beneficial to women.
See JEROME H. BARKOW, DARWIN, SEX, AND STATUS 338-39 (1989) (discussing better genes for
offspring, genetic diversity, reproduction if mate is infertile, resource accrual, protection, mate
replacement if disabled); BUSS, supra note 45, at 177-82 (discussing resource accrual, better
genes, mate switching, mating skills acquisition, mate manipulation); Buss, supra note 46, at
417-18 (same).

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

while a male is not only interested in high quality offspring, but also gains
simply from quantity, even if he fails to support them.48
The behavior of men and women reflects their own biological interests
as affected by the interests of their mates. As a pair-bonding species, the
traits they seek in mates are mostly the same.4 9 But not entirely. Women
tend to emphasize the finding of mates who will contribute more to the
success of their offspring. For this, the men must be willing and able to aid,
protect and nurture their mates and progeny. As relates to the rescue
doctrine, these traits preferred in a man include: good financial prospects;
social status; ambition and industriousness; size, strength, bravery and
athletic ability; dependability and stability, love and commitment; kindness;
and, health.5" Even for a woman only seeking "good genes" from a mating,
not a long-term mate, many of these traits would be preferred insofar as
they have a genetic component. Men, on the other hand, differ from women
by their disposition to value more greatly their mate's ability to produce and
raise many children, which turns on the woman's youth and health,51 as well
as her mothering skills. 2 Indicators of these first two traits include beauty
and vivacity.5 3 For simply a mating, on the other hand, men's inclined
preferences are quite minimal.
Depending on the circumstances, perhaps all the traits listed above that
are generally sought by a woman in a mate may be revealed in various
rescue efforts. This is partially the case because the honor bestowed on
daring rescuers by society may lead to increased status and financial
prospects. The traits sought in a wife-youth and health-may indeed be
revealed by a rescue effort, but it seems that there are adequate ways for a
woman to display these traits without undertaking risky rescues. For a man,
on the contrary, it seems that risky rescues offer a more effective
opportunity to display, and even increase, the preferred traits to a wide
range of potential mates. Thus, under sexual selection, it appears that men,

48.

See ROBERT TRIVERS, ParentalInvestment and Reproductive Success, in NATURAL
56, 74 (2002).
49. Men and women both prefer "partners who are intelligent, kind, understanding, and
healthy ... [and] who share their values and are similar to them in attitudes, personality, and
religious beliefs." Buss, supra note 15, at 134-35 (citation omitted). The characteristics they
seek in a mate are very similar. See GOULD & GOULD, supra note 45, at 258; DEL THIESSEN,
BITTERSWEET DESTINY 326 tbl. 15.3 (1996); Buss, supra note 46, at 420 tbl. 13.2.
50. See Buss, supra note 15, at 105. Studies confirm these preferences by women. See,
e.g., id. at 104-30; Buss, supra note 45, at 19-48.
51. See Buss, supra note 15, at 133-45; see also Buss, supra note 45, at 49-58.
52. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 15, at 415-16.
53. See id. at 139.
SELECTION AND SOCIAL THEORY

40:0453]

SELF-INTERESTED RESCUES

especially during their reproductive years, 4 have more to gain from rescue
attempts than do women.
C. EvolutionaryBehavioralMaxims
If a potential rescuer consciously considered only her own genetic
success in deciding the circumstances under which she would undertake
risky rescues, she would arrive at rescue maxims that seem quite peculiar to
the modem moral sensibility. Under kin selection, these types of maxims
are suggested: take risks to rescue another in proportion to her degree of
relatedness and her potential fecundity, age, wealth, popularity, marriageability (education, attractiveness, vivacity, etc.), familiarity, common
resemblance, and family (non-genetic) ties. Under reciprocal altruism, these
are among the ones implied: take rescue risks in proportion to the rescuee's
familiarity, friendliness, sympathy, morality, wealth, age, and community
respect. Finally, under sexual selection, these types of maxims are
suggested for men: take risks in proportion to the rescue's daringness,
arduousness, positive community response, or to the degree it reflects the
rescuer's commitment, dependability, kindness or concern for children, or
inversely proportional to the rescuer's preexisting mating prospects. Sexual
selection implies narrower maxims for women, including: take risks to the
extent that they reflect the rescuer's youth and vivacity.
These genetically driven rescue maxims sometimes jar our moral
sensibilities." For example, while we honor a person who confronts a high
level of risk to save her young children, we seem to honor even more a
person who confronts an equal risk to save the young children of a stranger.
Similarly, we seem to grant the same honor for an equal risk to save a
grandmother beyond her reproductive years and a young person just
entering hers. Honor, even reverence, was internationally bestowed on the
New York emergency workers who dashed into the World Trade Center as
it burned, though most were unacquainted with those inside. 6

54. Post-reproductive men and women are predicted to be altruistic primarily with respect
to kin under kin selection, since they are no longer concerned about sexual selection. See SARAH
B. HRDY, MOTHER NATURE 94 (1999); WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 173.
55. There is strong evidence that children innately develop various stages of moral
reasoning. See generally THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN (Jerome Kagan &
Sharon Lamb eds., 1987); William Damon, The Moral Development of Children, Scl. AM., Aug.
1, 1999, at 72.
56. "We stand in awe of risk-takers, because they tread the line between glory, with its
happy correlates to reproduction, and abject failure, with death at the ready." THIESSEN, supra
note 49, at 108.
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Perhaps the dissonance between moral sensibilities and the
predispositions suggested by basic evolutionary principles arises because
the behavioral inclinations actually driven by kin selection, reciprocal
altruism, and sexual selection differ from those predicted by general theory.
First, cognitive limitations preclude refined behavioral inclinations, as for
humans who are unable to directly discern genetic relationships or even
genetic self-interest. Even so, the inability to perceive what is in our genetic
self-interest need not always be a significant hindrance. For example, the
general maxim to rescue anyone at risk may be quite adequate in
environments in which nearly everybody around is kin or a reciprocator.
Second, and relatedly, irrespective of our cognitive ability to perceive
genetic self-interest, a behavioral disposition that was adequate during
ancestral times may prove less evolutionarily satisfactory in other environments. For example, if our ancestors on the African savanna lived in
isolated family units or clans, the evolved general inclination to rescue
anyone at risk would then have been less likely to misfire by inducing the
rescue of nonrelatives or nonreciprocators 7 Third, genes sometimes have
multiple effects ("pleiotropy"),58 so that genes that dispose us to rescue
relatives or reciprocators may also dispose us to rescue others. Fourth,
insofar as there are genes that predispose humans to conform to community
norms, 59 this inclination may overcome other, narrower predispositions for
more direct genetic payoffs.6" For example, an inclination to take risks only

It was within these
57. "[E]arly human groups ... were actually extended families ....
early human groups, over millennia, that humans evolved to care and protect not only
themselves, but also their genetic relatives." Yuwa Hedrick-Wong, The Global Environmental
Crisis and State Behavior: An Evolutionary Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 15, at 573, 578.
58. Wilson defines pleiotropism: "The control of more than one phenotypic characteristic,
for example eye color, courtship behavior, or size, by the same gene or set of genes." WILSON,
supra note 19, at 591.
59. "The array of evolutionary game theoretic models ... show conditions under which,
bucking the constant headwind of evolution's myopia, organisms can come to be designed by
evolution to cooperate, or more precisely designed to behave in such a way as to prefer the
long-term welfare of the group to their immediate individual welfare." DANIEL C. DENNETr,
FREEDOM EVOLVES 196-97 (2003).
60. Community norms may be specifically designed to counter or restrain certain natural
dispositions, as where norms are crafted to limit the extent of moralistic aggression against
nonreciprocators, see BADCOCK supra note 21, at 39 (explaining Trivers' concept of "moralistic
aggression"), or to encourage behavior that is evolutionarily neutral, such as those relating to
dress codes, or even to reinforce natural inclinations, as in the norm against incest. Supposedly,
then, the needed strength of the community norm would relate to the degree of resistance from
natural inclinations, among other things (such as the onerousness of satisfying the norm and its
benefit to the community).
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for relatives or reciprocators may be swamped by another disposition to
follow a community norm to rescue anyone in danger.
Because a predisposed rescue maxim may be overgeneralized for reasons
such as cognitive limitations, changed environments, and pleiotropy, the
maxim may appear to be a purely disinterested, moral one under today's
understanding of morality.6 Indeed, some commentators have speculated
that kin selection has driven our moral sensibilities.62 For example, even
though self-interested kin selection on the savanna may be a source of the
impulse to rescue, de Waal speculates, "as so often, the impulse became
dissociated from the consequences that shaped its evolution, which
permitted it to be expressed even when [genetic] payoffs were unlikely. The
impulse thus was emancipated to the point where it became genuinely
unselfish. 63 Others have ventured that reciprocal altruism underlies our
moral feelings.64 Perhaps sexual selection also plays a role.65
61. The relationship between evolution and moral theory is not settled. For example,
Lumsden and Wilson "suggest that moral reasoning ... appears to be ultimately dependent on
the genes as well as on culture and self-conscious decision. But the [epigenetic] rules [that
channel development of the mind] only bias development; they do not determine ethical
precepts or the necessary decisions in a fixed manner." CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD 0.
WILSON, PROMETHEAN FIRE 179 (1983). Thiessen sees risk as the main driving force in the
evolution of human mentality and concludes "that man did not evolve complicated moral and
philosophical systems in response to specific evolutionary demands for ethics and morality.
Rather, he evolved strategies to minimize danger and prolong life, some of which can be served
by moral imperatives, religious beliefs, and superstitions-bread and survival disguised as
philosophy." THIESSEN, supra note 49, at 108. See generally BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF
ETHICS (Jane Maienschein & Michael Ruse eds., 1999).
62. See, e.g., LIONEL TIGER, THE MANUFACTURE OF EVIL: ETHICS, EVOLUTION, AND THE
INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM 324 (1987) ("[T]here is reason to think that our broad ethical capacities
were formed during a long phase of human evolution when family relations were paramount.").
That kin selection drives the moral sense may not be very selfish. See CARL SAGAN & ANN
DRUYAN, SHADOWS OF FORGOTTEN ANCESTORS 116 (1992) ("Kin selection is also a continuum,
and in its arcane calculus some sacrifice must be worthwhile to aid the most far-flung and
distant members of your family. But since we are all related, some sacrifice must be justified to
save anyone on Earth .... ). "Some authors seem to think that all human ethics is more or less
raw inclusive fitness altruism." MAYR, supra note 21, at 76. While Mayr does not go this far, he
does state that "[t]he shift from an instinctive altruism based on inclusive fitness to an ethics
based on decision making was perhaps the most important step in humanization." Id. at 77
(emphasis omitted). "The correlated evolution of a larger brain and a larger social group made
two new aspects of ethical behavior possible: (1) a selective reward for certain unselfish traits
that benefitted the group, and (2) ethical behavior by deliberate choice, rather than purely by the
instinct of inclusive fitness." Id. at 80. Nonetheless, Mayr, unlike some other biologists, finds
that "the evidence indicates that the genetic component in human ethics is over all, of minor
importance." Id. at 82.
63. FRANS DE WAAL, THE APE AND THE SUSHI MASTER 330 (2001) [hereinafter DE WALL,
SUSHI MASTER]; see FRANS DE WAAL, PRIMATES AND PHILOSOPHERS 15 (2006) [hereinafter DE
WALL, PRIMATES]. In support of this speculation, de Waal discusses the reactions of rescue
dogs, who do not undertake rescues "like Skinnerian rats, doing what has been reinforced in the
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past, partly out of instinct, partly out of a desire for tidbits." DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra, at
332. Instead, as evidenced at the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, "[w]hen rescue dogs
encounter too many dead people, they lose interest in their job regardless of how much praise
and goodies they get." Id. Not finding someone alive, "all dogs on the team became depressed.
They required longer and longer resting periods, and their eagerness for the job dropped off
dramatically." Id. at 332-33. Even rescue dogs, then, "are emotionally invested. They relish the
opportunity to find and save a live person." Id. at 333. "Under certain conditions and for certain
species, therefore, we can drop the customary quotation marks around 'altruism.' At least in
some cases, we seem to be dealing with the genuine article: a good deed done and intended." Id.
For a discussion of chimps and people who are predisposed to provide altruistic help, see B.
Bower, Ape Aid: Chimps Share Altruistic Capacitywith People, Sc. NEWS, June 30, 2007, at
406.
64. See, e.g., Michael Shermer, The Pinker Instinct, 9 SKEPTIC, 2001, at 88, 92 (discussing
an interview of Steven Pinker in which he states that a moral sense has an adaptive payoff under
the theory of reciprocal altruism). See generally RIDLEY, supra note 37, at 188. According to R.
D. Alexander, "The essence of moral systems seems to lie in patterns of indirect reciprocity...
." Alexander, Moral Systems, supra note 43, at 188; see ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 77
("Moral systems are systems of indirect reciprocity."); HOWARD KAHANE, CONTRACT ETHICS 18
(1995) (stating that it is plausible to restrict "the label moral to sentiments, desires, and behavior
of a reciprocal altruistic nature"). "Morality, or more strictly our belief in morality, is merely an
adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends .... In an important sense, ethics as we
understand it is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooperate." Michael Ruse
& Edward 0. Wilson, The Evolution of Ethics, in PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 6, at
313, 316. Joyce notes that, while various evolutionary processes are consistent with human
moral sense, "one glaring datum is that all human moral systems give a leading role to
reciprocalrelations." JOYCE, supra note 26, at 140. "It therefore seems eminently reasonable to
assume that reciprocal exchanges were a central evolutionary problem that morality was
designed to solve." Id. at 141 (referring to evidence from primatology, experimental economics,
neuroscience, developmental psychology, and anthropology). More generally, "[m]oral
judgments ... can function as a kind of social glue, bonding individuals together in a shared
justificatory structure and providing a tool for solving many group coordination problems." Id.
at 117. For the view that reciprocity cannot sufficiently assure compliance with moral norms,
see Chandra S. Sripada, Punishment and the Strategic Structure ofMoral Systems, 20 BIOLOGY
& PHIL. 767, 770-77 (2005). On the other hand, congruent with findings that "[flor over 95% of
hominid evolution, humans lived in small social groups organized mainly by kinship and
reciprocity relationships," X. T. Wang, Risk as Reproductive Variance, 23 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 35, 38 (2002), perhaps some moral urges stem from a combination of reciprocal
altruism and kin selection. One problem with a sense of morality that springs from adaptation to
ancestral environments is that modern circumstances are vastly different. Moral urges that
served us well on the savanna may destroy us on city streets. See Janet R. Richards, The Darwin
Wars and the Human Self-Image, in A COMPANION TO GENETHICS 271, 280 (Justine Burley &
John Harris eds., 2002). Reason may come to our collective rescue: "I suggest[] that altruistic
impulses once limited to one's kin and one's own group might be extended to a wider circle by
reasoning creatures who can see that they and their kin are one group among others, and from
an impartial point of view no more important than others." SINGER, supra note 21, at 134.
Emotion, perhaps independent of reason, may suffice. "Does an ape have a robust enough
connection with sentience to permit it to expand the circle by recognising the suffering of
individuals outside its species?" Agar, supra note 26, at 135.
65. Miller, referring to evolutionary psychologists who believe that morality stems from
kin selection or reciprocal altruism, posits instead that "human morality is much more likely to
be a direct result of sexual selection." MILLER, supra note 46, at 292. "I shall argue that some of
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Yet I am not yet willing to concede that genetically self-interested rescue
dispositions will align with today's principled moral maxims only when the
behavioral inclinations misfire or overgeneralize. While acting on selfinterest certainly seems inconsistent with moral principles, appearances may
be deceptive. I turn to this question next.
II. MORALITY OF RESCUE

Whether an act is moral is independent of the original source of the
actor's moral sensibilities.66 This may be fortunate, for the biology of rescue
does not seem to conform to the morality of rescue.6 7 But before relying on
our most valued moral virtues had no survival benefits, but they did have strong courtship
benefits." Id. at 293. "A sexual selection perspective allows us to explain sympathy,
agreeableness, moral leadership, sexual fidelity, good parenting, charitable generosity,
sportsmanship, and our ambitions to provide for the common good." Id. Kinship and reciprocity
cannot explain several of these virtues, while sexual selection sheds new light on those virtues
explained by these other theories. See id. While the emphasis here is on rescue altruism, Miller
does not limit morality to altruism. See id. "Morality is a system of sexually selected
handicaps-costly indicators that advertise our moral character." Id. at 294. "In theory, mate
choice could be the single most powerful moral filter from one generation to the next. It could
favor almost any degree of altruism or heroism, compensating for almost any risk to survival."
Id. at 307. "Natural selection for selfishness would be impotent against sexual selection for
moral behavior." Id. at 308. "This does not mean that evolution favors truly selfless altruism,
simply that the hidden benefit of generosity is reproductive rather than nepotistic or reciprocal."
Id. at 318. While Miller sees sexual selection as a powerful hammer, not all moral virtues are
nails. See id. at 339 (stating that "sexual choice does not account for all of morality"). See
generally id. at 292-340 (discussing that morality may be a "result of sexual selections").
66. "[T]he theory that explains morality ... should be neutral with regard to whether our
moral attitudes, habits, preferences, and proclivities are a product of genes or culture."
DENNETT, supra note 59, at 190; see NOZICK, supra note 21, at 237-38 (questioning whether our
shared ethical intuitions should be given any ethical weight).
67. Evolutionary biology has particular difficulty explaining truly selfless acts of altruism
that can be expected to result in a loss in reproductive fitness. See THIESSEN, supra note 49, at
312-15. Perhaps these acts are the result of misplaced altruism, accident, genetic mutation, selfdeception, or even the self-interested manipulations by others. See id. Or perhaps they are the
result of the "heterozygote superiority ... of alleles that, in homozygotes, code for traits that
reduce reproductive success," as in the example of Sickle-cell anemia. Paul Thompson,
Introduction to ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 43, at 1, 35. Ruse addresses what
Thiessen suggests by "misplaced altruism":
To make us cooperate for our biological ends, evolution has filled us full of
thoughts about right and wrong, the need to help our fellows, and so forth..
. . [Because] it is in our biological interests to cooperate[,] . . . we have
evolved innate mental dispositions . . . inclining us to cooperate, in the
name of this thing which we call morality.
Michael Ruse, Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS,
supra note 43, at 225, 230. "The function of ethics, of ethical norms and ethical beliefs, is to
coordinate our actions with those of others to mutual benefit in a way that goes beyond the
coordination achieved through evolutionarily instilled desires and patterns of behavior
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the inexactitude of behavioral inclinations to support the intuitive morality

of rescue, let us examine more closely our moral principles.68
In this section I consider the foundations of moral theory and develop
basic moral arguments in support of the predicted biological dispositions

relating to the rescue doctrine, behavioral misfirings and overgeneralizations aside. I do this by discussing the two main orientations in moral
theory, teleology on the one hand, relying on utilitarianism to exemplify it,
and deontology on the other, with Kantianism as the model. The discussion
will not rely on nuanced normative reasoning;69 it seems that whatever

moral sense that may have emerged from evolutionary processes is more
likely to be manifested in nebulous urges and intuitions than in
sophisticated analysis.7 y Human behavior and feelings largely evolved while
our ancestors struggled on the savanna, eons before philosophers articulated
refined normative questions, propositions and systems.7 1 What apparently
(including self-sacrificing behavior toward biological relatives)." NOZICK, supra note 21, at 240.
"The coordination that ethics achieves is more extensive and better adapted to new and
changing circumstances and opportunities." Id. Posner suggests that insofar as there is a conflict
between the biology of rescue and moral principles, it is morals that will suffer. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 7 (1999) ("[T]he analytical tools
employed in academic moralism-whether moral casuistry, or reasoning from the canonical
texts of moral philosophy, or careful analysis, or reflective equilibrium, or some combination of
these tools-are too feeble to override either narrow self-interest or moral intuitions.").
68. Just as the existence of altruism may be a difficult problem confronting evolutionary
psychology, "[t]he ability to accommodate altruistic behavior is widely considered to be the
litmus test for ethical theories. Insofar as a theory fails to account for altruism, it is taken to be
deficient in a significant respect." Thompson, supra note 67, at 25.
69. "The sociobiologist can admit that particular moral judgments are immediately
derivable or supportable from a variety of different sources, culture, religion, even moral theory.
Where biology comes in is to explain the nature of those sources." JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
EVOLUTION, MORALITY, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 100-01 (1982). "The particular judgment
may be derivable from the theory; however, the theory itself is supported, not by some wider or
more general theory, but by certain facts of human biology." Id. at 101.
70. "Much of our moral sense, or moral knowledge, need not be of an articulable,
propositional kind at all." FLORIAN VON SCHILCHER & NEIL TENNANT, PHILOSOPHY, EVOLUTION
AND HUMAN NATURE 164 (1984). Posner suggests that because the moral sense developed in
ancestral times when humans lived in small bands, "we didn't need morality in its modem sense
of a set of duties toward unknown persons," and hence "there is no reason to believe that the
human brain evolved a capacity for reasoning intelligently about moral questions." Richard A.
Posner, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1661 (1998).
Posner advances a skeptical reason for moral nebulosity: "[M]orality is local. There are no
interesting moral universals." Id. at 1640. "A society's moral code changes when it is shown to
be nonadaptive .... Id. at 1689; see POSNER, supra note 67, at 33-35.
71. Ruse finds the Darwinian and the Humean agree that morality is grounded in human
nature. "[T]he Darwinian follows Hume in recognizing moral sentiments as being of a type
different from mere feelings. They carry a sense of obligation. This is what motivates us to
action." RUSE, supra note 6, at 267. Psychopaths are exceptions. This is why they are
considered abnormal. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy,
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evolved is a general moral sense, a facility and perhaps yearning for norms
and a feeling of obligation to fulfill them." While the great philosophers
must have tapped into human sensibilities, for otherwise we would have
rejected their thoughts out of hand, diverse structures can be erected on

their fundamental foundations. On utilitarian bedrock, for example, have
been built the society-centered principles of Jeremy Bentham and the
individual rights-respecting tenets of John Stuart Mill,74 while on Kantian

fundamentals have been erected the libertarianism of Robert Nozick and the
welfare-state liberalism of John Rawls.75 Since kin selection, reciprocal
altruism and sexual selection do much of their work below the level of selfaware consciousness, as suggested by animal ethology, we should expect
the reinforcing moral urges to do much of their work also at a vague,
subconscious level. The moral thinking of typical people that drives

everyday behavior does not derive from the intricate philosophy of a Rawls
82 ETHICS 284 (1972), reprinted in

JEFFRIE

G. MURPHY,

RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY

128, 130 (1979) ("Though psychopaths know, in some sense, what it means to wrong people, to
act immorally, this kind of judgment has for them no motivational component at all."). In the
nineteenth century, the condition was called "moral insanity." See WILLIAM H. CALVIN &
GEORGE A. OJEMANN, CONVERSATIONS WITH NEIL'S BRAIN 146 (1994). For a brief framework
of the connection in moral theory between feelings and behavior on the one side and morality
on the other, see Lawrence Blum, Particularity and Responsiveness, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 55, at 306, 307-09.
72. "[P]eople have a predisposition to adopt some set of principles (not any particular set)
that will define the moral system of society and that the exact nature of the system depends on
early experience, with these principles reflecting the coordinated influence of the evolved
genome and early social interactions." LEWIS PETRINOVICH, HUMAN EVOLUTION,
REPRODUCTION, AND MORALITY

72 (1995). Kitcher opines that "[a]t some point in our

prehistory, our ancestor developed a system of proto-morality, a set of rules that reinforced their
fragile altruistic tendencies and that enabled them to live in social groups that were subject to
less constant rupture and needed less frequent repair." Kitcher, supra note 37, at 305. "[I]t
seems to me overwhelmingly plausible that this history [of the emergence of morality from
proto-morality] has been guided mainly, if not exclusively, by forces of cultural, rather than
natural selection." Id.; see WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 324-25 ("We believe the things-about
morality, personal worth, even objective truth-that lead to behaviors that get our genes into the
next generation."). See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 269-80 (2002) ("The
Sanctimonious Animal").
73. While some philosophers question reliance on moral intuitions, see supra note 63,
"[o]thers ... believe that, other things being equal, the more closely a theory accords with our
considered moral intuitions the better." Douglas W. Portmore, Position-Relative
Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation, 113 ETHICS 303, 304 n.2
(2003).
74. Compare JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J. H. Bums & H. L. A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970) (1789), with JOHN
STUART

MILL,

Utilitarianism, in

UTILITARIANISM,

LIBERTY,

AND

REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT 51-84 (E. P. Dutton 1950) (1863).
75. Compare RAWLS, supra note 26, with ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974).
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or Nozick, but rather is reflected in the lessons of folktales,7 6 religious laws
and proverbs,77 and the rules of thumb of common aphorisms.78 But
considered moral theory has a place here. It helps us to understand the
intuitively agreeable lessons and the reach of the thumbs.79
The basic difference between teleology and deontology hearkens back to
the ancient questions of Socrates: "What is the good?" and "What is
justice?" In distinguishing the two, the good relates to states of being.
Normatively, a person or a society is to be good. Justice relates to actions.
76. One group of evolutionary researchers studied the patterns revealed in folktales from
forty-eight cultural areas around the world. "[T]he findings are consistent with previous
research on patterns of altruism, sex differences in mate preferences, sex differences in
reproductive strategy, and differing emphases on male and female physical attractiveness."
Jonathan Gottschall et al., Patternsof Characterizationin Folktales Across GeographicRegions
and Levels of Cultural Complexity, 14 HuM. NATURE 365, 365 (2003). For example, as
predictable from kin selection, "[b]oth male and female [folktale] protagonists in the sample
expended significant effort of behalf of their kin ... [while] [a]ntagonists were more selfinterested." Id. at 375. Furthermore, "highly disproportionate effort was expended on behalf of
mates or 50% genetic relatives (parents, siblings, children) at the expense of more distant
relatives." Id.
77. See, e.g., AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 37 (2002) ("[T]he poor of my
town . . . according to Jewish law should take precedence in my behavior over the poor in
general."); Janet T. Landa, Bounded Rationality of Homo Classificus: The Law and
Bioeconomics of Social Norms as Classification, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2005)
("Within the Hokkien-Chinese ethnic group, Confucian ethics further prescribe different
degrees of mutual cooperation and reciprocity among the different categories of people based on
degree of kinship or ethnic distance.").
78. For example, Ruse refers to an Arab saying consistent with kin selection: "My brother
and I against our cousin. My cousin and I against the stranger." MICHAEL RUSE, Evolution and
Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM 220, 244 (Kindle ed. 2007) (1995). Despite first
appearances, this is not in stark contrast to the religious parable of the Good Samaritan, who, by
virtue of finding an injured person by the road, became his neighbor. Thus, consistent with
robust reciprocal altruism, aid was not extended to a "stranger." See id. at 247. See generally
ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN, UNEXPECTED NEWS: READING THE BIBLE WITH THIRD WORLD EYES

105-14 (1984) (discussing further the parable of the Good Samaritan). Mackie finds reciprocal
altruism "expressed in such formulae as that justice consists in giving everyone his due,
interpreted, as Polemarchus interprets it in the first book of Plato's Republic, as doing good to
one's friends and harm to one's enemies, or repaying good with good and evil with evil."
Mackie, supra note 6, at 312. Other aphorisms that seem to align with evolutionary tendencies

include: "Blood is thicker than water,"

GREGORY TITELMAN, AMERICA'S POPULAR PROVERBS

29 (2d ed. 2000), "Charity begins at home," id. at 38, "Don't bite the hand that
feeds you," id. at 56, "Fortune favors the brave," id. at 104, and "Love your neighbor as
yourself," id. at 218.
79. "Darwinism can help highlight the contrast between the moral codes we have and the
sort that a detached philosopher might arrive at." WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 147. "For the
Darwinian inclined toward moral philosophy, then, the object of the game is to examine
traditional morality under the assumption that it is laden with practical, life-enhancing wisdom,
yet is also laced with self-serving and philosophically indefensible pronouncements about the
absolute 'immorality' of this or that." Id. at 148.
AND SAYINGS
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Normatively, a person or a society is to do the right thing. Now if doing the
right thing always led to a good state of affairs, and vice versa, the
distinction between the two would be of little practical import; but,
unfortunately, it turns out that they sometimes diverge, as where acting
justly toward a convicted criminal disallows a disproportionately severe
sentence that would be socially beneficial as a deterrent. In these circumstances a strict teleologist would elevate the good over the just, allowing the
severe sentence, while a strict deontologist would elevate justice over the
good, refusing to treat the convicted criminal simply as an object to be used
for the betterment of society. I first discuss the evolutionary teleology of the
rescue doctrine, and then the deontology of it.
A. Utilitarianism
The leading teleological system is utilitarianism which, like all forms of
teleology, is consequentialist. The consequences of an action determine its
moral value. Its touchstone of consequences aligns with natural selection,
which also measures accomplishment by consequences-in particular,
reproductive success. The means by which one gets one's genes into the
next generation is irrelevant. In the context of the rescue doctrine, I further
examine the extent of this consonance between natural selection and
teleology. In particular, I focus on three of the complexities of
utilitarianism: the nature of the "good" that designates which consequences
are morally relevant; whether the relevant consequences are those that affect
the agent alone (egoism) or everyone (universalism); and, relatedly, the
boundaries of the utilitarian calculus.8"

80. Evolutionary biology may actuate another complexity, which I do not address-the
distinction between act- and rule-utilitarianism:
Act-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is
to be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself. Ruleutilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to
be judged by the goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule that
everyone should perform the action in like circumstances.
J. J. C. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 3, 9 (1973); see, e.g., J. L. MACKIE, ETHICS 125-29, 136-40 (1977). One commentator
contends that certain studies "provide the empirical starting point for an argument that apes are
candidate act-utilitarians." Agar, supra note 26, at 124.
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1. The Good
The first problem for a teleologist is to identify the "good" that provides
the gauge of moral conduct."1 Jeremy Bentham, the progenitor of the bestknown form of utilitarianism,82 defined the good as happiness,83 and
declared that the goal of a utilitarian is to achieve the most good for the
most people.84 This is a form of hedonistic utilitarianism, so-called because
it identifies the good with qualities such as happiness, pleasure, or
avoidance of pain,85 each being directed at emotional satisfactions.86
Another form is ideal utilitarianism, which declares the good to be
something of intrinsic worth, such as knowledge, love, esthetic
contemplation, friendship, or a character trait.87 A modem form is
preference utilitarianism, which sees the good as preference satisfaction.88
This is distinguishable from hedonistic utilitarianism since, for example,
one may "prefer one thing to another where neither offers pleasure to
anyone."89 Because natural selection is driven by a particular desideratum,
81. See RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 295-352 (1959); W. D. Ross, THE RIGHT
AND THE GOOD 65-133 (1930). For a taxonomy of utilitarianism somewhat different from what
follows, see Ken Binmore, A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy, in ECONOMICS,
VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 101, 103-08 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998).
82. Utilitarian ideas preceding Bentham appear in the works of Epicurus, Locke, Hobbes,
and Hume, among others. See BRANDT, supra note 81, at 300-01.
83. BENTHAM, supra note 74, at 12 ("By utility is meant that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, . . . or ... to
prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is
considered."); see id. at 11-13, 40.
84. Id. at 12-13.
85. For the benefits of a negative standard (e.g., "avoid pain") as compared to a positive
one (e.g., "maximize happiness"), see S. I. BENN & R. S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT 62-63 (1959); SMART, supra note 80, at 28-30 (discussing "negative utilitarianism").
86. See A. C. EwNG, ETHICS 22 (1953). See generally BRANDT, supra note 81, at 295329; RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 132-38 (1979); WILLIAM K.
FRANKENA, ETHICS 83-92 (2d ed. 1973); G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 111-60 (Thomas
Baldwin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1903).
87. See BRANDT, supra note 81, at 332-52 (discussing pluralist theories); FRANKENA,
supra note 84, at 16 ("[Ideal] utilitarianism is a certain kind of teleological theory of obligation
and does not entail any particular theory of value, although a utilitarian must accept some
particular theory of value."); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour,
in UTILITARIANISM AND-BEYOND 39, 54 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (citing
MOORE, supra note 86).
88. See, e.g., R. M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 103 (1981); G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of
EgalitarianJustice, 99 ETHICS 906, 909-10 (1989) (agreeing with Amartya Sen and Ronald
Dworkin, distinguishing "hedonic welfare" from "preference satisfaction"); Harsanyi, supra
note 87, at 54-56.
89. Frederic Schick, Under Which Descriptions?, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra
note 87, at 251, 251; see AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 41 (1987) ("A person may
value the promotion of certain causes and the occurrence of certain things, even though the
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that is, the goal of reproductive success, the question arises whether "evolutionary utilitarianism" can be brought within any of the standard utilitarian
notions of the good.9"

The hedonistic form of utilitarianism that aims at emotional satisfaction
is suggestive of the evolutionary goal. Many actions that advance
reproductive success are usually pleasurable, such as eating, achievement,
and sexual intercourse. 9 Moreover, "[o]ne of the fundamental assumptions
of evolutionary psychology is that matters closely related to our survival
and reproduction have a likelihood of engaging our emotions." 92 Still, as
suggested by the word "likelihood," it is difficult to equate happiness
wholly with success at increasing one's genes in the gene pool. There are
various reasons for this.
First, natural selection does not always need pleasure and pain as
incentives for survival and reproduction, as is evident in the plant kingdom
and perhaps in simple animals. We do certainly see these incentives
influence human survival and reproduction-influence, but not dominate.
As one counterexample, those who must drag themselves out of bed to face
the drudgery of another day in the mines in order to feed the mouths at
home might well consider it a pain, not a pleasure ("How did I get myself
into this?").93 Some may even doubt the net pleasures stemming directly
importance that is attached to these developments are not reflected by the advancement of his or
her well-being, if any, that they respectively cause."); Harsanyi, supra note 87, at 54
(dissociating preference satisfaction from hedonism); cf Donald Regan, On Preferences and
Promises: A Response to Harsanyi,96 ETHICS 56, 58 (1985) (concluding that "the theorist who
takes preference satisfaction as the fundamental good has no satisfactory explanation of why").
90. Of course, without reproduction of the species, no human "good" is possible for very
long.
91. See Paul H. Rubin, Group Selection and the Limits to Altruism, 2 J. BIOECONOMICS 9,
15 (2000) ("Something approximating utilitarianism might well be consistent with efficient
altruism .... Utility functions are related to (if not the same as) fitness: we get pleasure from
those things that led to increased reproductive success in the EEA and pain from those things
that hindered our ancestors' reproductive success .... This may be why utilitarianism has been a
long lived and successful moral theory-it is a theory that is consistent with our evolved moral
preferences." (citations omitted)).
92. BROWN, supra note 45, at 115. "[T]he pursuit of genetic interest sometimes, though
not always, coincides with the pursuit of happiness." WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 148. Alexander
rejects utilitarian moral systems for biologically driven contractarian ones in which individuals
seek their own interests. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 80-81 ("[I]nterests are seen as
reproductive, not as individual survival, and, accordingly, pleasure and comfort are postulated
to have evolved as vehicles of reproductive success ....
");infra note 117.
93. A Gallup survey in October 2000 found that 26% of workers were "engaged" in their
work, 55% were "not engaged," and 19% were "actively disengaged." What Your Disaffected
Workers
Cost, THE
GALLUP
MGMT.
J. (Mar.
15, 2001), available at
http://gmj.gallup.com/content/439/What-Your-Disaffected-Workers-Cost.aspx
("Actively
disengaged workers tend to be less productive and report being less loyal to their companies,
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from the ultimate goal of raising offspring, especially in an unruly, needy
household ("Why did I ever have these rotten kids?").94 But nearly all
persevere, happy or not. And, of course, the vast majority of people are
happy to bear and raise children, even in modem times when humans have a
clear knowledge of the reproductive process and the means to obtain the
pleasures of intercourse without significant risks of pregnancy. But still, in
sum, equating emotional satisfaction with reproductive success is
sometimes a stretch.
Second, emotional satisfaction may not coincide with reproductive
success because human behavior and feelings evolved mainly in
environments existing long before modem times, going back to a few
million years ago when our ancestors were hunters and gatherers on the
African savanna. Behavioral dispositions, and the emotional impetus behind
them, were largely selected to cope with circumstances present then. They
may not be evolutionarily useful today.95 As an example, if our distant
ancestors lived in small clans of relatives with limited contact with other
clans, the satisfaction from the predisposition to take risks to rescue familiar
persons would be reinforced by kin selection. Today, because most familiar
persons in a modem society are not relatives, the same broad predisposition
selected on the savanna may lead to confronting risk with a reduced genetic
payoff structure. While reciprocal altruism and sexual selection may
support risky rescues in modem environments, once the additional incentive
of kin selection is attenuated, a different range of rescues would be beneficial from those adapted for living in clans on the savanna. For another
example, it has been supposed that moralistic aggression may be adaptive to
more stressed and less secure in their work. They miss more days and are less satisfied with
their personal lives."). A Harris poll in October 2001 found that 58% of employees were "very
satisfied" with their jobs, 36% were "somewhat satisfied," 5% were "not very satisfied," and
1% were "not at all satisfied." Humphrey Taylor, The Impact of Recent Events and Fears About
the Economy on Employee Attitudes, THE HARRIS POLL #57, Nov. 21, 2001,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris.poll!index.asp?PID=268.
94. "Why would any self-interested rational person want [to rear a child]? The costs are
enormous, the hours are terrible, the opportunity costs ... are astronomical, to say nothing of
losing the ability to take off on weekends on a whim." STEVEN R. QUARTZ & TERRENCE J.
SEJNOWSKI, LIARS, LOVERS, AND HEROES 159 (2002). Raising children seems to diminish
happiness. "[S]urveys of parents invariably find a clear dip in happiness after the Blessed
Miracle of Childbirth, which continues unabated for twenty years-bottoming out during
adolescence-and only returns to pre-birth levels when the child finally leaves home." Ben
Mathis-Lilley, Happiness: A User's Manual, N.Y. MAG., July 10, 2006, at 32, 33. One
researcher says, "'[E]very bit of data says children are an extreme source of negative affect, a
mild source of negative affect, or none at all. It's hard to find a study where there's one net positive."' Jennifer Senior, Some Dark Thoughts on Happiness, N.Y. MAG., July 10, 2006, at 26, 30
(quoting Daniel Gilbert, author of STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006)).
95. See Rubin, supra note 91, at 16.
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inhibit freeriders in cooperative ventures, such as reciprocal altruism.96 That
is, if persons partaking in cooperative interactions, and even onlookers,
aggress against those who are perceived to be acting unfairly, the costs of
shirking or freeriding go up, thereby reducing their occurrence. Presumably,
moralistic aggressors generally achieve satisfaction from their reactions.97
Road rage seems to be a modem incarnation of moralistic aggression.
Whether road rage, even if accompanied by satisfaction, has an evolutionary
benefit can be easily doubted. On the other hand, the emotional satisfaction
driving some evolutionarily beneficial dispositions may be suboptimal in
today's changed circumstances. For an example counter to the one above,
insofar as the inclination to rescue strangers resulted from sexual selection
on the savanna, it may now be unduly weak in light of the substantial media
coverage of rescues that reaches a much larger audience of potential mates
and benefactors.
As suggested by the examples above, evolution often works through
surrogates, or jerry built, satisficing mechanisms that may have been good
enough when they evolved,98 but inadequate in changed environments. To
refer to one of the examples, the predisposition to take risks for all familiar
persons may work satisfactorily in ancestral times as an indirect means to
take risks for relatives under kin selection.99 More accurate would be the
ability to sense kinship directly, as by smell,' 0 but once adequate surrogate
mechanisms developed, the evolutionary payoff for greater refinement was
reduced. But current living conditions give the kinship surrogate a different
evolutionary value since in modem communities, familiar persons are
usually unrelated. The satisfaction of rescuing familiar persons may then
correlate today less strongly with genetic benefit. Similarly, moralistic
96. See supra note 27.
97. One study found that "[r]evenge actually is sweet: it stimulates the same types of
reward centers in the brain that desserts, desire and drugs do." Aimee Cunningham, The
Pleasure of Revenge, 14 Sci. AM. MIND 6, 6 (2004). The economist who undertook the study
"says the experiment sheds some light on altruistic punishment-the human tendency to
discipline those who violate social norms-so a few bad apples don't undermine the general
cooperative spirit that permeates human existence." Id.
98. See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB 20, 24-26 (1980); ERNST MAYR,
THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 589-91 (1982).
99. Along with familiarity, other evolved mechanisms for indirectly identifying kin are
location, phenotype matching, and recognition alleles ("green beards"). CARTWRIGHT, supra
note 15, at 80; SHAW & WONG, supra note 21, at 39 (spatial proximity, early experience, and
phenotypic matching); Crawford, supra note 21, at 310-11 (spatial distribution, association,
phenotype matching, and recognition alleles). For brief explication, see Kuklin, supra note 7, at
183-84.
100. "In many species, kin recognition mechanisms involve olfactory cues, and there is

clear evidence for similar mechanisms in humans."

DAVID

(2005) (extending to mother and infant, and full siblings).

C.

GEARY, THE ORIGIN OF MIND
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aggression targeting unfair behavior may be advantageous when triggered
by cooperative hunting ventures, but unduly costly when directed at
highway driving with its minimal need for extensive cooperation. In sum,
the pleasures and pains of jerry built survival and reproduction mechanisms
may not be accurate guides today of fit behavior, or, for that matter,
accurate guides even in ancestral times under changed circumstances. For
example, even back then, for persons whose evolutionary satisfactions were
honed by a long line of ancestors living on the savanna, once they move to a
seashore, survival and reproductive success could require activities that may
have come to be unpleasurable, such as swimming in salt water or
seafaring.
Third, successful coping behavior may vary even in a relatively
unchanging environment. For instance, as game theory demonstrates,10 1 it
may be individually beneficial to take advantage of another's expected
behavior. In particular, in what evolutionists refer to as the "hawk-dove
game," if some organisms ("doves") peacefully cooperate for their mutual
benefit, it may be advantageous for others ("hawks") to exploit them. A
hawk would gain from invading a territory of doves. But if the hawks,
unlike doves, are sometimes injured when they interact, too many hawks in
the territory would be to their disadvantage and the doves would outperform
them. At some point, an equilibrium will be found in which there is an
optimal balance of doves and hawks.'0 ° There will then be two successful
coping behaviors, and the pleasures and pains of the organisms with
differing strategies would presumably vary accordingly. Hence, where the
optimal balance is absent, some organisms' feelings will not be
evolutionarily beneficial to them. More generally, whenever there are a
variety of behaviors in a species, depending on the circumstances, some will
be more successful than others, altruism of diverse sorts included. In sum,
personal pains and satisfactions often align with reproductive success. But
for the above reasons at least, this is not always the case.
It also seems problematic to identify reproductive success with the good
championed by ideal utilitarians. While one could by definitional fiat
declare reproduction to be a good, it certainly does not fit comfortably with
the usual, oftentimes pluralistic, goals advanced by idealists. These generally fall within the class of mental states said to be of intrinsic worth.
Reproductive success is not a mental state, nor does it consistently give rise
101. For a brief introduction to game theory in this context, see Peter Hammerstein, What Is
Evolutionary Game Theory?, in GAME THEORY AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 3 (Lee Alan Dugatkin
& Hudson Kern Reeve eds., 2000).
102. See, e.g., DAVID P. BARASH, THE SURVIVAL GAME 215-24 (2003). See generally JOHN
MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982).
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to any preferred mental states. Furthermore, when the good is seen as
pluralistic, there is the additional complexity of incorporating reproductive
success. When a moral choice has multiple effects, it is hard to imagine how
success with any ensuing mental
one would commensurate reproductive
13
1
worth.
intrinsic
of
be
to
states said
A third form of utilitarianism, which advocates preference satisfaction,"°
also has difficulty encompassing the reproductive goal of natural selection.
A common reason for advocating preference utilitarianism is that, under this
form, individuals may decide for themselves what is the good and what to
seek, whether happiness or anything else. 01 5 While most people may declare
that reproductive success is in their own best interests, perhaps even if it
brings them unhappiness, some would not. More so than for a hedonistic or
ideal utilitarian, a preference utilitarian must be cautious in responding to
this lack of a consensus. While she may attempt to persuade others of her
conception of the good, her tenets disallow her from paternalistically
imposing her vision on others. 10 6 If people prefer to avoid reproduction, that
103. Under pluralistic ethics, "there are many candidates with some credentials for the
status of intrinsic worth." BRANDT, supra note 81, at 340. "[T]he job [of evaluating the candidates] is a large one, and ... there is no easy way of reducing its proportions. Indeed, the job in
practical life is bigger: we have to make judgments of the comparative intrinsic worth of
complex sets of events .... " Id.; see PETRINOVICH, supra note 72, at 126-27 ("[Problems with
pluralistic consequentialism include the fact] that there is little agreement over the way intrinsic
value should be estimated" and, once this is accomplished, the way "to arrive at an estimate to
decide on the best course of action.").
104. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 371 (1992)
("There is also the currently popular desire or preference theory [of utilitarianism] which holds
that some state of affairs is a good, or a benefit, in itself, just to the extent that someone wants it

to obtain.");

PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS

94 (2d ed. 1993) ("According to preference

utilitarianism, an action contrary to the preference of any being is, unless this preference is
outweighed by contrary preferences, wrong."). Preferences may not be hedonistic. For example,
"it is by no means a necessary truth that we will enjoy life more if we discover and act on our
true preferences." Regan, supra note 89, at 58; see BRANDT, supra, at 371-72.
105. See Harsanyi, supra note 87, at 54; see also FRANK H. KNIGHT, The Sickness of
LiberalSociety, in FREEDOM AND REFORM 370, 372 (1947) ("It is also a part of the liberal faith
in human nature to believe that normal men prefer freedom to objective well-being, within
limits, when the two conflict."); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with PrivatePreferences,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1986) ("Some of the most well-established conceptions of
public law view the state as a mechanism for aggregating private preferences."). Relatedly,
Posner has advanced the ethical concept of wealth maximization, stating that "the wealth of
society is the aggregate satisfaction of those preferences (the only ones that have ethical weight
in a system of wealth maximization) that are backed up by money, that is, that are registered in
a market." RICHARD A. POSNER, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Social Theory, in THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 48, 61.
106. Cf Binmore, supra note 81, at 104 (discussing "how... we know what people ought
to want," referring to the "ipsedixists-those who offer their own moral prejudices in the guise
of moral imperatives").
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is their own business. Hence, while preference utilitarianism may align with
evolutionary ends for some, it may not for everyone.
Overall, then, evolutionary and utilitarian goals correspond to a large,
but imperfect, extent. The good of the main forms of utilitarianism must be
reworked or refined to fully align with reproductive success.
2.

Egoism Versus Universalism

Recall that the usual utilitarian mandate is to achieve the most good for
the most persons. Because the total happiness of all people is to be
maximized, this is known as universal utilitarianism."' 7 But another version
of utilitarianism, egoistic utilitarianism, is worthy of consideration because
it has affinities with the rescue doctrine in its evolutionary context. Under
this version, the satisfaction-utility--of the agent is all that counts, though
this may indirectly relate to the satisfaction of others if this is desired by the
agent. 108
Notice the kinship of egoistic utilitarianism to the biology of rescue.
Right at square one, the selfish gene and the self-interested utility maximizer have an obvious commonality. Both place the individual agent at the
center of attention, measuring success only by effects on her. Hence, insofar
as one gets satisfaction from having children and the successes of kin, then
egoistic utilitarianism aligns with kin selection. And insofar as one gets
satisfaction from rescuing another, either from personal gratification alone
or from social approbation, then the rescue, whether or not reciprocated,
aligns with egoistic utilitarianism. The prospect of possible future
reciprocation, direct or indirect, may even add an element of satisfaction.10 9
Finally, under sexual selection, the increased attractiveness of the rescuer
from the act of daring, especially for males, would often be a boon to the
egoistic utilitarian. The commitment to egoistic utilitarianism may even
impel the agent to be more evolutionarily successful by engaging in conduct
107. See BRANDT, supra note 81, at 355 ("Universaltheories roughly hold that it is morally
obligatory to perform a given act if and only if performing it will (actually or expectably)
produce more intrinsic good in general than any other act the agent could perform instead.").
Rawls observes that if the persons in the original position behind the veil of ignorance "are
conceived as perfect altruists, that is, as persons whose desires conform to the approvals of [an
impartial sympathetic] spectator, then the classical principle [of utility] would, of course, be
adopted. The greater net balance of happiness with which to sympathize, the more a perfect
altruist achieves his desire." RAWLS, supra note 26, at 188-89.
108. The egoistic principle is: "A person is obligated over all to perform an action A if and
only if A is, among all the actions he can perform, the one that will produce states of himself of
maximum intrinsic worth." BRANDT, supra note 81, at 369.
109. Alexander posits that patterns of indirect reciprocity ground moral systems, which take
on a utilitarian slant. Alexander, Moral Systems, supra note 43, at 188-95.
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that increases attractiveness. But surely there are limits to this correlation.
The agent may not actually prefer any of the apparent benefits from
performing a rescue. Nor is manifest egoism an attractive feature in either
sex, perhaps partially for Darwinian reasons. Such a characteristic seems
inconsistent with commitments to others, such as to be a loyal mate, to
concentrate one's efforts on raising the children in common, and to aid the
mate's kin. It also would leave others doubtful that the egoist would readily
reciprocate costly kindnesses.
As a side note, it is interesting that egoistic utilitarianism should have so
much in common with biological drives and yet, as discussed immediately
below, typically be thought of as immoral. Perhaps this supports Thomas
Huxley's observation: "Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical
progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process [of
evolution by natural selection], still less in running away from it, but in
combating it.""' Yet most Darwinians who attend to the relationship of
morality to evolution would reject this proposition. Some contend that the
sense of morality has its origin in biological drives."'
110. Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 29, 68 (Matthew
H. Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki eds., 1993). Even some modem biologists agree. See Francisco J.
Ayala, The Biological Roots of Morality, 2 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 235, 237 (1987); George C.
Williams, Huxley's Evolution and Ethics in Sociobiological Perspective, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 43, at 337-38; George C. Williams, Mother Nature Is a Wicked
Old Witch, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra,at 229 (citing Annie Dillard, Richard Dawkins and
Joseph Lopreato). But see DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra note 63, at 344-49 (referring to this
view as "Calvinistic sociobiology"); DE WAAL, PRIMATES, supra note 63, at 7-12 (referring to
this as the "Veneer Theory" of human morality); JOYCE, supra note 26, at 222 (defining natural
selection as "a process that has made us sociable, able to enter into cooperative exchanges,
capable of love, empathy, and altruism ... and has designed us to think of our relations with
one another in moral terms").
111. See supra notes 24-27, 62-63. Darwin, for example, found it highly probable "that
any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial
affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as
its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man." CHARLES
DARWIN, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, in THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES AND
THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX

387, 471-72 (Modem Library

1970) (1871) (footnote omitted). The first reason is:
[T]he social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its
fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform
various services for them. But these feelings and services are by no means
extended to all the individuals of the same species, only to those of the
same association.
Id. at 472. Does Darwin here anticipate reciprocal altruism and, perhaps, kin selection? But then
Darwin opines, that as human intellectual powers increased, "his sympathies became more
tender and widely diffused, extending to men of all races, . . . so would the standard of his
morality rise higher and higher." Id. at 493. Ruse points to other language in Darwin suggestive
of reciprocal altruism: "[A]s the reasoning powers and foresight of the members became
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While today most moral and political philosophers identify themselves
as Kantians, universal utilitarianism is nevertheless seen as much more
defensible than the egoistic version. Simply doing what is best for oneself is
seen as an act of prudence, the very antithesis of a moral act." 2 But unlike
for egoistic utilitarianism, under the universal version, everyone's utility
from an attempted rescue is directly part of the calculus: that of the rescuer,
the rescuee, their kin, friends, onlookers, and society in general. Everyone's
disutility from the attempted rescue, as where the rescuer perishes, is also
thrown onto the scales. Because individual utility may be exceedingly
difficult to quantify, to say nothing of interpersonal utility measurements,
the calculations may become very cloudy." 3 Nevertheless, a universal
utilitarian must make them."'

improved, each man would soon learn from experience that if he aided his fellow-men, he
would commonly receive aid in return." RUSE, supra note 6, at 220 (quoting DARWIN, supra, at
499).
112. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 556 (1980)
("Rational egoism ... is really not a moral conception at all, but rather a challenge to all such
). See generally BRANDT, supra note 81, at 369-75; FRANKENA, supra note
conceptions .
86, at 17-23.
113. Nearly a century ago, Henry Terry identified the factors relevant to the calculus of
reasonable risk. Notice that they are entirely utilitarian:
The reasonableness of a given risk may depend upon the following five
factors:
(1)The magnitude of the risk. A risk is more likely to be unreasonable the
greater it is.
(2) The value or importance of that which is exposed to the risk, which is the
object that the law desires to protect, and may be called the principal object.
The reasonableness of a risk means its reasonableness with respect to the
principal object.
(3) A person who takes a risk of injuring the principal object usually does so
because he has some reason of his own for such conduct,-is pursuing some
object of his own. This may be called the collateral object. In some cases, at
least, the value or importance of the collateral object is properly to be
considered in deciding upon the reasonableness of the risk.
(4) The probability that the collateral object will be attained by the conduct
which involves risk to the principal; the utility of the risk.
(5) The probability that the collateral object would have been attained without taking the risk; the necessity of the risk.
Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40, 42-43 (1915). Terry then turns to an
example based on Eckert v. Long Island Railroad Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), a famous rescue
doctrine case:
The plaintiffs intestate, seeing a child on a railroad track just in front of a
rapidly approaching train, went upon the track to save him. He did save him,
but was himself killed by the train. The jury were allowed to find that he had
not been guilty of contributory negligence. The question was of course
whether he had exposed himself to an unreasonably great risk.
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It may appear, at first glance, that considerations of kin selection are
irrelevant to the universal utilitarianism supporting rescues, for the
satisfaction of the various parties from the rescue may seem independent of
whether the rescuer and rescuee are related. But, as suggested above when
discussing egoistic utilitarianism, the rescuer and rescuee, and their kin,
may gain additional utility if the parties are related, this reaction being
partially disposed by the biology of kin selection. In a successful attempt,
not only is the kin rescued, but the rescuer is also a kin who gains in reproductively beneficial stature by the daring act via sexual selection, not only
for himself but also possibly for his kin. On the other hand, the satisfactions
of unrelated onlookers may be somewhat diminished in these circumstances, for they may feel that a daring rescue of a relative is less admirable
than that of a stranger. Furthermore, they may be envious that it was not
their relative who gained fame from the rescue. As usual in utilitarian
calculations, the bottom line is contingent on circumstances, often too
complicated to fully anticipate beforehand or even measure afterwards.
While I take up below the reaction of onlookers to rescuing kin versus
strangers, let me take a moment to advance the proposition that it is thought
to be more admirable, hence satisfaction-generating, to rescue strangers. For
this I will rely on your reaction to the World Trade Center disaster. Were
not the rescuers there more commendable for their risky efforts on behalf of
strangers? Was not the emotional response to the terrorist attacks by the
country, even much of the world, partly informed by the heroic rescue
efforts toward strangers? Might this explain in part the unprecedented
outpouring of support for the victims and their families, privately, institutionally, and governmentally?" 5 That is, are we honoring the fallen rescuers
to some extent by compensating their attempted rescuees? Of course, that a
large number of private citizens were the objects of attack for the first time
on American soil had much to do with the reactions, but I am still left

Id. at 43 (footnote omitted). In applying the five factors to the hypothetical, he concludes that,
"although the magnitude of the risk was very great and the principal object very valuable, yet
the value of the collateral object and the great utility and necessity of the risk counterbalanced
those considerations, and made the risk reasonable." Id. at 43-44.
114. For an example of the detailed utility considerations that must be weighed in the
context of a duty to rescue, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J.
247, 284-87 (1980).
115. For a brief description of the remarkable generosity of the September II Victim
Compensation Fund, Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 10742, § 405(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 239-40 (2001), passed within ten days of the calamity, see
Robert L. Rabin, Past as Prelude: The Legacy of Five Landmarks of Twentieth-Century Injury
Law for the Future of Torts, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 52, 63-65 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
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wondering whether the generosity was not also fueled by the disinterested
heroism.
At first blush, the universal utilitarian's reaction to reciprocal altruism
also seems to be indifference. The rescue generates satisfaction irrespective
of reciprocation. But to the extent that a rescue is known to be undertaken
with the thought of possible future reciprocation, overall satisfaction may be
reduced. As just discussed in the context of kin selection, the rescue, if done
with self-interested motives, is less admirable, less pleasing to the populace
at large. While the rescuer and her allies may be more satisfied with the
prospect of reciprocation, the rescuee and her allies, and onlookers in
general, may discount the rescuer's efforts by an offsetting amount. The
reinforcement of the general practice of reciprocal altruism may increase
overall satisfaction, but it may be increased even more when the rescuer
acts without self-interested motives.
Sexual selection offers a mixed picture to the universal utilitarian. Yes,
there is the good of the rescue itself, but, once again, if it is done with selfinterested motives, some of the shine is taken off. The rescuer who
knowingly acts for the purpose of becoming more attractive loses points.
Furthermore, overall sexual attractiveness may be a zero sum game. The
more one person becomes attractive, the less relatively attractive, and thus
satisfied, are competitors." 6 In fact, one can easily imagine that the utility of
a large number of competitors is diminished more than the utility of the
rescuer is enhanced. In sports terms, losing hurts more than winning feels
17
good.'

116. This is akin to "'positional goods'-goods that are sought after less because of any
absolute property they possess than because they compare favorably with others in their own
class." ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR
STATUS 7 (1985) (footnote omitted).
117. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1620 (1998)
("Negative events tend to have a larger effect on mood and tend to dominate conscious thought
relative to positive events, and negative emotions are experienced more intensely than are
positive ones."); Barry Schwartz, The Tyranny of Choice, Sci. AM., Apr. 2004, at 70, 73
("Losses make us hurt more than gains make us feel good."); Kathy Bissell, Interview: Bobby
Win
(1998), http://www.privateclubs.com/archives/1998-septBowden Playing to
oct/lifejivbobbybowden.htm (referring to other sports figures who share this view). In Charlie
Brown's words, "Winning isn't everything, but losing isn't anything." STEPHEN L. CARTER,
INTEGRITY 153-54 (1996). This suggests the behavioral economic notion, amply documented,
of loss aversion, which "expresses the intuition that a loss of $X is more aversive than a gain of
$X is attractive." Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1, 3 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
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In conclusion, it seems that both egoistic and universal utilitarianism
somewhat align with the evolutionary aspects of the rescue doctrine.'" 8 But
this estimate turns on the particularities of the rescue and on suppositions as
to what provides satisfaction to the various parties and its quantitative
measurement. It also turns on exactly whose utility is to count. This needs
further discussion.
3.

Boundaries

While egoistic utilitarianism is distinguished from the universal version
by whether it is the agent's, or everyone's, satisfaction that falls within the
utilitarian calculus, there are other possible places to draw the line. Even
under Bentham's version of universal utilitarianism, if the aim is to
maximize happiness, should not all animals that can experience pleasure
and pain, such as complex animals, be taken into account?" 9 This raises the
boundary question confronting utilitarianism. 20 What are the bounds of the
118. Ruse, speaking in terms of universal utilitarianism, asks, does "the willingness to help
and co-operate, which the Darwinian sees as the result of evolution ... bear any affinities to
utilitarian ethics, with its emphasis on happiness as the end and guide to action?" RUSE, supra
note 6, at 235. "The obvious answer is that it does. Things which give us pleasure and things
which give us pain ...did not just happen by evolutionary chance to be as they are." Id. at 23536. "[N]atural selection has made us in such a way that we enjoy things which are biologically
good for us and dislike things which are biologically bad for us." Id. at 236. Though we are
generally inclined to be self-interested, "(unbeknown to us) our biological fitness is increased if
we have urges to expend effort on promoting the ends that others (consciously) want. Since the
ends of others are analogous to our ends ...our urges are directed towards promoting the
general happiness of our fellows, as well as ourselves." Id. at 237. "In broad outline, therefore,
the utilitarian perspective on the nature of morality meshes comfortably with the Darwinian
approach to such thought and behaviour." Id.
119. "Indeed, as Bentham emphasized, the beneficiaries [of sacrifice] need not be Homo
sapiens-any sentient being's pains and pleasures are, he claimed, as morally significant as our
own." John Troyer, Human and Other Natures, in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY, supra
note 27, at 62, 65. Henry Sidgwick, a leading utilitarian, also discussed whether we should "try
to produce the greatest amount of happiness for human beings or for all sentient creatures."
Peter Singer, Deciding What Is Right, in ETHICS 243, 245 (Peter Singer ed., 1994) (citing
HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (7th ed. 1907)). "[V]irtually every utilitarian has
given the more inclusive answer, as Sidgwick does .... Id.; see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 144-45 (1996) ("[T]rue utilitarianism . . . expresses a
commitment to improve the well-being of all sentient beings, that is, all living beings, including
animals, who experience pleasure and pain.").
120. There are other aspects of this problem of scope. For example, Mackie questions
whether the utilitarian mandate reaches "'all human beings' or 'all sentient beings'? ...Does it
include only those who are now alive, or also future generations; and if so, only those who will
exist or also those who might exist?" MACKIE, supra note 80, at 126-27. Similarly, Posner
observes that welfare economics "cannot answer the question of what the boundaries of the
society are. Should fetuses be included or not? What about the unborn generally? And therefore
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utilitarian calculus? For some modem philosophers, such as Peter Singer,
the bounds do indeed reach all sentient creatures, including animals, driving
him to vegetarianism in most circumstances. 121 But even keeping the
boundary at all humans has implications that most people balk at. 122 At the
limit, it suggests that people in prosperous nations should donate their

money to those in third-world poverty to the point where their next dollar
would give more utility to the giver than to the receiver.'2 3 The result would
what about a person's future selves? I know of no other body of thought that offers a

satisfactory answer to the question either."

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE

89

(1995). "These paradoxes of utilitarianism reflect one of the fundamental and seemingly
insoluble problems of that philosophy, which is its inability to specify the community whose
utility is to be maximized." Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification,
and Comment on Conference Papers,in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 317, 335 (Matthew D. Adler
& Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); see, e.g., D. D. RAPHAEL, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 37-38 (1981)
(discussing "whose pleasure is to count"); Barbara Herman, The Scope of Moral Requirement,
30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 227, 227 (2001) ("In moral theories that take the promotion of well-being
as their core value, beneficence comes naturally .... Once the claim of need is acknowledged, it
is not easy to see what, morally, can constrain its demand."); Singer, supra note 119, at 245
("And is it only good to increase happiness by making existing beings happier, or is it also good
to bring into existence beings who will be happy?"). As the following sources further indicate, it
is not just utilitarians who are fretting over boundaries. In general, "[t]here has been growing
debate over the claim that we have 'associative duties' to people with whom we have special
relationships, such as our relatives, friends, and countrymen." Niko Kolodny, Do Associative
Duties Matter?, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 250, 250 (2002). "The debate has tended to focus on the
Id.; see, e.g., Neera K. Badhwar,
differential treatment that associative duties would entail .
InternationalAid: When Giving Becomes a Vice, 23 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 69 (2006); Michael
Blake, DistributiveJustice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257 (2001);
Herman, supra; Charles Jones, Patriotism, Morality, and Global Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE
125 (Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999); Richard W. Miller, Beneficence, Duty and
Distance, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 357 (2004); Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity,
and the State, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2007).
121. See SINGER, supra note 104, at 55, 62-65 (naming, among possible exceptions, when
animals are "produced without suffering").
122. "In practice, utilitarians have been remarkably unforthcoming about the international
implications of the doctrine, with the exception of Peter Singer." Brian Barry, Statism and
Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 12, 36.
"Darwinism seems to fit more with our moral intuitions than does utilitarianism. We have a
moral obligation to promote happiness, but this obligation weakens as the circle widens." RUSE,
supra note 6, at 242. This is reflected in our courts. "The true utilitarian would be concerned
about all of humankind, but national courts are interested exclusively in the welfare of the
nation." FLETCHER, supra note 119, at 146.
123. "Many moralists argue that we have an equal obligation to all human beings,
indifferently as to relationship acquaintance, nationality, or whatever." Ruse, supra note 67, at
239; see Weinrib, supra note 114, at 264 ("[William] Godwin's comprehensive view of [utilitarian] morality required everyone to devote all of their resources, energies, and opportunities to
the assistance of others in order to maximize the utility of all."). Singer points in this direction:
"[I]t is difficult to see any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or community
membership, makes a crucial difference to our obligations." SINGER, supra note 104, at 232. But
Ruse suspects "that, sincerely meant, this doctrine makes the evolutionist decidedly queasy,"
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be a worldwide leveling of wealth, insofar as wealth is associated with
utility. A counterargument to required generosity this extensive is that it
would produce negative utility effects, including those that stem from
undermining incentives for the wealth generation needed for economic
development. 2 4 But long before this point is reached, most people would
already object to sending their dollars abroad.
One way to respond to the impulse that "charity begins at home" is to
adjust the boundaries of the utilitarian calculus.' 25 One could draw the
boundary short of all humans. Falling between the reaches of egoistic and
universal utilitarianism, one could declare, say, that the satisfaction of distant humans has less value than the equal satisfaction of nearer ones.'26
since, biologically, our concerns are with kin, those we have a relationship with, "and only
finally to complete strangers." Ruse, supra note 67, at 239. "And, feelings of moral obligation
have to mirror biology." Id. Singer acknowledges the biases from human nature, but still rejects
their moral significance. See Badhwar, supra note 120, at 93. Hume largely agrees with Ruse,
though he overlooks the tug of reciprocal altruism: "A man naturally loves his children better
than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where

every thing else is equal."

DAVID HUME,

A TREATISE

OF HUMAN NATURE

483-84 (L.A. Selby-

Bigge ed., London, Oxford 1888). "Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural
course of our passions." Id. at 484. To speculate on the origins of our passions towards
strangers: "For our ancestors, encounters with strangers were probably rare, owing to low
population densities and territorial defense against outsiders, and they were possibly accompanied by strong emotions (e.g., anxiety, hostility, sexual interest)." Adrian Treves & Diego
Pizzagalli, Vigilance and Perception of Social Stimuli: Views from Ethology and Social
Neuroscience, in THE COGNITIVE ANIMAL 463, 464 (Marc Bekoff et al. eds., 2002). Indeed,
"[a]ny modem parents who gave no more care and affection to their own children than they did

to all others would be seen as monsters."

MARY MIDGLEY, THE ETHICAL PRIMATE

146 (1994).

Ruse invokes Rawls: "Explicitly, Rawls treats close kin as a case meriting special attention, and
as he himself admits it is far from obvious that his theory readily embraces relations with the
Third World." Ruse, supra note 67, at 240 (citing Rawls, supra note 112).
124. See Badhwar, supra note 120, at 75; Kolodny, supra note 120, at 262. Furthermore,
"[t]he element of truth in the view that we should first take care of our own, lies in the advantage of a recognised system of responsibilities." SINGER, supra note 104, at 233. Singer considers, and rejects, various objections to expecting extensive generosity to strangers. See id. at
232-46. But even Singer, finding "that the standard set by [his] argument is so high as to be
counterproductive," settles "for a round percentage of one's income like, say, 10 per cent,"
unless the donor has special needs. Id. at 246. For utilitarian problems with the requirement of
"perfect and general altruism," see Weinrib, supra note 114, at 281-83.
125. "'Charity begins at home' is the motto of the evolutionary ethicist." RUSE, supra note
78, at 248.
126. Samuel Scheffler observes that "the importance of special obligations in commonsense moral thought seems undeniable." SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Individual Responsibility in a
GlobalAge, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES 32, 36 (2001).
The willingness to make sacrifices for one's family, one's community, one's
friends, and one's comrades is seen as one of the marks of a good or virtuous
person, and the demands of morality, as ordinarily interpreted, have less to
do with abstractions like the overall good than with the specific web of roles
and relationships that serve to situate a person in social space.
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Though not a typical utilitarian standard, one might say that the utility of
persons in foreign countries is to be weighted as half that of fellow citizens,
so that one is to donate money to foreigners in poverty to the point where
the next dollar would give more than half the utility to the giver than to the
receiver. Or a sliding scale could be embraced depending on which foreign
country is in question, distinguishing, say, nearby Mexico from distant
Nepal. Or one might simply exclude foreigners altogether from the calculus.
For example, Rawls considers, but rejects, "the strict classical doctrine" of
utilitarianism "that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its
major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of
satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it. ' 127
' For that
matter, one might exclude altogether, or at least discount, residents of

Id. at 36-37. Many of the essays in Scheffler's collection discuss this and related issues. See
SCHEFFLER, supra; see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1067-68 (1976) (discussing the utilitarian
position of Mill and Sidgwick "that our propensity to prefer the interests of those who are close
to us is in fact perfectly reasonable because we are more likely to be able to benefit those
people"). In considering this issue, Margalit distinguishes ethics from morality. "Morality, in
my usage, ought to guide our behavior toward those to whom we are related just by virtue of
their being fellow human beings, and by virtue of no other attribute." MARGALIT, supra note 77,
at 37 (explaining "thin relations"). "Ethics, in contrast, guides our thick relations," id., which
"are grounded in attributes such as parent, friend, lover, fellow-countryman," id. at 7. "Ethical
relations involve partiality-that is, favoring a person or a group over others with equal moral
claim." Id. at 87. For similar distinctions, see generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS
OF IDENTITY (2005). See also T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 171-77 (1998);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 6, 174-96 (1985). As an example,
Christopher Heath Wellman advocates on moral grounds a redistributive policy favoring
compatriots over foreigners, contending that the domestic poor should receive more than the
foreign poor. See Christopher Wellman, RelationalFacts in Liberal PoliticalTheory: Is There
Magic in the Pronoun "My"?, 110 ETHICS 537 (2000). For criticism of his reasoning, see
Christian Coons, Wellman 's "Reductive" Justificationsfor Redistributive Policies that Favor
Compatriots: Metaphysicaland Geographical,111 ETHICS 782 (2001). Singer, to the contrary,
argues that "taking care of our own" is not a persuasive reason to reduce foreign aid. See
SINGER, supra note 104, at 232-34. Similarly, "[t]o many Christians, allowing believers to
develop a hierarchy of responsibilities accedes too much to everyday custom, thereby dulling
the edge of Christianity's capacity for social criticism, its radical message of selfless,
indiscriminate love." Richard B. Miller, Christian Attitudes Toward Boundaries, in
BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE 15, 17-18 (David Miller & Sohail H. Hashmi eds., 2001). "Territorial
boundaries are a source of embarrassment for liberals of all stripes, and particularly for liberal
egalitarians." Will Kymlicka, Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in
BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE, supra, at 249, 249. That, by declining to aid the distant needy, we
may be ogres or irrational, see Caspar Hare, Rationalityand the DistantNeedy, 35 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 161 (2007).
127. RAWLS, supra note 26, at 22 (emphasis added).
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distant parts of the same country or society. Or members of different
communities,128 or neighborhoods.' 29

Once one is willing to draw boundaries, it becomes easier to mesh
utilitarianism with evolutionary dispositions. If drawn at family members,
then kin selection is approached.1 30 Approached, but not reached, since utilitarianism ordinarily weighs equally the satisfaction of all within the boundary, while kin selection preferentially weighs the reproductive advantages,
whether or not measurable in terms of satisfaction, to kin in proportion to
their genetic closeness. In other words, for the universal utilitarian, all
human satisfactions count the same, but for the kin selector, some relative's
reproductive success is more valuable than other's. But since we are now
128. One form of communitarianism suggests this line drawing. Communitarianism is a
political philosophy that rejects the priority of the individual over the community. Observing
that persons are not self-made, but are largely formed by their environment, the communitarian
argues that therefore the community has claims against its members beyond those recognized by
individualists, such as libertarians. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). The communitarian must then identify the community to which each
person has obligations. In fact, each person is a member of many communities, including the
neighborhood, city, state, nation, religious group, school, company, civic organizations, etc. If
they all have claims against the individual, conflicting demands are likely. Arguably, in cases of
conflict, obligations to each of a person's communities must be prioritized and weighted. "The
theory of justice is alert to differences, sensitive to boundaries." MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 315 (1983). "[Bloundary conflict is endemic. The principles appropriate to the different
spheres are not harmonious with one another ... " Id. at 318. To cope with any disharmony, an
adjustment is needed. "But this adjustment must itself be worked out politically, and its precise
character will depend upon understandings shared among the citizens about the value of cultural
diversity, local autonomy, and so on." Id. at 29. In the context of the rescue doctrine, for
example, while Walzer recognizes duties to strangers in distress, he curtails them beyond those
owed to fellow community members. See id. at 33-34; see also RUSE, supra note 78, at 247
(referring to those who "have argued for a more restricted morality, arguing that there is a
falling away of the moral imperatives as one moves farther from oneself, one's family, one's
friends, one's society and one's country").
129. One "should acknowledge the ethical salience of not just the state but the county, the
town, the street, the business, the craft, the profession, the family as communities, as circles
among the many circles narrower than the human horizon that are appropriate spheres of moral
concern." APPIAH, supra note 126, at 246. "The morality most people practice... [reveals that]
the strongest obligations are those to family and kin, then to friends who have benefited oneself,
then, in diminishing order of urgency, to one's group, tribe, neighborhood, nation-and only
lastly to humans in general." John Chandler, Ethical Philosophy, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL
IMAGINATION, supra note 21, at 157, 159. This "cohere[s] well with sociobiological theory." Id.;
cf HOWARD RACHLIN, THE SCIENCE OF SELF-CONTROL 185-86 (2000) (arguing that, in light of
unselfish behavior towards friends, "[i]t seems that people's concepts of their selves may
include other people with whom they function together").
130. "In 1997, . . . over four thousand living Americans donated kidneys. One of these
donors actually gave a kidney to a non-relative. Her act was so rare that she received a flood of
media attention." TERRY BURNHAM & JAY PHELAN, MEAN GENES 204 (2000). Did this media
attention improve her mate or mating opportunities, via sexual selection, or her future prospects,
via reciprocal altruism?
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departing from standard utilitarianism, let us not hesitate to further
subdivide boundaries. We could weigh the utility of kin in incremental
proportion to their closeness. Then the only remaining gap between this
utilitarianism and kin selection is that utilitarianism aims for satisfaction or
utility, while kin selection aims for genetic success, the chances of which
may vary among equally close kin because of, say, their relative ages,
attractiveness, or prospective supportiveness. But once we begin to freely
adjust the utilitarian calculus, we could take into account these last factors
as well.
By adjusting boundaries, the gap between utilitarianism and reciprocal
altruism can also be narrowed. If the utilitarian calculus extends only to
members of the community, acquaintances, friends, or neighbors, then the
principle of reciprocal altruism may be brought closer to utilitarianism, the
distinction between utility and reproduction remaining."' As one example,
"Sidgwick notes, a utilitarian never regards himself as acting merely for the
sake of an impersonal law, but always for the welfare of some being or
beings for whom he has some degree of fellow feeling."' As another
example, Donald Reagan champions "co-operative utilitarianism," the first
step of which is that each agent "should identify the other agents who are
willing and able to co-operate in the production of best possible consequences, 133 and then she should cooperate with them.'34 But again the
131. On the other hand, Pinker, using reciprocal altruism ideas in discussing Singer's
utilitarian expanding circle, contends that "[t]he expansion of the moral circle does not have to
be powered by some mysterious drive toward goodness. It may come from the interaction
between the selfish process of evolution and a law of complex systems." PINKER, supra note 72,
at 167. "Human societies, like living things, have become more complicated and cooperative
over time. Again, it is because agents do better when they team up and specialize in pursuit of
their shared interests, as long as they solve the problems of exchanging information and
punishing cheaters." Id. at 167-68.
132. RAWLS, supra note 26, at 477 (citing SIDGWICK, supra note 119, at 501). Sidgwick,
wishing to expand the boundaries, goes on to "maintain that, on empirical grounds alone,
enlightened self-interest would direct most men to foster and develop their sympathetic
susceptibilities to a greater extent than is now commonly attained." SIDGWICK, supra note 119,
at 501. Yet Sidgwick doubts that human affection can be expanded to a universal scope, see id.
at 434-35, but takes comfort in the observation that "each person is for the most part, from
limitation either of power or knowledge, not in a position to do much good to more than a very
small number of persons," id. at 434. Mill was also restrictive about the moral claims to
altruistic concern. "No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are
not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any given individual." MILL, supra note 74,
at 61-62. For a modem view that one should be partial to one's friends, see, for example, Sarah
Stroud, Epistemic Partialityin Friendship, 116 ETHICS 498 (2006).
133. DONALD REAGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION, at x (1980).
134. Specifically, "[t]hen he should do his part in the best plan of behaviour for the group
consisting of himself and the others so identified, in view of the behaviour of non-members of
that group." Id. Evolution may be brought into this utilitarian conception. In discussing
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boundary may not circumscribe an all-or-nothing calculus, but instead
consist of innumerable delineations generating a sliding scale that weighs
the utility of others according to the likelihood that they will interact, and
hence be in a position to reciprocate in the future. Even finer lines can be
drawn that turn not only on the likelihood of interacting, but also on the
likelihood of reciprocating, as where the age, status, and wherewithal of the
rescuee, her kin, and supporters are considered.'35 Why not slide all the way
down the slope to coincide with full-fledged reciprocal altruism under the
cover of demarcating utilitarian boundaries?
While the utilitarianization of kin selection and reciprocal altruism does
not seem to require general distinctions between the conduct of men and
women, when it comes to exploring the utilitarian boundaries of the rescue
doctrine suggested by sexual selection, the substantial differences in the
mating strategies of men and women call for explicit consideration of the
sex of the prospective rescuer. The possible mating benefits for men from
rescues appear so much greater than those for women, such that their
reinforcing moral impulses would seem to differ substantially. For women
desiring men, it was postulated that daring or arduous rescues may provide
opportunities to demonstrate their youth, health and even commitment, 36
but it would seem that women simply seeking matings need not demonstrate
very much of these qualities, if any, and women seeking better mates, along
with those simply seeking matings, usually have other, less costly means to
amply demonstrate these qualities. In other words, because of the risks of
undertaking rescues, a woman's good, insofar as it relates to mate or mating
opportunities, typically would be increased more efficiently by displaying
the qualities that make her desirable in other, safer manners. Yet this may
not always be the case. The quality of commitment sought by men may be
uniquely demonstrated by a woman's risky rescue attempt of a person to
whom she is committed. But "commitment" in these circumstances implies
a preexisting relationship. The rescue of a stranger is not the product of a
commitment in this sense. The rescue of a fellow householder, relative, or
friend, on the other hand, does reflect the relevant commitment. This
implies that for women, moral urges regarding rescues stemming from
sexual selection would be skewed toward extant, warm relationships. This
evaluative capacities, Nozick opines that "evolutionarily selected desires and patterns of
behavior might get incorporated into norms: 'Care for your offspring'; 'Help members of your
family'; 'Cooperate with those who evidence a willingness to cooperate with you for mutual
benefit."' NOZICK, supra note 21, at 276.
135. Sam Murumba noted to me the daunting computational requirements of this
suggestion along with its prisoner's dilemma and collective action problems.
136. See supra Part I.B.3.
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is consistent with Gilligan's findings that women generally share an ethic of
attachment and care-giving for loved ones beyond that of men, who tend to
develop a moral sensibility that does not give as high priority to such
relationships.' 3
For men, on the other hand, sexual selection would favor a substantial
enlargement of the utilitarian boundaries of the rescue doctrine beyond
those of kin selection and reciprocal altruism. It was noted that a man by a
daring rescue might display several qualities desired by a woman, such as
strength, athleticism, bravery, health, kindness, dependability, love and
commitment, along with the possible enhancement of social status and
financial prospects. Most of these qualities are demonstrated or furthered
irrespectively of the character of the rescuee. While the rescue of a social
pariah may decrease social status and financial prospects, it would still
usually demonstrate the physical and emotional qualities preferred by
women in a man. Therefore, it seems that the moral urges of men springing
from sexual selection would encompass wide boundaries for rescuees,
extending toward, if not quite reaching, universal ethical utilitarianism. 3 '
To summarize, the utilitarian boundaries of the rescue doctrine consistent
with the considered evolutionary factors substantially differ from one to the
next, and even depend on the sex of the agent. The urges from kin selection
would approach egoistic utilitarianism in their narrowness, and the urges for
men from sexual selection would approach universal utilitarianism. Those
from reciprocal altruism would fall in between. Perhaps this lack of
coherence helps to explain why humans are ambivalent about the aptness of
various moral mandates for rescue attempts, and, more immediately, vary so
much in their willingness to undertake risky rescues.
Though I have been able in principle to drag utilitarianism closer to
biological dispositions, I will be the first to admit that I have stretched
principle beyond that of any standard utilitarian system, partially because
the three considered evolutionary factors suggest different versions of utilitarianism. But my stretches are not over. See what I next do to Kant.

137. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN,

IN A DIFFERENT VOICE

151-74 (1982).

138. Despite my argument that sexual selection may induce men to rescue more people than
it would women, this may not dominate actual overall dispositions. To refer to an example used
before, the inclination of both women and men to rescue anyone at risk may have become
established on the savanna where nearly everyone in the vicinity was kin or a potential
reciprocator. See supra text accompanying note 18. In this case, any narrower tendencies from
sexual selection may have been swamped by those from kin selection and reciprocal altruism.
For this and other reasons, it remains an empirical question whether men and women diverge in
their tendencies to rescue strangers. For suggestive evidence, see Kuklin, supra note 7, at 206
n.136.
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B. Kantianism: The CategoricalImperative

Immanuel Kant developed the best-known deontological theory. Kant's
deontology is grounded on pure reason and not on any natural moral
feelings such as an innate sense of justice. 139 Reason alone drove Kant to the
categorical imperative.
Three key forms of Kant's categorical imperative suffice to identify his
basic moral framework.14 ° First, moral maxims are to be universalized.141
For example, it is improper for a person to embrace a maxim that declares,
"Everyone is to attempt reasonable rescues of those in peril, except me."
Second, people, as moral beings by virtue of their rational nature, are to be
treated with respect, as ends in themselves and not as a means only to
another's end.'42 In other words, as autonomous, ethical beings, people are
not simply to be used by others. Third, adopted moral maxims are to be performed disinterestedly. 4 3 One is to perform them out of a sense of duty, and
139. Arnhart challenges Kant's proposition that morality must stem from a disinterested
rationality. "Psychopaths show that [this] cannot be true.... Their immorality comes not from
any defect of abstract reason, but from their emotional poverty. They cannot be moral, because
they lack the social emotions-such as sympathy, guilt, and shame-that sustain moral
conduct." LARRY ARNHART, DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT 229 (1998). Even chimpanzees may
have a sense of justice. See FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS 207 (1982) ("[T]his
[conduct by two chimpanzees] would suggest that reciprocity among chimpanzees is governed
by the same sense of moral rightness and justice as it is among humans."); Frans B.M. de Waal,
The Chimpanzee's Sense of Social Regularityand Its Relation to the Human Sense ofJustice, in
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 241, 241-54. Even capuchin monkeys object to
perceived unfairness. See Nicholas Wade, Genetic Basis To Fairness,Study Hints, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2003, at A27. "Based on recent research on chimpanzee cognition, it seems likely that
some of the cognitive capacities that underlie the expression of ethics in humans were also
present in the common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees." Daniel J. Povinelli & Laurie R.
Godfrey, The Chimpanzee's Mind: How Noble in Reason? How Absent of Ethics?, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 110, at 277, 277. Since biological traits evolve gradually, one
would expect other higher primates to have some sense of morality, as do humans. See RUSE,
supra note 6, at 227-29.
140. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H. J.
Paton trans., 3d ed. 1956) (1785).
141. See generally CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Kant's Formula of Universal Law, in
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 77, 77-102 (1996). Many moralists other than Kantians,
including religious leaders, utilitarians, stoics, and existentialists, have embraced a
universalization principle. See SINGER, supra note 104, at 10-11. "The criterion of generality
[universality] is so widely accepted that it is often identified with the moral point of view." AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 13 (1996). See generally
MACKIE, supra note 80, at 83-102.
142. Note that Kant would reject the utilitarian position that animals fall within the sphere
of beings considered part of the moral calculus. See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS
239-41 (Louis Infield trans., Harper & Row 1963) (1930).
143. For a brief summary of these three forms of the categorical imperative, see FLETCHER,
supra note 119, at 147-49.
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not because it is in one's self interest to do so or because one gets pleasure
from it. A prime example of a Kantian maxim is that all promises are to be
kept, such as those central to contractual obligations. Because both parties
agree to the contract, their autonomy is respected and they are not simply
using one another. Both contracting parties, presumably, benefit from the
arrangement, but even if this is not the case, they must dutifully perform
because they have promised.
Kant's moral system is said to be merely formal. 44 It establishes only a
framework for moral maxims. While, as a matter of logic, adopted maxims
must cohere with one another, Kant's system does not necessitate any
particular maxim or set of maxims.145 Thus, in theory, there are an infinite
number of Kantian moral orders. Every member of a society could rationally adopt a different set of maxims.
Emphasizing the formal structure of Kant's moral system, I will examine
the three main forms of the categorical imperative to see the extent to which
they may be consistent with the principles of kin selection, reciprocal
altruism, and sexual selection in the context of the rescue doctrine. First, I
analyze the universalization principle, then the mandate to respect persons,
and finally the duty to act disinterestedly.
1.

Universalized Maxims

Kant's universalization principle has been likened to the Golden Rule.
More closely, but still inexactly, it boils down to: "'A person's maxim is
universalizable if, and only if, he can agree, as a matter of reflective policy,
to everyone else also acting in accordance with it."" 46

144. See, e.g., F. H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 142-59 (photo. reprint 1959) (2d ed.
1927); C. D. BROAD, FIVE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 123 (7th ed. 1956) (1930); ONORA NELL,
ACTING ON PRINCIPLE 132-37 (1975). Hegel first asserted this understanding. See G. W. F.
HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 89-90, 253-54 (T. M. Knox trans., 1953) (1821). Some
challenge the interpretation of Kant as a pure formalist. See, e.g., CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD,
Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF
ENDS, supra note 141, at 43, 64-65; MARCUS GEORGE SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS
251-52 (1961). Ruse sees in Kant the argument that "the basis for ethics [is] the interrelation of
rational beings as they attempt to live and work together. Without ethics, in the normative sense,
we run into 'contradictions', where these are to be understood as failures of social living rather
than anything in a formal sort of way." RUSE, supra note 78, at 255.
145. For a Kantian argument for a duty to rescue, see Weinrib, supra note 114, at 287-92.
146. BRANDT, supra note 81, at 29. One of Kant's versions is, "I ought never to act except
in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." KANT, supra
note 140, at 70.
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Kant himself championed at least two moral maxims as basic: truthtelling and, as in the contract example above, promise-keeping. 147 These
maxims, circumscribed by the categorical imperative, led him to some
conclusions that most would find untenable. For example, assume that a
person has promised to meet another for lunch sharply at noon. While
racing to the appointed restaurant to get there on time, the promisor, an
excellent swimmer, sees a person in distress flailing in a nearby lake while
crying for help. If the rescue would delay the promisor beyond the noon
148
appointment, Kant would have her pass on by. Promises must be kept!
For another example, assume a host asks a guest how she enjoyed the
dinner party. If the guest actually found the evening excruciatingly boring
and the food barely edible, she must report this to the host. 149 No white lies,
the truth must be told!
Few moralists, even Kantians, would agree with the extreme strictures
implied by Kant's universalized framework as seen in the examples above.
Various ways have been found to soften them. For example, regarding the
truth-telling example, one might define "lie" in such a way as to exclude
white lies. A lie may be defined as an assertion of fact on which the listener

147. See KANT, supra note 140, at 70-71 (discussing truth-telling and promise-keeping);
supra note 142, at 224-29 (discussing truth-telling).
148. See IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in THE

KANT,

CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

346, 346-50

(Lewis White Beck trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1949) (1797). For criticism, see, for example,
SISSELA BOK, LYING 37-39 (1978) (calling Kant "obsessive" but concluding he is correct);
Brian Barry, And Who Is My Neighbor?, 88 YALE L. J. 629, 644-45 (1979). For analyses by

distinguished Kantians that avoid the "rigorism" of Kant's passages endorsing an absolute duty
of truth-telling, see generally CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing
with Evil, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS, supra note 141, at 133 [hereinafter KORSGAARD,
Right to Lie]; CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Two Arguments Against Lying, in id. at 335
[hereinafter KORSGAARD, Two Arguments]; H. J. Paton, An Alleged Right to Lie: A Problem in
Kantian Ethics, 45 KANT-STUDIEN 190 (1953-54); Tamar Schapiro, Kantian Rigorism and
Mitigating Circumstances, 117 ETHICS 32 (2006).
149. Perhaps the guest need not be so forthright. For example, in the movie Amadeus,
Mozart attends an opera by Salieri and afterwards is asked by him, "Did my work please you?"
AMADEUS (Warner Bros. 1984). Mozart, obviously unimpressed, answers, "How could it not,
Excellency?" "Yes?" Salieri responds. "I never knew that music like that was possible," says
Mozart. "You flatter me." Mozart finally concludes, "Oh no! One hears such sounds and what
can one say, but-Salieri!" Id. Upon that, Salieri smiles, as does the knowing viewer. Id. Apparently, Mozart kept abreast of the writings of his contemporary, Kant. On the other hand, Bok,
who defines a lie as "any intentionally deceptive message which is stated," may not approve.
BOK, supra note 148, at 13 (emphasis omitted). Yet even she "would not wish to argue that all
white lies should be ruled out." Id. at 71. Carter opines that the commitment never to lie is
"psychologically impossible." STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 33 (1996).
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may be reasonably expected to rely to her detriment.151 Since a host is
unlikely to detrimentally rely on a guest's etiquette-driven compliment of
her dinner party, the assertion is not a lie, properly speaking."' Or, as in the
promise-keeping example of the foregone rescue, one might qualify each
express promise with implied exceptions, the provisos to be filled according
to legal rules, customs, social mores, and other normative understandings.'52
In this example, the implied proviso might be, "except if I am delayed by
attempting a rescue," or, more generally, "except if I find myself in a dire
emergency."' 53 As a matter of reflective policy, moral persons normally
would agree to these qualifications. But a qualification may be unacceptable
if, say, the meeting exactly at noon was known to be crucial to the
wellbeing of the promisee, as where the promisor was to pay off a debt that
the promisee must turn over to a gangster at 12:01, "or else .... .
At first glance it may seem that the exceptions run afoul of Kant's
universalization principle. But this would be a mistaken confusion of
generality for universality. 5 4 Though the unqualified maxims are more
general than those with provisos, all of them may be equally universal
when, qualified or not, they apply to everyone without exclusion whenever
the specified circumstances arise. 55 For example, one universalized maxim
150. This version of "lie" verges into fraud or misrepresentation. See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 236-52 (4th ed. 2004). For an insightful taxonomy of "lie," see
STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST 297-300 (2001).
151. Baier suggests other plausible universalized maxims regarding truth-telling: "'Lie
when it is the only way to avoid harming someone,' or 'Lie when it is helpful to you and harmful to no one else,' or 'Lie when it is entertaining and harmless."' KURT BALER, THE MORAL
POINT OF VIEW 200 (1958). But cf SINGER, supra note 144, at 100-01 (noting the problem that a
lie may benefit one person while injuring another). Proper and improper lies may be
distinguished "by fine-grained, context-sensitive descriptions, rather than general descriptions
like 'deception."' Schapiro, supra note 148, at 37.
152. If the "other normative understandings" include Kantian maxims, then one is at risk of
circular reasoning.
153. "Possibly Kant could argue . . . [that] one can will the maxim, 'When breaking a
promise is required in order to help someone I will break it,' to be universally acted on in the
situations specified, especially if it is also specified in the maxim that the promise is not crucially important and that the help is." FRANKENA, supra note 86, at 26-27; cf CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 26 (1996) ("Many rules have explicit
or implicit exceptions for cases of necessity or emergency."); W. D. Ross, The Personal
Characterof Duty, in ETHICS, supra note 119, at 332, 334 ("If I have promised to meet a friend
at a particular time for some trivial purpose, I should certainly think myself justified in breaking
my engagement if by doing so I could prevent a serious accident or bring relief to the victims of
one.").
154. "A famous flaw with the categorical-imperative test is that it fails to establish at what
generality the maxims that we test ought to be pitched." WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, NATURAL
ETHICAL FACTS 134 (2003).
155. "Briefly, generality is the opposite of specificity, whereas universality is compatible
with specificity, and means merely the logical property of being governed by a universal
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with broad generality is, "One is to attempt reasonable rescues of those in
peril." We could expand the generality, that is, enlarge the number of cases
to which rescue is morally required by eliminating the "reasonable"
limitation and declaring, "One is to attempt rescues of those in peril." To
put the less general maxim in the form of an explicit exception, it might
read, "One is to attempt rescues of those in peril, except when such a rescue
attempt would be unreasonably demanding."' 6 While this gambit of
narrowing the generality of a maxim may facilitate self-serving rationaliza"' it appears that we have no choice but to face this risk in developing
tions, 57
a reasonable, principled moral system.'
Qualified moral maxims, then, do not necessarily violate Kant's
universalization principle, though they still must satisfy the coherence
quantifier and not containing individual constants." HARE, supra note 88, at 41 (using the
distinguishing examples, "'Never kill people' and 'Never kill people except in self-defence..
.'); see SINGER, supra note 144, at 67 (using the label "restricted universality" for a "restriction
to 'every similar person in similar circumstances"'). Brandt refers to the general Kantian
maxim: "In circumstances of the kind FGH, let me do A!" BRANDT, supra note 81, at 28. A
completely general, universal maxim would be, "always do A."
156. "To help others where one can is a duty .... " KANT, supra note 140, at 66 (emphasis
added). Kant found the duty of mutual aid to be "an imperfect duty of virtue, since the law does
not say exactly what or how much we must do along these lines." KORSGAARD, Right to Lie,
supra note 148, at 145. But there is some question whether Kant adequately defends his view
that one logically does have a duty render aid. See George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A
Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 533, 547-49 (1987). In Weinrib's Kantian analysis of
a proposed duty to rescue, he finds room for "emergency" and "convenience" limitations to the
duty. See Weinrib, supra note 114, at 289-92; George Klosko, Samaritanism and Political
Obligation: A Response to Christopher Wellman's "Liberal Theory of Political Obligation,"
113 ETHICS 835, 837 (2003) ("As ordinarily construed, [a person's] duty to rescue other people
is limited by the proviso that this must not be unduly costly to herself.").
157. See SINGER, supra note 144, at 101-03 (criticizing the ad hocery of avoiding conflicts
among maxims by qualifications and questioning the possibility of specifying all governing
qualifications).
158. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 118 (1979). "Most Kantians try to avoid fanaticism by carving exceptions to the
categorical duties they impose [as where one person must be tortured to save the human race]..
. . Once this much is conceded, however, there is no logical stopping point." Id. (footnote
omitted). "Depending on where he does draw the line, the Kantian either shades into the
utilitarian (if he gives a lot of weight to costs) or remains a fanatic (if he doesn't)." Id.
Korsgaard, a thorough Kantian, discusses the consideration of utilitarian and other values when
adjusting the reach of universalized maxims. See KORSGAARD, Two Arguments, supra note 148,
at 357. She writes:
A natural objection is that if we work this way there is a danger that we
will simply adjust our ethical categories and principles reciprocally until
we get whatever result we want ....
Of course there are dangers of this
kind, but it is not clear that we have any option but to face them, and to try
to be intellectually honest.
Id. at 357-58.
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requirement.159 That is, the set of adopted moral maxims must be consistent
with one another, so that a person is able to satisfy them all simultaneously.
This can be seen as an aspect of Kant's famous mandate that "'ought'
implies 'can."" 6 In legal terms, society cannot properly require compliance
with a particular law if one cannot do so without violating another law. 6 '
Interestingly, "'ought' implies 'can"' also restricts maxims to those that are
physically possible, precluding maxims such as, "if necessary, one must
leap over tall buildings to rescue those in distress." General psychological
impediments also suggest the impossibility limitation to maxims,' 62 as
where, when considering utilitarianism, the leveling principle of voluntary
equal-wealth distribution throughout the world was discussed. Would most
people find
it psychologically "impossible" to be so generous to distant
163
strangers?

159. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 308 (J. M. D. Meiklejohn trans., P.
F. Collier & Son 1900) (1781).
160. See, e.g., William K. Frankena, Obligation and Ability, in PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
157, 157 (Max Black ed., 1950) ("[M]any moral philosophers ... say, in one way or another,
that 'ought' implies 'can.' Indeed, if there is anything on which philosophers are agreed with
plain men and with each other, and goodness knows there is very little, it is Kant's dictum, 'Du
kannst, denn du sollst!"'); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 341 (1984) (stating that
both John Rawls and H. L. A. Hart regard "ought" implies "can" "as the principle of
responsibility from which more particular principles, such as those requiring actions, intentions,
or reasons, may be derived").
161. Lon Fuller insists that among the eight ways "that the attempt to create and maintain a
system of legal rules may miscarry [are] ... (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules
that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party."

LON

L.

FULLER, THE MORALITY

OF LAW 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969).

162. See CASEBEER, supra note 154, at 65. "'Ought implies can': If a moral system
produces obligations upon us that are so severe that we are psychologically incapable of
implementing them, then this speaks against the viability of the moral system." Id. "[T]here are
a number of different ways in which it is possible to interpret the principle [that "'ought'
implies 'can"'], depending on what is meant by 'can.' [One commentator] suggests that we
should understand 'can' as 'can learn to."' Carolyn Price, Rationality, Biology and Optimality,
17 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 613, 616 (2002) (citing STEPHEN STICH, THE FRAGMENTATION OF REASON
156 (1990)). "If people ought to do something, then it must be possible for them to do it. Human
nature circumscribes what is possible." Elliott Sober & David Sloan Wilson, Summary of Unto
Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF
MORALITY, supra note 27, at 185, 205. Mackie, in discussing why "moralities of universal
concern [are] impracticable," declares that "a large element of selfishness-or, in an older
terminology, self-love-is a quite ineradicable part of human nature." MACKIE, supra note 80,
at 132. "[W]hat we recognize as unselfishness or benevolence is ... incompatible with
universal concern. It takes the form of what Broad called self-referential altruism--concerns for
others, but for others who have some special connection with oneself; children, parents, friends,
workmates, neighbours in the literal, not the metaphorically extended, sense." Id.
163. Ruse and Wilson suggest a route to disinterested moral rules. While behavior
advancing kin selection and reciprocal altruism is self-interested in a strong biological sense, it
may run afoul of our immediately perceived self-interest, as where one considers whether to aid
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Let us turn to possible qualifications of moral maxims in the context of
the rescue doctrine. Suppose one qualifies the maxim, "One is to attempt
reasonable rescues of those in peril," with the proviso, "except when the
person in peril is not a member of the community," or, "except when the
person in peril is a stranger," or, ". . . is not a neighbor," or, ". . . is not a
relative."' 64 (These maxims are more likely to be expressed in a way that
obscures the qualification, such as: "One is to attempt reasonable rescues of
fellow community members in peril," or, ". . . reasonable rescues of
acquaintances . . . ," "neighbors," or, "relatives.") While these qualifications

reduce the generality of the maxim, they still maintain its universality.
Everyone is to undertake a rescue of anyone who falls within the specified
categories. The maxim, though still universal in some weak sense, fails to
be general at all when the qualification reaches this point: "except when the
person in peril is not me."' 161 Conversely, an example of a maxim that is
exceedingly general but hardly universal is: "Everyone but me is to attempt
reasonable rescues of those in peril."' 66 While the maxim applies to the

a neighbor. Ruse & Wilson, supra note 64, at 315. The authors wonder how the dispositions for
the adaptive behavior are "expressed in our conscious awareness[.] We need something to spur
us against our usual selfish dispositions. Nature, therefore, has made us ...believe in a
disinterested moral code, according to which we ought to help our fellows." Id. "In short, to
make us altruistic in the adaptive, biological sense, our biology makes us altruistic in the more
conventionally understood sense of acting on deeply held beliefs about right and wrong." Id.;
see Michael Ruse & Edward 0. Wilson, Moral Philosophy as Applied Science, in CONCEPTUAL
ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 421, 425 (Elliott Sober ed., 1994) ("[H]uman beings
function better if they are deceived by their genes into thinking that there is a disinterested
objective morality binding upon them, which all should obey.").
164. "Virtually all known ethical systems contain some version of the categorical
imperative (although, regrettably, the fine print reveals that such rules have almost always been
intended to apply only to within group, not out of group members)." ALEXANDER J. FIELD,
ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED?

amity, out-group enmity."'

91-92 (2001). "Sociologists have a convenient epigram: 'in-group
P. BARASH, REVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 94 (2001). Barash

DAVID

points out that the fundamental biblical mandate to "'love your neighbor as yourself ... almost
certainly means literally neighbor; that is, someone who is nearby, not just anybody and
everybody, but an in-group member." Id. at 96. "Rather than a blanket prohibition against bad
behavior across the board, the Ten Commandments can be interpreted equally-and probably
more accurately-as a warning that such behavior is prohibited, but only toward a fellow group
member." Id. at 97.
165. This may be too far down the slippery slope to make much sense. From the agent's
perspective, it amounts to, "I am to attempt reasonable rescues of myself when I am in peril."
166. A way to get to the "except me" proviso that smacks of universalization, though it is
not, is by this type of qualification: "except for graying, six foot tall males living at 543 West
21st Street, N.Y.C." For a similar example, see CASEBEER, supra note 154, at 137.
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entire world except 67
for one person, it is the type of maxim that fails Kant's
test of universality. 1
It has not escaped the reader's notice that, given the posed, proper
qualifications above, the rescue maxim can conform to the evolutionary
principles of kin selection or reciprocal altruism.' 68 Indeed, a universalized
maxim may satisfy both principles at once, as where the proviso is, to
choose one of the possible classes supported by reciprocal altruism, "except
when the person in peril is neither a relative nor a fellow community
member."
Perhaps the reader has also noticed the similarity in the gambits of
reducing the generality of moral maxims by means of implied or explicit
exceptions and the boundary drawing in utilitarian reasoning used to narrow
the reach of the utilitarian calculus. Both can lead to moral justifications of
maxims that conform to the principles of kin selection and reciprocal
altruism.
Of greater difficulty for the Kantian, as it is for the utilitarian, is to
identify maxims that support the evolutionary principle of sexual selection.
As discussed in the context of utilitarianism, a complexity arises because
sexual selection posits different mating preferences for men and women.
This would imply that women would adopt moral maxims reflecting their
purposes, while men would adopt others.'6 9 Although this may appear to
violate the universalization principle, again, we must be careful to distinguish generality from universality. A universalized maxim at the highest
level of generality, such as, "do the right thing," applies equally to men and
women, but less general, though universalized maxims may turn on sexual
differences, as where, say, a maxim implicitly distinguishes women by
declaring, "one is not to expose one's private parts in public except when
nursing a child."' 70 Certainly moral double standards relating to sexual and
gender matters have been around for a very long time.17'
167. For illustrations discussed by Kant, see KANT, supra note 140, at 89-91. Furthermore,
"[i]t is almost as immoral to make exceptions in favor of one's wife, son, or nephew as in favor
of oneself." BAIER, supra note 151, at 193. A fervent kin selectionist may disagree.
168. While "it is of the utmost importance to take warning that we should not dream for a
moment of trying to derive the reality of this principle [of duty] from the special characteristics
of human nature," KANT, supra note 140, at 92, once the principle of duty is derived, there
would then be no need to ignore human nature in deciding which maxims to universalize.
169. For the role of the agent's "purpose" in the adoption of a universalized maxim, see
infra note 173 and accompanying text.
170. Is this a moral maxim or simply etiquette? Certainly it would not be bizarre to hear
from an on-looking prig that such behavior was "immoral." Of course, we might also hear from
this person, "That's tacky!" Some moral philosophers "exclude etiquette from the 'institution'
of morality." Carolyn Pope Edwards, Culture and the Construction of Moral Values: A
Comparative Ethnography of Moral Encounters in Two Cultural Settings, in THE EMERGENCE
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Even if one may defensibly circumscribe a moral maxim to reach one
gender only, it is a long stretch to articulate a reasonable or rational maxim
that would coincide with the interests of women in attracting a mate under
the sway of sexual selection. Recall that men are disposed to prefer women
who are young, healthy and committed.' But maxims that would advertise
these qualities seem not to ring true. Might a woman properly endorse these
maxims to promote her interest in demonstrating her desired youthfulness:
"When seeking a mate, one is to attempt reasonable rescues of those in
peril," or, "When one is young ...

?" Turning to the woman's interest in

revealing fitness, is this a proper maxim: "When seeking a mate, one is to
attempt arduous rescues of those in peril?" These maxims seem peculiar, as
not very moral-like. First, these maxims alone imply that women not of an
age or situation to be in the market for mates would have no moral duty to
rescue. Second, the self-interested reason for adoption is on the surface,
making the maxim seem to be a transparent dictate of prudence rather than
morality.'73 Or, to avoid these appearances, perhaps the original moral

OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 55, at 123, 137 (citing JOHN LADD, THE
STRUCTURE OF A MORAL CODE (1957) and FRANKENA, supra note 86); cf Katherine J.
Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1235, 1258-59 (2005) (discussing the social norm against nursing in public). This weak
example reflects the difficulty I had in coming up with a common moral maxim that overtly
distinguishes women from men. The application of particular maxims may sometimes lead to
differences between the sexes, as where the performance of a rescue maxim in specific circumstances requires physical strength less common among women than men, but this difference can
be buried in the expression of the maxim. For example, the maxim may mandate "reasonable"
rescues, physical strength being a factor in what is reasonable.
171. For example, "polygyny . . . is allowed or encouraged in most cultures in the
anthropological record (708 of 849, or 83 percent), while the converse arrangement, polyandry,
is rare (4 of 849); and a double standard of sexual restriction is found in the majority of
societies." MELVIN KONNER, WHY THE RECKLESS SURVIVE 7-8 (1990). Of course, a long history
of double standards says nothing about their moral value. On the existence and problematics of
sexual double standards, see WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 147-48.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
173. But under Kant's contradiction test, "the contradiction that is involved in the
universalization of an immoral maxim is that the agent would be unable to act on the maxim in
a world in which it were universalized so as to achieve his own purpose - that is, the purpose
that is specified in the maxim." KORSGAARD, supra note 141, at 92. "If this interpretation is
correct, then it is essential that in testing maxims of actions the purpose always be included in
the formulation of the maxim." Id.; see SINGER, supra note 144, at 237 ("[A] reference to the
circumstances and purpose of an action is necessarily involved in the 'maxim' of the action.").
Because circumstances and purpose are included in maxims, "Kant's ethical rigorism is neither
a consequence of nor compatible with the principle of universality." SINGER, supra note 144, at
238. Mill takes the implicit purposes for universalized maxims down a utilitarian path: "When
Kant ...propounds as the fundamental principle of morals ... he virtually acknowledges that
the interest of mankind collectively, or at least of mankind indiscriminately, must be in the mind
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maxim, "one is to attempt reasonable rescues of those in peril," will suffice
to do the work, with the balancing implications of the word "reasonable"
incorporating the interest of the mate-seeking woman in displaying her
attractive qualities. Under this approach, sexual selection does not affect the
chosen maxim, but only whether the maxim is applicable in particular
situations.
But women not only have an interest in attracting mates, but also in
attracting matings. These are not the same thing. Nirvana for a woman in
the Darwinian world is to obtain the best possible, permanent, unsuspecting,
cuckold-ready mate, and the genes of a male 10.174 While a highly-rated
mate may be hard to obtain, outside matings are not, as is evidenced by the
statistics.175 For the woman seeking a clandestine, genetic upgrade, it is not
obvious what maxim she would adopt in the context of the rescue doctrine.
Because when it comes to mating, men are disposed to seek quantity while
women seek quality, a man's roving eye focuses less on youth and health
than does his devoted heart. For a male higher on the scale of desirability
than a woman's actual or probable mate, physical allurement (and
discretion?) may do for a brief affair, a quality that does not seem to be
relevant to a rescue attempt. 176
Moral maxims advancing the interests of men in attracting potential
mates under the influence of sexual selection also are a stretch. Women, it
was noted, generally prefer mates who are strong, daring, wealthy,
powerful, generous, loving, and committed. 177 Some of these qualities are
better exemplified than others in the likely circumstances of the rescue
of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act." MILL, supra note 74, at
64-65.
174. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 44, at 90-91.
175. See, e.g., NANcy L. SEGAL, ENTWINED LIVES 39 (1999) ("Nonpaternity rates are
estimated to be between 5 and 30%, so a substantial minority of children are not related to
presumed fathers." (footnote omitted)); THIESSEN, supra note 49, at 323 ("The estimates for
female cuckoldry range from 5 to over 40 percent in America and Britain, escalating even
higher, depending upon the society."); Serge Br~dart & Robert M. French, Do Babies Resemble
Their Fathers More Than Their Mothers? A Failureto Replicate Christenfeld and Hill (1995),
20 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 130 (1999) ("[R]ates of human misassigned paternity
(based on blood typing tests) of 6% to 30% have been reported in studies done in southern
England, 9% among Venezuelan Yanoman6, and 10% in rural Michigan." (references omitted));
Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to Children's Faces: Males Are More Affected by
Resemblance than Females Are, and So Are Their Brains, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 394,
395 (2004) ("Current estimates of extra-pair paternity in humans vary between 1% and 20%,
with most around 10% .... ."). Genetically for men, nothing could be worse than cuckoldry.
176. The man, of course, is not indifferent to considerations of health, for he wants to avoid
transmitted diseases. Furthermore, any fame that comes from a rescue by a woman may be an
attractive feature to a man for even a simple mating.
177. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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doctrine. Strength and daring would seem to come often into play. Wealth,
power and generosity may be important if resources must be mustered for a
rescue, but the rescue doctrine usually relates to situations in which fast
action is needed, thereby precluding the deliberate behavior that seems
necessary to demonstrate these attributes. On the other hand, the social
approbation that usually ensues from heroics may bring some wealth and
power in its train. Lovingness and commitment may be reflected in rescues
of family members and friends. Therefore, to weave moral maxims tightly
around the relevant qualities being sought by women may lead to the same
types of nonmoral-like precepts discussed above in considering a woman's
adoption of maxims driven by sexual selection. At a higher level of generality, such a maxim might be, "One is to attempt reasonable rescues of those
in peril, [especially(?)] when they demonstrate attractive qualities." But
again, the proviso does not ring true to a Kantian moralist. This maxim
seems more prudential than moral. Or, also again, the word "reasonable" in
the otherwise unqualified maxim may do the work to allow the potential
male rescuer to take into account the tugs of sexual selection when judging
the applicability of the maxim.
For the male seeking matings rather than a mate, most of the qualities
preferred by women in a mate recede, and hence the man's self-interested
moral maxims would change accordingly. Rather, this should be put the
other way around. For women seeking matings, that is, "good" genes, the
only preferred qualities in men that are relevant would be those that have a
genetic component. Strength would generally fall into this category. Beyond
this one, we move into controversial territory. Daring, or at least lack of
inhibition, is an aspect of temperament'78 that has genetic ingredients, 79 and
178. From extensive studies of children, Kagan found "two easily observed behavioral
profiles, which we call inhibited and uninhibited." Jerome Kagan, Born to Be Shy?, in STATES
OF MIND 29, 33 (Roberta Conlan ed., 1999) ("[T]hese terms reflect only two of the many
possible temperaments.").
179. "The concept of temperament refers to any moderately stable, differentiating
emotional or behavioral quality whose appearance in childhood is influenced by an inherited

biology, including differences in brain neurochemistry."

JEROME KAGAN, GALEN'S PROPHECY,

at xvii (1994). Relevant to rescue attempts, "there are genes for the development of a fearless,
risk-taking profile." Kagan, supra note 178, at 49. "Psychologists have discovered that our
personalities differ in five major ways: we are to varying degrees introverted or extroverted,
neurotic or stable, incurious or open to experience, agreeable or antagonistic, and conscientious
or undirected." PINIKER, supra note 72, at 50. "All five of the major personality dimensions are
heritable, with perhaps 40 to 50 percent of the variation in a typical population tied to
differences in their genes." Id.; see MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE 83 (2003)
("Psychologists nowadays define personality in five dimensions - the so-called 'big five'
factors: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism . . . . In
each case a little over 40 percent of the variation in personality is due to direct genetic factors..
. ."). Research has shown that "long alleles (e.g., 7-repeats) of the DRD4 gene have been linked
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temperament generally may have adaptive value.18 Generosity and
commitment may also overlap with heritable temperaments. The remaining
qualities of wealth and power seem not to have a significant genetic
component, at least insofar as they do not correlate with intelligence. 8' We
will await further enlightenment from scientists. Other genetic qualities,
however, would be important to a woman seeking only "good" genes. For
example, she would like her children to be intelligent, attractive and healthy
in order to increase their reproductive opportunities.'82 Since she may need
to trade off these qualities, and others, in order to find a committed, supportive mate, they should move higher onto her wish list for outside matings.183
The male with a roving eye considering which rescue maxim to embrace
to novelty-seeking personality, hyperactivity, and risk-taking behaviors." Chuansheng Chen et
al., Population Migration and the Variation of Dopamine D4 Receptor (DRD4) Allele
Frequencies Around the Globe, 20 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 309, 320 (1999). The authors
ascribe differences among populations in the frequency of this gene to whether the society is
migratory, where the exploratory aspect of human nature is beneficial, or sedentary, where
novelty-seeking would have social costs and be selected against. See id.; see also PINKER, supra
note 72, at 48 (noting that particular genes are associated with general intelligence, thrill
seeking, and anxiety).
180. See Randolph M. Nesse, Psychiatry, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra
note 21, at 23, 33 ("We know that many personality attributes are strongly heritable, and it is
thus tempting to interpret personality types as alternative strategies for getting along in the
social world."). But "the precise origins of the many human temperaments-the processes that
make for gregarious risktakers or for shy souls who prefer the safety of the known-remain
something of a puzzle." Kagan, supra note 178, at 30.
181. Intelligence does have a substantial genetic component. See, e.g., DEAN HAMER &
PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES 218-19 (1998) (stating that IQ is 48-75%
heritable); SEGAL, supra note 175, at 49-60, 135-36 ("30-70%"); ULLICA SEGERSTRALE,
DEFENDERS OF THE TRUTH 236, 283 (2000) (stating that IQ is up to 80% heritable); Tim
Beardsley, For Whom Did the Bell Curve Toll?, 9 SCI. AM. PRESENTS, Winter 1998, at 30, 30
("[A]bout 48 percent.").
182. But, at least today, studies show that intelligence decreases the number of offspring
and frequency of sex for both men and women. Rosemary L. Hopcroft, Sex, Status, and
Reproductive Success in the Contemporary United States, 27 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 104,
110, 112 (2006). Even though attractiveness is not high on the list of qualities sought by women
in a mate, there are reproductive benefits to having a sexy son: "If female tastes were also
heritable, as they probably would be, a female choosing a mate who appealed to her would
effectively be choosing genes for her sons, which would make them appealing to the next
generation of females." Christopher R. Badcock, PsychoDarwinism: The New Synthesis of
Darwin and Freud,in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 15, at 457, 472;
see BARKOW, supra note 47, at 58-59; CRONIN, supra note 19, at 201-04; RICHARD DAWKINS,
THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 195-220 (1987). This is known as the "sexy son[]" theory. Buss,
supra note 45, at 91; MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN 142-43 (1993); Daniel J. Kruger et al.,
Properand Dark Heroes as Dads and Cads, 14 HuM. NATURE 305, 307 (2003). All else equal,
an attractive daughter would also have better marriage prospects.
183. See Michele K. Surbey & Collette D. Conohan, Willingness to Engage in Casual Sex,
11 HUM. NATURE 367, 379 (2000) ("Where little else is to be gained from a relationship, a focus
on attractiveness, insofar as it signifies 'good genes,' may be the best strategy for women.").
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would then be eager to demonstrate his intelligence, strength, and health,
and perhaps his daring and lovingness. I have pondered above the types of
maxims that these might produce. Perhaps here, more than when
accommodating the other reaches of sexual selection, the simple maxim,
"One is to attempt reasonable rescues of those in peril," will suffice as an
articulated guideline, though again the word "reasonable" hides the
complications of application. But those ancestral men who acted on a more
refined impulse that corresponded to the nuances of sexual selection were
more likely to leave additional descendants.
To reconnoiter, because the genetically self-interested adoption of
maxims may seem inconsistent with Kantian rational morality, let me
summarize my argument to the contrary. I have contended that the
universalization form of the categorical imperative is not necessarily
abridged simply by reducing the generality of a moral maxim to coincide
with genetic self-interest. Though related, generality is different from
universality. The agent's purpose for adopting the maxim also may
legitimately be on the surface. Evident self-interest does not disqualify a
maxim. It only must be one that the agent would agree to everyone else
embracing as well. Yet still, at some point we may wonder at self-interested
moral maxims that appear to be simply dictates of prudence for advancing
the interests of only "number one." Among other things, they may seem to
exploit the rescuee and others, contrary to the second form of the
categorical imperative, to which I now turn.
2.

Respect for Persons

The adoption of maxims based on genetic self-interest may appear to run
afoul of the second form of Kant's categorical imperative that people are to
be treated as an end in themselves and not used as a means only to another's
end.184 The maxims seem to use the rescuee as a means to the rescuer's
reproductive advantage. Indeed, this is supposed to be the case. Nevertheless, the maxims do not use the rescuee as a means only to the rescuer's
advantage. The rescuee is not simply being exploited.'85 The rescuee gets
much from adherence to the maxims. She gets rescued. We could hardly
184. "[M]an, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as

a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether they are
directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end."
KANT,

supra note 140, at 95-98.

185. "At the most general level, A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B." ALAN
WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 10 (1996). At worst, the rescue may be a "mutually advantageous
exploitation" in which "A gains unfairly or excessively by an action or transaction that is
beneficial to B." Id. at 207.
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imagine a potential rescuee objecting to the attempt to rescue her because
she knows that the rescuer was motivated, even entirely, by the opportunity
to display his daring to potential mates.' 86 The rescuee will not cut off her
nose in spite. As in a contractual arrangement, there is a quid pro quo. The
rescuee gets rescued, and the rescuer gets evolutionary benefits. In this
sense, both parties are using one another, but this is done with mutual
respect for the other's autonomy, even though there is no explicit prior
agreement.
While an actual rescuee will gladly agree to the rescue even though the
rescuer is self-interested, those potential rescuees who fall outside the
evolutionarily driven, universalized maxims may object to being left out of
the classes of persons to be aided. They are being neglected. Does this mean
that they are not being respected as ends in themselves?
At first glance, it appears that those persons who fall outside the
evolutionary-centered maxims have no grounds to object. Unlike for an
actual rescuee, they are not being used as any kind of means at all.
Therefore, what do they have to complain about? To answer this, we must
recall why this form of the categorical imperative emerges. It is because
humans, as rational beings, are thereby ethical beings, and hence are to be
respected as ends in themselves. Each person is to be respected as much as
any other person. In our context, by declaring some people subject to
rescue, but not others, the respect granted appears to be unequal.
One way to avoid the thrust of this second form demanding respect for
others is to deny its factual underpinnings for particular persons. As history
has demonstrated all too often, people can easily dismiss the humanity of
outsiders.187 They might say that the outsiders are neither rational nor ethical
186. "[O]n at least one plausible reading of the Kantian maxim, one treats another as a mere
means only when one treats 'him in a way to which he could not possibly consent,' as in cases
of coercion and fraud." Id. at 23.
187. Petrinovich observes that people who understand moral principles can avoid their
force by distorting the relevant facts. "Thus, the idea of humanity is redefined so that it does not
include an outgroup ...and this definition is used to justify decisions to disregard moral
obligations to those of the outgroup on the grounds that they are not equal humans of our kin,
kind, or community." PETRINOVICH, supra note 72, at 31; see HRDY, supra note 54, at 529 ("In
many cultures the word for one's own group is the word for 'humans.' Humans are, by
definition, those people like oneself, and also likely to be those people one is most closely
related to."). Jane Goodall refers to cultural "pseudospeciation" whereby:
[M]embers of one group may not only see themselves as different from
members of another, but also behave in different ways to group and
nongroup individuals. In its extreme form pseudospeciation leads to the
'dehumanizing' of other groups, so that they may be regarded almost as
members of a different species.
Jane Goodall, Gombe Chimpanzee Politics, in PRIMATE POLITICS 105, 135-36 (Glendon
Schubert & Roger D. Masters eds., 1991). "Virtually all people tend to denigrate those they
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and therefore, under Kantian suppositions, they are not entitled to respect.
Even Nazi Germany, a highly educated society familiar, if not imbued, with
Kantian morality, was able to adopt this gambit in partial justification of the
Final Solution.188 While cognitive dissonance may have played a role in the
Nazis' perception of facts, all humans are subject to the distortions of this
and other psychological defense mechanisms. As Hume instructed, reason is

define as other, regarding them as inferior, less than human." Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan
in Christian Traditions, in 20 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1, 16-17 (Grethe B.
Peterson ed., 1999). Conversely, "altruists simply have a different way of seeing things. Where
the rest of us see a stranger, altruists see a fellow human being." MONROE, supra note 13, at 3.
One observer finds three interrelated processes behind "sanctioned massacres": the processes of
authorization and routinization, which deflect the perceived need and opportunities for moral
challenges, "and (c) processes of dehumanization which deprive both victim and victimizer of
identity and community." Herbert C. Kelman, Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on
the Dehumanizationof Victims and Victimizers, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES 25, 25 (1973). A psychologist
who studies the psychology of moral reasoning, Albert Bandura, "has identified eight
mechanisms that people use to rationalize immoral behavior." Benedict Carey, In the Execution
Chamber, The Moral Compass Wavers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at F6. One of them is
dehumanization, that is, "[a]ssailing others as degenerates, devils, savages or infidels." Id.
(listing the others as moral justification, euphemistic labeling, advantageous comparison,
displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregard or distortion of consequences and blaming the victim).
188. See SAMUEL P. OLINER & PEARL M. OLINER, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY:
RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAZI GERMANY 6 (1988) (explaining that the differences between Jews
and others "were highlighted and exaggerated by a constant barrage of Nazi propaganda that
defined Jews as outside the pale of humanity"). For example, one rescuer of concentration-camp
Jews reported that a guard at a concentration camp rationalized his shooting of six Jews with the
afterthought, "You know, they were not human anymore." MONROE, supra note 13, at 205. One
commentator particularly condemns the Nazis because they should have known better than, say,
"primitive tribe[s]," to dehumanize those outside their group. See Robert J. Richards, Birth,
Death, and Resurrection of Evolutionary Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 110, at
113, 122. Some Americans used this rationalization to justify atrocious behavior towards
Amerindians. "For example, Oliver Wendel[1] Holmes claimed that Indians were nothing more
than a 'half-filled outline of humanity' whose 'extermination' was the necessary 'solution to the
problem of [their] relation to the white race."' James P. Sterba, UnderstandingEvil: American
Slavery, the Holocaust, and the Conquest of the American Indians, 106 ETHICS 424, 430 (1996)
(quoting DAVID E.STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST 245 (1992)). Slavery has been similarly
justified. "'Ignorance and depravity, and the inability to rise from degradation to civilization and
respectability, are the most usual allegations against the oppressed.... By making the enslaved
a character fit only for slavery, [slaveholders] excuse themselves for refusing to make the slave
a freeman."' David A. J. Richards, Toleration and the Struggle Against Prejudice, in
TOLERATION 127, 137 (David Heyd ed., 1996) (quoting Frederick Douglass, The Claims of the
Negro Ethnologically Considered,in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 295
(Philip S. Foner ed., 1975)). "[l]f there is a universal in genocide, it surely is the practice of
dehumanizing the victims, just as dehumanizing the enemy is a frequent feature of warfare."
PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES 263 (2000) (footnote omitted); see PINKER, supra note 72,
at 273-74, 320-21.
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the slave of the passions. 189 Though today we are quick to distinguish
between ratiocination and rationalization, at least in principle, it is easy to
imagine this distortional process at work when our ancestors, perhaps with
lesser cognitive abilities, struggled against other clans or groups on the
savanna.190
One would hope that the modem, developed world has grown beyond
these rationalizations for dismissing the humanity of outsiders. But we have
little reason to believe this is true, and much evidence to the contrary. As
seen in the former Yugoslavia, it is easy enough to deny the humanity of
one's life-long neighbors, let alone outsiders. This may have biological
roots. Humans appear to have inclinations toward ethnocentricity, xenophobia, and territoriality, among other tendencies to look askance at
outsiders. 9 For example, some anthropologists have found evidence of
global ethnocentrism: "People universally see the ingroups to which they
belong as 'virtuous and superior' . . . and 'strong'. . . . Moreover, people
tend to 'see [an] out group as contemptible, immoral and inferior' ....,,92 It
189. See

HUME,

supra note 123, at 413. "The heart of man is made so as to reconcile

contradictions."

ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 107 (quoting 2 DAVID HUME, ESSAYS AND
TREATISES ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS 203 (1772)). In Darwinian terms, "[b]elonging as we do to a

species (the species) whose members justify their actions morally, we are designed to think of
ourselves as good and our behavior as defensible, even when these propositions are objectively
dubious." WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 338-39.
190. In band societies that periodically face times of need, "[t]here would be advantages to
being able to define people in other groups as a different species-as 'them,' not 'us.' They
could thus be placed outside the universe of obligation, and it would then be psychologically
easier to remove them indiscriminately as competitors." EHRLICH, supra note 188, at 261
(footnote omitted).
191. See W. D. HAMILTON, Innate Social Aptitudes of Man: An Approach from
Evolutionary Genetics, in NARROW ROADS OF GENE LAND, supra note 21, at 315, 330
(xenophobia); Edward 0. Wilson, Comparative Social Theory, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 49, 68 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980) (ethnocentricity, xenophobia,
territoriality). "The common evolutionary adaptations of strong kinship ties were nepotism,
ethnocentrism, tribalism, social bonding, obedience to authority, nationalism, patriotism, [territoriality], enemy thinking, xenophobia, jingoism, and reciprocal social exchange. We carry
these traits with us to the market every day." THIESSEN, supra note 49, at 296. "The dark side to
the inborn propensity to moral behavior is xenophobia." WILSON, supra note 44, at 253. "People
give trust to strangers with effort, and true compassion is a commodity in chronically short
supply." Id. Even among animals, xenophobic aggression is pervasive. See JOSEPH LOPREATO &
TIMOTHY CRIPPEN, CRISIS IN SOCIOLOGY

263 (1999); Josiah Ober & Stephen Macedo,

Introduction to DE WAAL, PRIMATES supra note 63, at ix, xv ("The tendency towards partiality
for insiders is a constant among nonhuman social animals.").
192. Ian Jobling, The PsychologicalFoundationsof the Hero-Ogre Story, 12 HUM. NATURE
247, 252 (2001) (quoting R.A. LEVINE & D.T. CAMPBELL, ETHNOCENTRISM 13, 14 (1972)).
"The theory of ethnocentrism known as 'realistic group conflict theory' . .. argues that these
biases in the perception of ingroup and outgroup are exacerbated by conflict between the
groups." Id. at 253 (citations omitted). "'In viewing our enemies as dissimilar to us, we move
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is not difficult to conjure up reasons why this may have had survival value
on the savanna where, presumably, competition for resources was intense,
and reasons why this may bring us to disaster today. Acceptance of the
demeaning of out-groups as the supposed facts could lead even a strong
Kantian to exclude them from a rescue maxim.
A second plausible means of rejecting the extension of a rescue maxim
to others is, rather than to deny their humanity, to declare that they have
forfeited their claim to kind treatment. 19 3 One of the responses to criminal
conduct provides a good example of this line of reasoning: By virtue of the
illegal conduct, the criminal forfeits her right to be free of public
chastisement. Indeed, Kant argues, a society shows respect for the
criminal's ethical personhood by holding her responsible for her illicit
conduct.' 94 Otherwise, the criminal is not respected as a rational person, but
rather is treated as a child or mental incompetent. The retributive aspect of
them outside our domain of empathy. Indeed, when out-group members are perceived as a
threat, it is not unusual to dehumanize them completely, viewing them as rats, pigs, weasels,
snakes, and dogs .... .' Id. (quoting D. L. Krebs & K. Denton, Social Illusions and SelfDeception: The Evolution of Biases in Person Perception,in EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 21, 28 (J. A. Simpson & D. T. Kenrick eds., 1997)); see BROWN, supra note 45, at 139
(noting that among people in general, "[a]n ethical dualism distinguishes the in-group from the
out-group, so that, for example, cooperation is more expectable in the former than with the
latter"); DE WAAL, PRIMATES, supra note 63, at 53 ("Universally, humans treat outsiders far
worse than members of their own community: in fact, moral rules hardly seem to apply to the
outside."); GEARY, supra note 100, at 136-39 (discussing the universal tendency of a wide
range of species, including humans, to identify in-groups and out-groups, which, at times among
humans, leads to devaluing or even dehumanizing out-groups); WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 340
("We tend to find our rivals morally deficient, [and] to find our allies worthy of compassion
....
").There may be a silver lining to this: "In the course of human evolution, out-group
hostility enhanced in-group solidarity to the point that morality emerged," though "[mioral
systems are inherently biased towards the in-group." DE WAAL, PRIMATES, supra note 63, at 54,
163.
193. This relates to "blaming the victim" whereby "[tihe people being cheated or attacked
are 'asking for it."' Carey, supra note 187, at F6 (discussing the findings of the psychologist Dr.
Albert Bandura).
194. See M. Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, 6 LAW &
PHIL. 25, 25 (1987) (noting that Kant's standards for punishment are "his renowned principle of
respect for persons and his insistence that only the 'Law of retribution' (jus talionis) could
determine the morally appropriate kind and degree of punishment"). In a remarkable passage,
Kant goes so far as to write that if a society is about to dissolve forever, it has the duty to carry
out the executions of its convicted murderers, "for if [the people] fail to do so, they may be

regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal justice." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797); see also CHRISTINE M.
KORSGAARD, Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal
Relations, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS, supra note 141, at 188, 189 ("To hold someone
responsible is to regard her as a person-that is to say, as a free and equal person, capable of
acting both rationally and morally."). See generally JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Kant's Theory of
CriminalPunishment, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 71, at 82.
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Kant's morality is well known. As applied to an evolutionary rescue maxim,
a person could be denied equal consideration if she has committed a
relevant grievance.195 On the ancestral savanna, simple trespass on clan or

tribal territory may have been a sufficient grievance to justify hostility, to
say nothing of the denial of beneficence.' 9 6 Beyond this, if, by means of her

conduct, a person has denied the humanity of the agent or her cohorts, has
not treated them with due respect, a like response may be warranted. 9 7

Again, we may imagine how these justifications may have been prominent
during evolutionary times. A neighboring group may have once invaded a
campsite, or intruded into the ancestral hunting grounds, or even simply
abused, refused to aid, or declined to reciprocate the kindness of the agent's
fellow clan member. Then, all members of this out-group are guilty of
unacceptable conduct or disrespect, either as perpetrators, conspirators,
sympathizers, or by virtue of their membership status under a notion of
collective guilt. 98 Unfortunately, this reasoning would not sound unduly
anachronistic in today's world.
195. "[G]enocidalists frequently see themselves as the victimized parties honestly acting to
redress a grievance. What to an objective observer is a barbaric act of murder, genocidalists
perceive as a preemptive strike necessary to ward off their own destruction." MONROE, supra
note 13, at 220; see Kelman, supra note 187, at 33-34 ("The most widely accepted justification
for violence is that it occurred for reasons of self-defense against attack or the threat of attack.").
It is easy enough to perceive others as wanting, even when they are not a threat. One
investigator "found that research participants were likely to derogate a person whom they
perceived to be an innocent victim of suffering. This derogation presumably served to maintain
participants' belief that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get." C. DANIEL
BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION 221 (1991) (citation omitted).
196. We can only wonder how tolerant ancient peoples were to outsiders seeking resources.
In modem times, one researcher finds that "[h]uman foragers are overwhelmingly permissive in
allowing neighbouring groups to forage on their land." Bruce M. Knauft, Symbols, Sex, and
Sociality in the Evolution of Human Morality, in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY, supra
note 27, at 130, 133. "Revealingly, warfare between bands of simple human foragers is rare to
nonexistent .... Id. at 134. Other researchers find less tolerance. "Extant bands fight a lot, and
they seem more likely to fight if they have a history of having to deal with some environmental
unpredictability. They also seem more prone to fighting if hunting is predominantly their subsistence strategy." Christopher Boehm, The Origin of Morality as Social Control, in
EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY, supra note 27, at 149, 154 (citation omitted). "There is
a lot of anthropological and archeological evidence that warfare was and is common among past
and present hunter-gatherer societies." Christoph Kuzmics & Carlos Rodriguez-Sickert, The
Evolution of Moral Codes of Behavior 34 (Aug. 11, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
197. "[C]an a person's conduct be so contemptuous of others that it defeats and cancels our
(presumed) obligation to respect him or her as a human being? Many seem to think so; Kant did
not ..
" Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Respect for Humanity, in 18 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 1, 65 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1997) (1996).
198. "[Emotions] can be experienced in a corporatefashion. By this we mean that anger,
shame, pride, gratitude, and so on can be elicited by actions that affect some part of a group in
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Beyond reliance on (problematic) facts to circumscribe the reach of a
Kantian, evolutionary rescue maxim, there is a contractual approach to the
imperative to respect potential rescuees. As suggested above, a contract is
quite consistent with Kantian mandates, indeed, it is an archetype of a just
relationship. Each party, in seeking the consent of the other, demonstrates
respect for her as an end in herself. A contractual analysis of rescue maxims
may therefore provide a way to satisfy the Kantian. Since individual
contracts are unrealistic, the contract in question will be a type of social
contract, a hypothetical one in the fashion of Rawls, who professes his own
theory of justice to be Kantian."9 9 Suppose, then, that the founders, not
simply of a particular society but rather of all societies in order to encompass outsiders, sit down behind a veil of ignorance to draft a rational rescue
doctrine or set of maxims. What would it look like?
Well, the rescue doctrine emerging from behind a veil of ignorance could
be highly variable. I doubt that it would coincide with kin selection alone.
While each of the contractors behind the veil may well prefer their own kin
to others because of biological urges, they would realize that the beneficial
interdependency of the modem world depends on more extensive
cooperation. Therefore, the rescue doctrine would cover, at least, the
enlarged range of reciprocal altruism. Modem commercial societies may
favor an international reach to the doctrine to reflect the current marketplace, while traditional, exploited societies may prefer to stay within their
visible horizons. 00 But even the expansive societies would reject a doctrine
which the actor is a member, even though the actor was not directly involved in the interaction."
Fessler & Haley, supra note 32, at 27. "For example, intervillage violence occurs not infrequently in Bengkulu, most commonly when a young man from one village insults someone
from another village-the action is experienced as a transgression by all members of the second
village, leading to widespread anger and calls for retribution." Id. at 28. By way of brief
explanation, "corporate emotions not only function to promote the individual's interests by
leading actors to act in the group's interests, they also function to promote the individual's
interests by shaping relationships with fellow group members." Id.
199. See RAWLS, supra note 26, at 140-41, 251-57. Eisenberg, under a deontological,
Rawlsian perspective that considers consequences, finds the existence of a moral duty to rescue.
"People imagining that they might be in a position of needing rescue or might be able to make a
rescue certainly would choose to have such legal duty (since the adverse consequence of not
being rescued is far greater than the inconvenience of rescuing)." Eisenberg, supra note 12, at
681. Ruse, discussing the Rawlsian contract, suggests a third way to reduce obligations to
outsiders: "[A] Rawlsian might well argue that relations with people from other countries,
particularly very deprived countries, call for somewhat different levels of moral obligation.
Were the members of such countries really, even hypothetically, in an original position with
us?" RUSE, supra note 6, at 247. Rawls himself puts aside "questions of justice between
societies." Rawls, supra note 112, at 524.
200. But the veil of ignorance may keep the founders from knowing what type of society
they are members of.
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derived from reciprocal altruism that would accord equal rescue effort to
neighbors and distant strangers. In economic terms, this would be
inefficient, oftentimes simply because of the information and transportation
costs relating to distant dangers, to say nothing of unavoidable delays. The
required effort would take into account the likelihood of reciprocation,
direct or indirect, and this depends partially on prospective interactions,
including geographical considerations. The breadth, then, of the adopted
rescue maxim would not turn on community, race, religion, or ethnicity per
se, but may somewhat have this consequence because co-members of
particular groups may interact with one another more often in, say, their
houses of worship or concentrated neighborhoods.
But again, distinguishing neighbors from strangers, and indirectly,
coreligionists, et cetera, seems troublesome for a Kantian. These rescue
distinctions smack of discrimination, as valuing some persons more than
others. This is a problem with hypothetical contracts. As long as everyone
"agrees," such a contract could justify a vast array of legal and political
regimes. While the Kantian may balk at allowing people to consent to selfenslavement or self-destruction, because these reflect disrespect for oneself,
most other regimes could, arguably, claim justification through a supposed
hypothetical contract. Rawls found his rational persons behind the veil of
ignorance to agree to a regime of welfare state liberalism. °1 Nozick's
Kantian political state turned out to be libertarian.0 2 Posner declared
consent as the grounding for the social goal of wealth maximization, "in the
Kantian philosophical tradition." ' 3 In light of the range of these wellregarded Kantian systems, what kind of distinction in a rescue doctrine
would be supported by committed Kantians? Without pursuing this much
201. See generally RAWLS, supra note 26. In setting out his case for "justice as fairness,"
Rawls's guiding light is that society's basic structure must satisfy "the principles that free and
rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of
equality." Id. at 11. These principles "regulate all further agreements" and "specify the kinds of
social cooperation that can be entered into." Id. Ruse finds that "[t]his all sounds like reciprocal
altruism in action." RUSE, supra note 6, at 245. The Rawlsian social contract "is simulated by
natural selection-burned into our souls-because that is the way to maximize an individual's
interests, in a group where everyone is trying to do the same." Id. at 246; see Michael Ruse, The
New Evolutionary Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 110, at 133, 149-50. As Ruse
points out, Rawls himself suggests this. See RAWLS, supra note 26, at 503 ("The theory of
evolution would suggest that ... the capacity for a sense of justice and the moral feelings is an
adaption of mankind to its place in nature.").
202. Nozick advocates a minimal state that recognizes strong side constraints on what can
be done in pursuit of goals. See NOZICK, supra note 75, at 28-30. "Side constraints upon action
reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they
may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent." Id. at 3031.
203. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 89.

40:0453]

SELF-INTERESTED RESCUES

517

further, my intuition is that the spirit of Kantian morality, seeing all humans
as ends in themselves, would disfavor narrow categories of mandated
rescues. Those aligning with kin selection alone are too exclusive, placing
the vast bulk of humanity outside one's substantial moral concerns. Even
enlarging the circle to encompass reciprocal altruism may not suffice to
satisfy the spirit of Kantianism, for this also draws peculiar, morally jarring
boundaries. Recall that when discussing the purely evolutionary implications of reciprocal altruism, I observed that distinctions would be made
among persons who are more or less likely to be in a position, or to have the
inclination, to reciprocate, directly or indirectly, and hence one would
distinguish among fellow householders, friends, distant acquaintances and
strangers, the rich and the poor, the young and the elderly, the demonstrated
altruists and loners, prominent leaders and social pariahs, et al. Like
Rawls,2"4 and even Posner," 5 I believe a dedicated Kantian would find at
least some of these distinctions problematic. Notwithstanding support from
a supposed hypothetical contract, some persons are being treated
disrespectfully.
The hypothetical contract aligning the rescue maxims with the urges of
sexual selection is indifferent to most, if not all, of these questionable
distinctions among potential rescuees. The rescuer here is not particularly
concerned with the identity of the rescuee, that is, whether she is a relative
or someone with whom future reciprocation is in the offing. Instead, the
rescuer is primarily concerned with demonstrating and improving her, or,
204. Rawls finds among the "natural duties:" "[T]he duty of help[ing] another when he is in
need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself." RAWLS,
supra note 26, at 114, 117. "[I]t is characteristic of natural duties that they apply to us without
regard to our voluntary acts." Id. at 114. Natural duties also "hold between persons irrespective
of their institutional relationships; they obtain between all as equal moral persons. In this sense
the natural duties are owed not only to definite individuals, say to those cooperating together in
a particular social arrangement, but to persons generally." Id. at 115. Notice that Rawls's natural
duties exist irrespective of a Kantian social contract. Notice also that the natural duty to help
does not extend to "excessive risk or loss to oneself," thereby often falling short of the risks
assumed in rescue doctrine cases. Rawls asks whether, under his social contract, one has special
duties to immediate descendants. See id. at 128. He finds that, motivationally, "representatives
from periods adjacent in time have overlapping interests," and that everyone would have
concern for some persons in the next generation, "it being presumed that their concern is for
different individuals in each case." Id. at 128-29. "Thus the interests of all are looked after and,
given the veil of ignorance, the whole strand is tied together." Id. at 129.
205. "Suppose that if all the members of society could somehow be assembled they would
agree unanimously that, as a reasonable measure of mutual protection, anyone who can warn or
rescue someone in distress at negligible cost to himself (in time, danger, or whatever) should be
required to do so." Richard A. Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457,
460 (1979). Because insurmountable technical obstacles prevent the formation of such a
contract, "tort duties can sometimes (perhaps, as we shall see, generally) be viewed as devices
for vindicating the principles that underlie freedom of contract." Id.
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more insistently, his own qualities by means of the rescue effort for purposes of attracting a mate or mating. But there are limits to the rescuer's
indifference to the identity of the rescuee. For example, the rescue of a
social pariah, as a Jew in Nazi Germany, particularly if this identity is
known when undertaking the rescue, is not likely to endear the rescuer to
most available mates, to say nothing of the detriment to the rescuer's
family. A highly risky rescue that is perceived to cross the line into
foolhardiness might also give pause to prospective mates. Even Kant would
not count foolish rescues among his maxims. What if everyone tried them?
Still, in the end, the hypothetical contract coinciding with sexual selection
comes closer to satisfying the expansiveness of Kant's targets of moral
concern than do the contractual maxims aligning with kin selection or

reciprocal altruism.
To summarize, even though I may have had a modicum of success in
squeezing the evolutionary principles of kin selection, reciprocal altruism,

and sexual selection into a Kantian framework for moral maxims, something about my tactics may seem grossly unsatisfactory. Evolutionary
principles are grounded largely on the "selfish gene," while Kantian
principles are famous for their foundation on purely rational, detached
reasoning. °6 Despite any such uneasiness, one must be wary of falling into
the genetic fallacy.20 7 Just because qualified moral maxims have their
genesis in selfish, evolutionary principles, it does not follow that they

therefore violate the Kantian framework, for this is purely a formal one.
That a person adopts a set of maxims that are consistent with evolutionary

principles, and embraced for that very reason, is not, for this reason alone,
improper, so long as the categorical imperative is met."' A maxim does not
fail the test of pure rationality simply because it is beneficial to the maxim206. For example, Rawls refers to the Kantian view "of trying to derive the content of
justice within a framework that uses an idea of the rational as the sole normative idea." John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 237 n.20
(1985).
207. The genetic fallacy is "the fallacy of believing that the causal origin of a belief affects
the truth or reasonableness of that belief." MURPHY, supra note 69, at 24; see CARTWRIGHT,
supra note 15, at 331 ("[T]he belief that the origin of ideas impacts on their truth-value."). "In
the case of this, as of our other moral sentiments, there is no necessary connection between the
question of its origin, and that of its binding force. That a feeling is bestowed on us by Nature,
does not necessarily legitimate all its promptings." MILL, supra note 74, at 51; see Tamler
Sommers & Alex Rosenberg, Darwin's Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaningless of Life,
18 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 653, 662 (2003) ("Thus, it is fallacious to infer directly from the fact that
selection for reproductive fitness is the cause of our dispositions to advance and honor moral
claims, to the claim that ethical propositions are either false or unjustified.").
208. "We have the Categorical Imperative, or something very much like it, embedded in an
epigenetic rule. We feel we ought to treat others as ends. They feel the same way about us.
Hence, Darwinism and Kantianism are each satisfied." RUSE, supra note 6, at 244.
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maker. For example, Kant's defenses of both truth-telling and promise-keeping, while put in terms of contradiction, specifically invoke the longterm interest of the agent. 20 9 But even so, Kant's categorical call for
performing duties disinterestedly seems to be in jeopardy under my
analysis. This requires a sharper focus.
3.

Disinterested Duty

Though a self-interested rescue effort will satisfy the rescuee, if not those
outside the scope of the rescue maxims, we must see if it will also satisfy
Kant. He is more demanding. While his framework may accommodate selfinterested moral maxims, Kant specifies under the third form of the
categorical imperative that, once adopted, the maxims are to be performed
disinterestedly. One is not to perform a duty because it is in one's selfinterest, as where the agent might otherwise be punished, or because she
would earn praise from the community, or even because she would simply
get self-satisfaction,2"' but rather one is to perform one's duty purely out of
a sense of duty.21 In the context of the rescue maxim qualified to coincide
with evolutionary dispositions, an agent is not to attempt a particular rescue
for the conscious purpose of promoting her genes, though this may have
driven her rationale for adopting the maxim originally.2"2 Instead, she is to
209. Under a universal law of lying, "there could properly be no promises at all, since it
would be futile to profess a will for future action to others who would not believe my profession
or who, if they did so over-hastily, would pay me back in like coin." KANT, supra note 140, at
71; see id. at 90 (proposing a similar argument). For a brief explication of Kant's standard of
contradiction, see CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, An Introduction to the Ethical, Political, and
Religious Thought of Kant, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS, supra note 141, at 3, 14-16.
See also KORSGAARD, supra note 141, at 77-102.
210. See KANT, supra note 140, at 65. He states:
To help others where one can is a duty, and besides this there are many
spirits of so sympathetic a temper that, without any further motive of vanity
or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around
them and can take delight in the contentment of others as their own work.
Id. at 66. But however "right" and "amiable" such an action may be, "[it] still has no genuinely
moral worth," unless it is done from a sense of duty. Id. One commentator demurs, "[q]uite the
opposite of Kant's moral principles, altruistic motivation prompts us to care for another not
from duty but from inclination. Rather than a source of obligation, it seems a cause foradmittedly guarded-hope and celebration." BATSON, supra note 195, at 230.
211. "A human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclinationstill less because it is done from self-interest-but because it is done for the sake of duty." H. J.
Paton, Analysis of the Argument, in KANT, supra note 140, at 17, 18-19 (emphasis omitted); see
KANT, supra note 140, at 64-69. "This is Kant's first proposition about duty, though he does not
state it in this general form." Paton, supra, at 21; see, e.g., EWING, supra note 86, at 51; KORSGAARD, supra note 209, at 12-13; KORSGAARD, supra note 144, at 55-64.
212. Recall that selfish genes need not be aware of their selfishness. "[N]either
sociobiology nor evolutionary psychology requires that humans be any more self-consciously
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engage in the rescue disinterestedly simply because she had previously
committed herself to the maxim. Duty for duty's sake.
For example, in accord with sexual selection, a rescuer, motivated to
perform his duty in order to show off to prospective mates, will not earn
Kant's approval.2 14 But the mental state ascribed to this rescuer seems
implausible. We could imagine the rescuer, while considering the rescue or
while swimming out to the drowning rescuee, thinking to himself, "I must
get there as fast as I can," or, "I hope I can pull this off," or even, less
plausibly, "I hope I can succeed at doing my duty here," but hardly, "this
will really impress the gals. 21 5 On the other hand, in cooler circumstances,
desirous of achieving personal genetic success than are red-winged blackbirds."
THE TRIUMPH OF SOCIOBIOLOGY

JOHN ALCOCK,

26 (2001).

To say that an act of altruism arises from our proximate capacity for
intentional morality in no way eliminates the complementary ultimate
explanation that our morally motivated behavior, or the psychological
mechanism that underlies the behavior, tends to advance the genetic
success of individuals, or did so in environments in the past.

Id. at 181.
213. Nozick considers "a Kantian disposition to act from respect for the moral law."
supra note 21, at 273. "Couldn't this itself (not the Kantian theory but its psychological
basis or underpinnings) be a psychological disposition that was selected for because of the firm
reliability it gives one in the eyes of others as a participant in cooperative activities?" Id.
Perversely, Adolph Eichmann partially defended himself with a muddled version of Kantian
morality duing his trial for war crimes for expediting the transportation of Jews to concentration
camps during the Third Reich. He said, in effect, "I was just doing my duty, not only following
orders, but also obeying the law." See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN INJERUSALEM 135-38 (rev.
ed. 1965).
214. Under Kant, "[a]n action-even if it accords with duty and is in that sense right-is
not commonly regarded as morally good if it is done solely out of self-interest." Paton, supra
note 211, at 19. But, "Kant's doctrine would be absurd if it meant that the presence of a natural
inclination to good actions (or even of a feeling of satisfaction in doing them) detracted from
their moral worth. The ambiguity of his language lends some colour to this interpretation, which
is almost universally accepted." Id. Kant's position "is that if an action is to be morally good,
the motive of duty, while it may be present at the same time as other motives, must by itself be
sufficient to determine the action." Id.; see KORSGAARD, supra note 209, at 12-13;
KORSGAARD, supra note 144, at 58-61.
Trivers, on the other hand, makes the disinterested rescuer suspect. "Selection may favor
distrusting those who perform altruistic acts without the emotional bas[e]s ... because the
altruistic tendencies of such individuals may be less reliable in the future." Trivers, supra note
22, at 50-51. "[H]umans respond to altruistic acts according to their perception of the motives
of the altruist." Id.; cf KANT, supra note 140, at 62 ("[T]he very coolness of a scoundrel makes
him, not merely more dangerous, but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than we
should have taken him to be without it."). For the emotional bases of reciprocal altruism, see
supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
215. In emergencies, "[t]he decision to help is instantaneous and impulsive, without much
time to think. When fugitives knock on the door, one determines there and then whether to take
them in." DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra note 63, at 329. "Realistically, the rescuer in such
[emergency] situations will likely have no time to calculate more than what actions are required
NOZICK,
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say, where a person is contemplating whether to offer food to a neighbor
who lost her crops, self-interested thoughts do seem more plausible, though
these types of calmer situations generally fall outside the rescue doctrine.
Yet plausible or not, if self-interested motives drive the decision to help, to
perform one's duty, Kant would give it no moral worth.216
The proper performance of a duty, then, depends on the agent's mental
state. While the agent may be able to perceive whether she is performing
her duty disinterestedly-though even here, despite her privileged position,
cognitive distortions may be at work-the determination of the agent's
mental state is quite problematic for onlookers. This weak ability to judge
another's mental state hearkens back to the prior observation that it seems
more praiseworthy to rescue a stranger than to rescue one's close relative.
While we may admire a risky rescue of one's mother, we admire even more
a similarly risky rescue of a complete stranger.217 Now in principle there is
no reason why the rescue of one's mother cannot be performed entirely out
of a disinterested sense of duty, but we tend to doubt that such a rescue was
in fact so driven. Indeed, when the reporters stick their microphones in the
face of the rescuer to ask what motivated her to undertake such a risky
venture, we would be appalled if she said, "I was just doing my duty." We
expect her to reply, "She's my mother!"2" 8 That says it all. Why even bother
to effect the rescue." Ross A. Albert, Comment, RestitutionaryRecovery for Rescuers of Human
Life, 74 CAL. L. REv. 85, 103 (1986) (determining that a rescuer is not thinking of
compensation). For additional examples, see supra text accompanying note 115.
216. Others disagree. Under Kant, the complete egoist "acts wrongly, not only when he
steals, breaks promises, and harms other people, but also when, for self-interested reasons, he
acts honestly, keeps his promises, and helps other people. These are unacceptable conclusions."
Derek Parfit, What We Could Rationally Will, in 24 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
285, 326 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2004). Furthermore, if you rescue me purely from a sense of
duty, "then I may be glad of being rescued, but I shall hardly regard your motives as purer or
nobler or more virtuous than the motives of one who rushes to my rescue from immediate
affection and heartfelt concern for my welfare, with no dutiful deliberations entering into it."
BRUCE

N. WALLER,

THE NATURAL SELECTION OF AUTONOMY

105 (1998).

217. De Waal, asserting that kin selection drives altruism, as suggested by the expression,
"Blood is thicker than water," then observes: "No wonder awards for heroism are rarely
bestowed on those who have saved members of their own family." DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER,
supra note 63, at 317-18. Consistent with de Waal's point, "[t]he Carnegie Hero Fund
Commission awards medals to individuals who performed some heroic and altruistic act."
Clarry Lay et al., The Responsive Bystander in Emergencies: Some PreliminaryData, 15 CAN.
PSYCHOL. 220, 221 (1974). Among the criteria for the awards is that "the rescuer was not
related to the rescued person." Id.
218. "A difficulty that strikes most readers of Kant is that men seem often to perform the
most noble and self-sacrificing actions under the influence of love rather than out of a conscious
sense of duty, and it seems unfair to deny all intrinsic value to such actions." EWING, supra note
86, at 51. Indeed, one philosopher "endorse[s] the view that on occasions a person whose
motivations derive from explicit moral calculation rather than direct sympathy is manifesting a
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to ask? Rescuing a stranger, on the other hand, is more likely to elicit the
response, which Kantians would approve, "I was just doing my duty," or
"What else could I do?" This was the reply most commonly heard from
those who rescued Jewish strangers from the Nazis. 19 This answer seems
nobler than the response, aligning with reciprocal altruism, "Well, who
knows, maybe someday I will need to be rescued myself," or the response,
aligning with sexual selection, "Ijust wanted all the ladies to know what a
daring guy I am." Certainly the rescuers of Jews were not driven by selfinterest. Quite to the contrary, because they often faced the disapprobation
of their anti-Semitic family or neighbors, and potential penalties for
violating German laws, including death for their entire families,22 they were
extraordinarily heroic despite garnering unexpected public approval after
the passing of the Third Reich."2 Perhaps, short of knowingly sacrificing
one's life for a stranger, the most heroic rescue we can imagine is one done
for a stranger with the knowledge that it would make the rescuer an outcast
from her family and community. But we cannot push this line of thought
too far. If, say, the stranger is already terminally ill, or, to speak indelicately, is one who has been a substantial drain on society, such as a known
hardened criminal, the rescuer's heroic effort may strike us as simply
foolish, even when the rescuer says quite justifiably, "I was just doing my
duty." Yet now, based on this consequentialist, cost-benefit analysis, our
intuitive reaction seems to have become infected with explicit utilitarian
reasoning when we were holding ourselves out, in this section, as Kantians.
Or perhaps our intuitive reaction stems from evolutionary thinking, since
the rescuer who risks much to save, say, a social pariah stranger, is doing
nothing to promote kin selection, perhaps nothing to reinforce reciprocal
altruism, and even nothing to increase his attractiveness under sexual
kind of moral vice." JOYCE, supra note 26, at 50. While commentators disagree as to whether
Kant actually goes this far, Ewing reads him as finding moral value in the action "if it was
motivated both by some desire and by respect for the moral law in such a way that either motive
by itself would have been sufficient to bring about the act." EWING, supra note 86, at 51; see
supra note 211.
219. See FIELD, supra note 164, at 78-79 (noting that the rescuers of Jews "did, in their
view only what others would have done in their place ....This is a common sentiment
expressed by those honored for heroism"); MONROE, supra note 13, at 11 (describing that when
pressed, the rescuers often said, "Everybody does it," "That's what you're supposed to do," or,
"But what else could I do?"). That moral and religious education may have had little or no
impact on the rescuers of Jews, see POSNER, supra note 67, at 69-72.
220. See MONROE, supra note 13, at 18, 140, 153, 165. Because families were put at risk,
Monroe challenges the kin selection theory of altruism. See id. at 165.
221. But even after the war, some rescuers refused to identify themselves for fear of being
labeled a "Jew lover" or exposing themselves to the threats of neo-Nazi groups. See OLINER &
OLINER, supra note 188, at 1-2.
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selection, for women are likely to say, "Who would want this crazy guy
'
who risks so much for so little?"222
Perhaps I have pushed Kant's demand for the disinterested performance
of duties too far. The problem with some of the hypotheticals considered
above may be that I lose sight of the rescue maxim that I had previously
emphasized: "One is to attempt reasonable rescues of those in peril." The
word "reasonable" implies a cost-benefit analysis of sorts, smacking of
utilitarian consequentialism. It seems unlikely that even a die-hard Kantian
would omit the word "reasonable., 223 Even such a Kantian would see as
foolish an extremely risky, unpromising rescue attempt. A maxim demanding this would not be one a rational person would adopt. Furthermore, the
substantial likelihood of "throwing away one's life" does not give due
consideration to one's own life which, like all other human lives, is owed
respect as an end in itself, as seen in Kant's rejection of suicide.224 In his
own (translated) words, "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end. '225 The Kantian does not
calculate the "worth" of the rescuee, or, for that matter, the rescuer,
because, as ethical beings, they are entitled to respect equal to that of
anyone else. 226 Nevertheless, the Kantian would consider the likelihood of
effectuating a successful rescue and the degree of risk to the rescuer.
Disinterest need not be entirely cold.
III. CONCLUSION
Rescues are encouraged by the law, honored by society, but seemingly
difficult to explain in evolutionary terms. There is no question that the
rescue doctrine is well established in the law. Injured rescuers of those
placed in peril through tortious behavior have an independent, direct cause
222. Perhaps people often question the sanity of those who coolly perform extremely
altruistic acts without apparent payoffs to the actor. For example, as reported by one person who
volunteered to donate one of his kidneys to a complete stranger, "[t]he first thing they do is send
you to see a psychiatrist." Stephanie Strom, Giving of Yourself, Literally, To People You've
Never Met, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3. "I thought that was
hilarious, but it made sense. I mean, what kind of nut puts up his hand and says 'I want to give
away body parts?' Id.
223. See supra note 158.
224. See KANT, supra note 140, at 96-97; KANT, supra note 148, at 148-54. Kant also
rejects suicide as a reflection of a maxim based on self-love that violates the universalization
principle. See KANT, supra note 140, at 89. "Self-respect, [Kant] argued, requires that we avoid
servility and other forms of self-degradation." Hill, Jr., supra note 197, at 9.
225. KANT, supra note 140, at 96 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
226. If the object in peril is an animal or property, then the Kantian would consider worth.

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

of action against the tortfeasors, or even against the rescuees who
endangered themselves through negligent behavior. Beyond the courtroom,
society often treats rescuers as altruistic heroes. That rescuers are altruists,
however, is a position that would appear to run afoul of the notion of the
"selfish" gene that largely grounds evolutionary thinking. Under
this
precept, fitness is measured by reproductive success, that is, by the extent to
which one leaves one's genes in the gene pool. Altruism, on the other hand,
turns on the willingness to sacrifice personal interests for those of another
person. It would seem that such genetically disposed behavior would be
driven out of the gene pool. Nevertheless, evolutionary psychologists have
developed various theories to explain this apparently unselfish behavior. I
have considered the three main theories: kin selection, reciprocal altruism,
and sexual selection.
The three evolutionary theories of altruism imply that rescues will be
skewed along differing predictable lines. Under kin selection, rescuers of
relatives serve their own genetic self-interest since they share genes in
common with their rescuees, the more so as they are more closely related.
All else equal, then, saving one's child is more evolutionarily beneficial
than saving a first cousin. But under evolutionary considerations, the rescue
of an offspring without reproductive prospects is less beneficial than the
rescue of a cousin with high prospects. Indeed, insofar as kin selection
drives decisions about whom to rescue, how much effort to expend, and the
degree of risk to confront, finely nuanced behavior may lead to choices that
seem peculiar, as in the preference above for the cousin over the progeny.
Under reciprocal altruism, a risky rescue may be genetically beneficial once
one takes into account the likelihood that the rescuee will later return the
favor, not necessarily in kind, or once the rescue induces others to do so.
Again, as under kin selection, this may lead to particular choices that seem
arbitrary or unsettling, as where the rescue of a wealthy person is preferred
to that of a poor one. Finally, under sexual selection, the prospective genetic
payoff of a rescue is measured by the likelihood that it will increase the
rescuer's success in obtaining a better mate or matings. Here the interests of
females and males differ. Because females, as mammals and through
historical contingency, have been more burdened with childbearing and
nurturance than have males, their mating opportunities are more limited. In
principle, men can mate indiscriminately without any significant burden on
themselves, while women must invest much in each child. As a
consequence, when it comes to matings, men are genetically disposed to
seek quantity while women seek quality. On the other hand, when it comes
to mates, to put it simply, it is genetically beneficial for women to seek men
who will be better protectors and providers, while men seek women who
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will be more fecund and maternal. In the context of the rescue doctrine,
women would be impressed by men who display such qualities as strength,
daring and kindness, while men would be impressed by women who reveal
the qualities associated with fertility and motherliness, which usually seem
less evident in these circumstances. Because of these differences, it is
expected that men are more likely to undertake risky rescues than are
women, and the attempted rescues are more likely to be ones that display
the desired traits. Thus, the rescuer would be less concerned about the
identity and character of the rescuee than under kin selection or reciprocal
altruism, so long as the rescue provides a means to "show off' to the
opposite sex or to gain additional resources.
The predictions from evolutionary psychology about the features of
likely rescues are somewhat curious and morally disquieting. To pursue this
further, I examined fundamental moral theory to see the extent to which the
predicted behavior may be aligned with moral tenets. The two grand
schools were considered: teleology as represented by utilitarianism and
deontology in its Kantian version.
In discussing utilitarianism, I delved into three abiding questions: the
nature of the Good that is to be sought by moral choices, whether the moral
calculus is to encompass the effects on the chooser alone (egoism) or all
persons (universalism), and, relatedly, the boundaries of the utilitarian
concern. First, the most prominent versions of the Good of utilitarianism are
hedonism, which values "happiness" or some other emotional satisfaction,
idealism, which values mental states said to be of intrinsic worth, and
preference satisfaction, which values the individual choice of personal
moral goals. None of these versions aligns strongly with the evolutionary
touchstone of reproductive success, for reproduction itself may not be
pleasurable overall or promote any of the other standard notions of the
Good. Second, I found that evolutionary reasoning fits somewhat with both
egoism and universalism, but this conclusion depends, as always for
consequentialism, on the particular circumstances and conjectures about the
satisfactions ensuing from the rescue of the various parties and onlookers.
Third, by carefully drawing the boundaries of the utilitarian calculus and
differentially weighting the classes of persons within moral concern,
utilitarianism can be roughly fitted with either kin selection or reciprocal
altruism, but usually not both at the same time. Sexual selection, on the
other hand, implies that women and men have different reproductive
interests, and few of women's interests would be advanced by risky rescues,
thus suggesting a narrower boundary of concern for them, while men's
interests would usually be furthered by daring rescues of nearly any human
being, thus suggesting an expansive boundary.
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In incorporating Kantianism, I examined the requirements of three forms
of the categorical imperative: to universalize moral maxims, to respect all
persons equally, and to perform duties disinterestedly. First, the
universalization of a moral maxim is distinguishable from its generalization,
and hence, as in the utilitarian boundary question, one may reduce the
generality of moral maxims to coincide with kin selection and reciprocal
altruism without necessarily abridging the universalization demanded by the
formality of the categorical imperative. Once again, however, supposed
moral maxims supporting sexual selection, which differentiates the interests
of women and men in obtaining mates or matings, would not ring true to the
everyday moralist. Second, the equal respect due to every person does not
imply that each one has the same claim to be rescued. When the rescue
doctrine is put though the filter of a Kantian social contract, distinctions
among persons may well emerge that tend to align with kin selection and
reciprocal altruism. Sexual selection, on the other hand, implies a rescue
doctrine that encompasses a wider range of potential rescuees, but only
indirectly, since in these cases the rescuer is more concerned with
displaying personal qualities than preserving particular persons or engaging
the rescuee or her affiliates in future interactions. Third, performing duties
disinterestedly does not mean that the underlying moral maxims must be
adopted dispassionately. It only means that a disinterested motive for
performing the chosen maxim must be sufficient itself to spark the required
conduct. While we may often doubt that a particular rescue is performed
with sufficient disinterest, as when the rescuee is closely related, in
principle every such rescue could satisfy this form of Kant's categorical
imperative.
Overall, at least some rescues, or refusals to rescue, consistent with the
evolutionary forces of kin selection, reciprocal altruism and sexual selection
may run afoul of utilitarian or Kantian guidelines. However, despite their
genesis in selfish genes, many of these choices can be justified on basic,
though perhaps unrefined, moral terms, especially when they invoke
agreeable positions on some of the controversial, fundamental questions
that still dog moral thought.

